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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This dissertation consists of five empirical chapters spanning the areas of natural resource 
economics and labor economics. After a general introduction in chapter one, the next four 
chapters deal with how households respond to exogenous changes to economic opportunities 
such as shocks to employment or to life expectancy at birth. The fifth chapter investigates the 
linkage between agricultural management and ecosystem services. The dissertation makes 
extensive use of household survey data, both from the US and from a large number of cross-
country surveys. The first two chapters show that unemployment during recessions may lower 
households’ recreation expenditure but increase households’ participation in local outdoor 
recreation activities. The findings from the third and fourth chapters suggest that rising life 
expectancy at birth increases years in school as well as lifetime earnings, which reinforces the 
role of health in economic development. The final chapter provides an estimate of the 
environmental benefits associated with the set of agricultural conservation practices identified in 
Iowa nutrient reduction Strategy 2013. The economic value from local recreation and aesthetics, 
drinking water purification, reduced soil erosion, and reduced greenhouse gas emissions are 
sizable and under some assumptions are of same order of magnitude as the estimated costs.  
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CHAPTER 1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
 
This dissertation consists of five essays. In the second chapter, we investigate how the recession 
of 2008-2009 affected Iowans’ outdoor recreation behavior. The U.S. economy was hit hard by a 
recession during 2008-2009. During periods of high unemployment, many households suffered 
income losses which resulted in lower spending on normal goods. However, with changes in 
employment status, members of some households also experienced a lower opportunity cost of 
time, and may therefore undertake more household activities that are time intensive. The 
opposing effects of lower income and cheaper time associated with unemployment motivate the 
research question of how effects from the recession alter household recreation behavior. To study 
effects of this type requires detailed household- level data both before and after a recessionary 
event. In this study, we utilize a panel data set that is uniquely suited to studying the effects of 
recession on micro decision making in the context of household recreational choices. 
Specifically, utilizing a panel comprised of both pre-recession and post-recession data on 
household employment status, usage of recreational sites, and a suite of socioeconomic variables, 
this paper investigates how changes in employment status during the recession alters lake-based 
recreation demand. The findings suggest that outdoor recreation in Iowa, in general, is recession-
proof. 
In the third chapter, we investigate the relationship between household recreation 
expenditure and job loss during a national cyclical downturn.. We utilize the Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics (PSID), a longitudinal data set with information on household yearly trip and 
vacation expenditure, that constitutes better socioeconomic and occupation data to model 
changes in employment status during a recession. We use a household-level fixed effect model 
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and a difference-in-differences estimator to control for possible selection into unemployment or 
retirement. Our results suggest that both local economic conditions and individual 
unemployment during a recession affect recreation expenditure. 
The fourth chapter draws empirical evidence from cross-country household surveys on 
the relationship between life expectancy at birth, human capital accumulation, and lifetime labor 
market earnings. Life expectancy at birth has improved dramatically over time and across 
countries during the last century. In the standard Ben-Porath framework, greater life expectancy 
should increase human capital investment both by extending the period in which an individual 
devotes full time to training in school and by increasing the fraction of time devoted to training 
after starting to work. Both types of training should increase lifetime earnings, as would 
extending the number of productive work years. Motivated by Heckman’s (1976) lifecycle 
analysis, we investigate the causal relationship between life expectancy at birth and years of 
schooling by exploiting cross-birth-cohort and cross-country variation from a pool of 194 
household surveys from 115 countries. We treat the country-cohort life expectancy at birth as the 
health endowment that parents use to plan out the investments in their children’s' education. A 
gain of 10 years in life expectancy at birth leads individuals to increase their completed 
schooling by 1.1 years and raises lifetime earnings by 1 percent. To put this in perspective, life 
expectancy at birth in the U.S. rose 28 years from 1880 to 1980, but birth cohorts and years of 
schooling rose by about 6.5 years. Our estimates suggest that rising life expectancy in the U.S. 
explains fifty percent of this increase in schooling. 
The fifth chapter tests the robustness of the link between life expectancy at birth and time 
spent in school across 919 cross-country household surveys. In 95 percent of the surveys, the 
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effect of life expectancy at birth on years of schooling turns out to be positive and statistically 
significant. 
The sixth chapter focuses an economic valuation of ecosystem benefits from nutrient 
reduction strategies. With the aim of improving water quality, the Iowa Nutrient Reduction 
Strategy 2013 set a goal of reducing agricultural non-point-source generated nitrogen load by 41 
percent and phosphorus load by 29 percent in Iowa’s waterways. Various combinations of 
nutrient reduction technologies are proposed including widespread adoption of conservation 
practices in farming, land retirement, and wetland restoration can meet the specified target 
reduction. This study identifies the dollar value of ecosystem benefits resulting from the 
conservation practices adopted under each of the scenarios. The ecosystem services generated 
from the nutrient reduction practices include carbon sequestration, increased opportunity for 
recreation, reduced cost for drinking water purification, aesthetic value of cleaner lakes and 
streams, reduced soil erosion, enhanced habitat for wildlife, and increased biodiversity. A 
conservative monetization of these benefits suggests that the benefits of the nutrient reduction 
practices can exceed the implementation costs.  
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CHAPTER 2. IS OUTDOOR RECREATION RECESSION PROOF? AN 
EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF THE 2009 RECESSION 
 
1. Introduction 
The US economy was hit hard by a long recession during 2008–2009, which is considered the 
longest and most severe economic crisis since the end of the Great Depression. The recession 
affected individual economic well-being through unemployment, stock market crashes, and 
falling real estate prices, all of which generated low consumer confidence. While much is known 
about the effect of recessions on macro-level variables, much less is known about how the effects 
of recession alter household-level consumption behavior. Specifically, during periods of high 
unemployment, many households will experience lower income, which results in lower spending 
on normal goods. However, with changes in employment status, members of some households 
will also experience a lower opportunity cost of time, and may therefore undertake more 
household activities that are time intensive. To study effects of this type requires detailed 
household-level data both before and after a recessionary event.   
In this paper, we utilize a panel data set that is uniquely suited to studying the effects of 
recession on micro decision making in the context of household recreational choices. Specifically, 
utilizing a panel from the “Iowa Lakes Project” comprised of both pre-recession and post-recession 
data on household income, usage of recreational sites, and a suite of socioeconomic variables, this 
paper investigates how employment status changes during the recession affects lake-based 
recreation demand. 
Quasi-experimental studies for impact evaluation have become popular in the economics 
literature. However, causality analysis relating a recessionary shock to recreation behavior has 
not been undertaken. Using the 2009 great recession as a natural and exogenous event, we fill 
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this gap. To our knowledge this is the first study investigating the effects of a recession on micro 
decision making in the context of household recreational choices. 
Recession can affect an individual’s recreation demand through several opposing paths. Even 
if employment status remains unchanged during a recession, an individual may demand less 
recreation due to uncertainty and therefore increase precautionary savings. Both income and the 
opportunity cost of time can be affected for an individual experiencing an employment change. 
When recession hits the economy, an individual previously employed full time may get fewer paid 
work hours or be forced into retirement, resulting in a fall in income. However, this change offers 
more time for leisure and recreation. A change in employment status during recession, therefore, 
may influence one’s outdoor recreation demand through two opposing effects: a substitution effect 
from cheaper time and an income effect from a fall in income. Further, employment change might 
lead an individual to revise plans for exotic vacations and trips, which, in turn, might increase 
demand for cheap local recreation activities.  
The Outdoor Foundation’s aggregate statistics reveal that, compared to 2008, total 
participation in outdoor recreation across the United States increased slightly in the recession 
year 2009. However, nearly 42% of respondents reported that the recession affected their 
outdoor recreation participation to some extent. At the state level, Iowans’ lake visitation rates 
increased in 2009 relative to 2005 (Iowa Lake Survey Report 2011). Almost 60% of Iowans 
participated in some form of lake-based recreation activities in 2009, taking around fifteen 
single-day lake trips on average. In contrast, the consumer-expenditure survey statistics show 
that expenditures on pleasure and non-business traveling declined during the recession year of 
2008–2009 (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2012).  
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The literature investigating the relationship between recession and recreation demand is 
limited. Utilizing two intercept surveys conducted in 2006 and 2009 on Quandary Peak, a very 
popular hiking place in southeast Denver, Loomis and Keske (2012) find no significant impact of 
recession on total number of visits, travel expenditure, and willingness to pay for visits. 
However, the respondent groups studied before and after the recession are different. Thus, it is 
not clear whether the survey respondents experienced any employment or wealth shock during 
the recessionary period.  
The Iowa Lakes Project survey data contains individual recreation demand behavior 
(participation and number of trips) and employment status both before and during the recession. 
In this random population survey, a rich set of information on Iowans’ lake visitation patterns at 
132 lakes was collected, as were demographics including employment status. The survey has been 
administered five times in total, including once each in 2005 and 2009. The 2005 and 2009 surveys 
together provide a panel of 2,773 individuals who are observed both before and during the 
recession. We exploit this panel to investigate how the individuals who move from full-time 
employment status in 2005 to part-time employment, unemployment, or retirement status in 2009, 
change their outdoor lake recreation usage, both at the extensive and intensive margins.  
In our setting, the treatment group individuals are those who experience an employment shock 
during the recession year 2009. Assignment to this treatment group is non-random due to both 
observable and unobservable factors, also known as a selection problem. We use the propensity 
score matching (PSM) method (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983) to address the selection problem. 
Since we have an individual-level panel, we can control for time-invariant unobservable factors 
utilizing the methodology of Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997) and Smith and Todd (2005). 
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Following the non-experimental treatment effect literature, we adopt both semi-parametric cross-
sectional and difference-in-difference matching strategies to conduct empirical analysis. 
In our empirical design, we define the treatment and control groups based on employment 
status. Individuals who were employed full time both before and during the recession constitute 
the controls. Individuals who were employed full time before the recession year but had been 
unemployed, employed part time, or retired during the recession year form the first treatment 
group. Since the retired individuals might have different recreation preferences compared to those 
of the unemployed and part-time employed group, we also consider a treatment group that excludes 
retired people. In the first stage of the PSM analysis, we estimate an individual’s propensity to 
experience an employment shock based on pre-recession information on individual demographics 
and recreation usage. Using the estimated propensity scores, we conduct the treatment effect 
analysis using both levels, where we compare recreation behavior of treated and matched controls 
in 2009, as well as differences (i.e., a difference-in-difference approach) to control for time-
invariant unobservable factors. We apply five different matching methods to check consistency of 
the results. As a robustness check, we conduct a placebo exercise, include a subset of covariates 
to estimate the propensity score, and conduct exact matching based on location.  
The main results from this analysis reveal that employment change during a recession does 
not affect outdoor recreation. Households who became unemployed either did not change or 
increase participation in outdoor lake recreation during the recession. On the intensive margin, 
they visited lakes as frequently as before the recession. However, people going into retirement 
during the 2009 recession did not exhibit any systematic differences in recreation behavior 
compared to what they would have done were they employed full time.  Our placebo exercise 
confirms that our findings are not driven by a pre-existing differentiated trend for the treatment 
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and control group.  Incorporating county-level unemployment rate as a proxy for aggregate 
economic condition, we extend the analysis in an individual fixed-effect framework. The results 
suggest that households residing in counties with high unemployment during a recession 
participated more in outdoor lake recreation.  
The insensitivity of recreation demand to recession implies that there are stable economic 
benefits from nature-based economic activities. This finding is of direct policy relevance for 
decisions by public officials concerning nature-based public amenities. Improving water quality 
and public facilities appears to provide social benefits that are resilient to recessions - the 
stability of returns to this form of public good provision may raise its value relative to other local 
public goods. 
2. Background and Theoretical Motivation 
 Two important components that determine recreation behavior are income and the 
opportunity cost of time [Bockstael and Hanemann 1987; Cesario 1976; Englin and Shonkwiler 
1995; Feather and Shaw 1999; Larson and Shaikh 2004; McConnell 1992]. Like any other 
economic good, income determines an individual’s purchasing power of recreation services. If 
recreation is a normal good, the impact of a rise in income is positive, and vice versa if it is an 
inferior good. Time spent for recreation services has two components: travel time and time spent 
on site. Phaneuf and Requate (2013) provides a useful recreation demand model to motivate an 
individual’s optimization between consumption of non-recreation necessities, and recreation 
goods and services. The individual is naturally endowed with T units of time, out of which she 
works for H hours in the market for an hourly wage of 𝑤, and allocates the remaining time, 𝑇 −
𝐻, between recreation(R) and leisure(l) so that her utility from consumption of  R, l, and the 
numeraire good(z) is maximized. For simplicity, we are assuming that the hours of work, H, is 
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determined outside the model independent of choices for R, l, and, z.  Formally, the individual 
wants to maximize the utility function U(z, R, l; q), where q represents taste parameters, subject 
to two separate constraints 
i) Money income constraint: 𝑤𝐻 = 𝑐𝑅 + 𝑧, where c is the $ cost of a trip, and 
ii) Time resource constraint: = 𝐻 + 𝑙 + 𝑡 ∗ 𝑅 , where time remaining after work hours, 
𝑇 − 𝐻, is used for leisure and recreation, and t is the time cost for consumption of 
each unit of R. 
The individual solves the following 2-constraint, utility maximization problem 
max
𝑧,𝑅,𝐿,µ,𝜆
𝑈(𝑧, 𝑅, 𝑙; 𝑞) + 𝜆(𝑤𝐻 − 𝑐𝑅 − 𝑧) + µ(𝑇 − 𝐻 − 𝑙 − 𝑡𝑅).   
Manipulation of the first order conditions results in   
𝑈𝑅
𝑈𝑍
= 𝑐 +
µ
𝜆
𝑡 = 𝑐 + 𝜙𝑡. At the 
optimum, the marginal monetary benefit from one unit of recreation trip (
𝑈𝑅
𝑈𝑍
=
𝛿𝑧
𝛿𝑅
) must equate 
with the marginal cost (𝑐 + 𝜙𝑡)of the trip. The recreation price consists of an explicit part, c, and 
an implicit part 𝜙𝑡. Solving the first order conditions with specific functional form for utility 
would give us demand equation for each of  𝑧∗(𝑐, 𝑡, 𝑤, 𝐻, 𝑇, 𝑞), 𝑅∗(𝑐, 𝑡, 𝑤, 𝐻, 𝑇, 𝑞), 
𝑙∗(𝑐, 𝑡, 𝑤, 𝐻, 𝑇, 𝑞) and, 𝜙∗(𝑐, 𝑡, 𝑤, 𝐻, 𝑇, 𝑞). 
The model succinctly identifies the possible pathways through which recession might 
influence recreation demand behavior. If the recession affects the recreationist directly through a 
reduction in working hours, or job loss, the individual experiences a fall in money income but 
have more available time for leisure and recreation. Thus, the opportunity cost of time to be 
spent for recreation (𝜙) decreases. However, an opposing effect takes place through the decrease 
in working hours and resulting fall in income. These two opposing effects are comparable to 
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substitution and income effect resulting from a price change. Whether the time effect dominates 
the income effect will determine the overall effect of recession on recreation demand behavior.  
Unemployment or, fall in working hours during recession and resulting income loss 
might lead an individual to demand more cheap local recreation activities. In modeling recreation 
demand, the choice set often includes an element “stay-at-home” option [e.g., Egan, Herriges and 
Kling 2009]. This “stay-at-home” option captures everything outside the model including options 
for other recreation activities such as exotic vacations or an international trip. If a recreationist 
has plan for such a trip but experiences a fall in income due to a recession, s/he is less likely to 
make those expensive tours. In such cases, the “stay-at-home” option becomes less appealing, 
and might induce an increase in demand for local recreation activities. In the model specified 
above, this is equivalent to saying that corner solution, i.e., 
𝑈𝑅
𝑈𝑍
< 𝑐 + 𝜙𝑡, is less likely to occur. 
Similar to the static model above, in a dynamic setting (Hoque, Kling, and Herriges 
2013) we showed that it is difficult to predict the change in recreation behavior in response to a 
recession. During a recession, everyone is subject to uncertainty, and one may experience 
unemployment and fall in income. In the latter case, individuals try to smooth consumption of 
leisure and recreation across periods by reallocating time-resource within periods and monetary 
resources across and within periods. While in the former case, precautionary motive sets in 
which, depending on risk attitude, may alter one’s demand for recreation in any direction. The 
combined effect of uncertainty and unemployment may go in any direction, and depends on the 
relative strength of precautionary motive against the consumption smoothing effects. Individual 
exposure to recession will vary by type and intensity, and, in accordance, responses to such 
shocks will vary as well. The implication is that the net effect is ambiguous. 
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Literature search suggests that Loomis and Keske (2012) is the only study that 
investigates the impact of an exogenous shock, such as a recession, on recreation behavior, either 
empirically or theoretically. Their study relies on two intercept surveys conducted in 2006 and 
2009 on a single location-Quandary Peak, a popular hiking spot in Southeast Denver, Colorado. 
They found no significant changes in average number of visits, visitation expenditure, and 
willingness to pay across periods. Since they did not observe any significant difference in hikers’ 
income between the two periods, it is not clear whether the survey respondents in their study 
experienced any employment shock during the recession. If not, the individuals did not face the 
tradeoff between time resources and income in choosing recreation demand.  A longitudinal 
recreation data incorporating pre-recession and post-recession period will help to figure out 
correctly whether an individual was affected by recession, and how the affected individual alters 
recreation behavior during a recession. 
In contrast to the recreation demand literature, studies in other applied microeconomic 
fields explored changes in economic behavior during a recession. For example, health economics 
literature demonstrates a negative association between business cycle and mortality [Ruhm 2000; 
2005].  Other examples include studies on the relationship between recession and child health 
care [Dehejia and Lleras-Muney 2004; Baird, Friedman, and Schady 2011], recession and food-
at-home [Dave and Kelly 2010]. Many of these studies focus on economic goods that have both 
monetary prices and time costs, and thus resemble recreation demand to some extent.1 
                                                 
1 Time intensive activities (for example, child care) exhibits interesting implication in the context of recession. A 
depressed wage during recession reduces the time cost in taking various caregiving activities such as more 
preventive health visits, breastfeeding, cooking healthy meals, or improving general cleanliness. However, during 
such contraction income also falls, which might affect parents’ ability to purchase nutritious food or health 
augmenting inputs. It seems that two opposing effects work simultaneously: substitution effect from cheaper time, 
and income effect from fall in income.  
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3. Econometric Framework 
Given the multiple influences of recession on recreation usage in theory, the overall effect is 
purely an empirical question. We study the impact of employment change during recession on 
lake recreation in a non-experimental setting. In our case, the treatment group includes those who 
experience a change in employment status facing a recession, and assignment to this treatment 
group is non-random. This non-random treatment assignment is also known as a selection 
problem, which can be due to both observables and unobservable factors. The selection problem 
can hide the true causal effect of a change in employment status during a recession on recreation 
behavior, and there might be confounding factors that affect both selection into the treatment 
(experience of a change in employment status) and the outcome variable (trip taking to lake). 
Propensity Score Matching (PSM) method, due to Rosenbaum Rubin (1983), is one approach to 
overcome the selection problem. PSM is widely used in the program evaluation literature 
[Dehejia and Wahba 2002; Ravallion 2005; Ravallion and Jalan 2003; List et al. 2003; Ferret and 
Subervie 2013]. Under certain assumptions, the method solves the problem of missing 
counterfactual in non-experimental setting. 2 
3.1 Empirical design and strategy 
 
In this study, we investigate empirically how the individual’s trip-taking behavior to lake 
changes in response to a change in employment status during a recession. The relevant periods 
for the analysis are 2005, the pre-recession year, and 2009, the recession year. As identified in 
the theoretical model, there are several ways an individual may respond to a recessionary shock. 
                                                 
2 In the first step of a two-step procedure, the method estimates a propensity score (one’s probability of being 
included in the treatment group) for each individual in the treatment and control groups based on observed 
covariates, and based on that in the second step it matches the treatment observations with the appropriate control to 
estimate the impact of treatment. 
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An individual who used to visit lakes before recession may choose “stay at home” option during 
the recession depending on how the combination of income effect, substitution effects, and 
consumption smoothing effect resulting from unemployment, and attitude towards risk and 
uncertainty works. In contrast, depending on the relative strength of these effects, an individual 
may switch from “stay at home” option and start visiting lakes during recession.3 There are 
confounding factors that may affect both of an individual’s chance of experiencing a change in 
employment status, as well as lake recreation behavior during a recession. For example, facing a 
depressed wage during the recession, an avid trip-taker might choose voluntary unemployment. 
To control for such confounding factors, a semi-parametric approach, such as PSM method, 
seems appealing.  
Treatment group: The treatment group consists of the set of individuals whose employment 
status has changed during the recession. In a recession, a previously fulltime employed 
individual might become unemployed, part-time employed, or retired.4 The control group in all 
cases consists of the recreationists who are full-time employed in both of 2005 and 2009. The 
three treatment and control groups we study are: 
𝑇1𝑖  = {
1  𝑖𝑓 "i" is fulltime employed in 2005 but Unemployed/Part time/Retired  in 2009
0                                      𝑖𝑓 "i" is fulltime employed in year 2005 and 2009 .              
       
(1) 
𝑇2𝑖  = {
1 𝑖𝑓 "i" is fulltime employed in 2005 but Unemployed/Part time employed in 2009
0                                      𝑖𝑓 "i" is fulltime employed in year 2005 and 2009 .              
     
(2) 
𝑇3𝑖  = {
1 𝑖𝑓 "i" is fulltime employed in 2005 but Retired in 2009
0                                      𝑖𝑓 "i" is fulltime employed in year 2005 and 2009 .              
              
(3) 
                                                 
3 By similar reasoning, a recreationist who do not alter lake recreation at the extensive margin may respond at the 
intensive margin by increasing or decreasing number of trips. 
4 Recognizing the possible differences between unemployed and retirees, we form three treatment groups including 
and excluding the retirees. 
14 
 
 
 
Outcome variable: Let the treatment group indicator is 𝑇 = {0,1}, and year indicator is t =
{𝑌09, 𝑌05}. The first outcome variable of interest is a binary variable, 𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑇,𝑡,  indicating 
whether an individual in group 𝑇 takes any trip in year 𝑡. The second outcome variable is 
𝑁𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑇,𝑡 which denotes the total number of trips for group 𝑇 in year 𝑡.
5  
Propensity of experiencing a change in employment status during the recession: We first 
estimate one’s probability of being unemployed or retired during the 2009 recession. There is no 
clear set of standards on what variables to include in the propensity score equation. However, 
program evaluation literature [(Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd 1997; Smith and Todd 2005; and 
Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008] suggests to incorporate all important and necessary variables that 
may influence both outcome and treatment variables to reduce bias. Accordingly, economic 
theory, previous research, and institutional setting can help to characterize the covariates. In our 
setting, previous research is limited to guide us specify the propensity score equation.  
Utilizing the treatment status, as defined in equation (1)-(3), and the covariate 𝑿, we estimate the 
probability of one’s being unemployed or retired using separate logistic regression models for 
each treatment group l:  
Pr(𝑇𝑙 = 1|𝑿) = 𝑃(𝑿) =
exp (𝑿′𝜷)
1+exp (𝑿′𝜷)
.                                                    (4) 
  
Identification assumption: once we control for propensity score, 𝑃(𝑿), the treatment and the 
control groups satisfy the ignorability condition, as stated in equation (5) and (6) below.  
𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑝1,𝑌09 , 𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑝0,𝑌09 ┴ 𝑇|𝑃(𝑿).                                                       (5) 
𝑁𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑝1,𝑌09 , 𝑁𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑝0,𝑌09 ┴ 𝑇|𝑃(𝑿).                    (6) 
                                                 
5 𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑝1,𝑌09 indicates whether an individual experiencing a change in employment status in 2009 take any trip at all 
in the year 2009 while 𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑝0,𝑌09 is the similar indicator for individuals who do not experience any such changes in 
employment. Similarly,  𝑁𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑝1,𝑌09 denotes total number of trips for treatment group while 𝑁𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑝0,𝑌09  denotes 
total number of trips for the control group in the recession year 2009. 
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The above states that conditional on the propensity score, exposure to unemployment or 
retirement during the recession is independent of contemporaneous recreation outcome. One 
implication of the ignorability condition is the mean equivalence condition  which states that 
once the propensity score is controlled for, the treatment and the control group have similar 
distribution for the covariate vector 𝑋: 𝑇┴ 𝑋|𝑃(𝑋). In other words, 
 𝐸[𝑋|𝑃(𝑋), 𝑇 = 1] = 𝐸[𝑋  |𝑃(𝑋), 𝑇 = 0].
6  
Since we are interested in estimating the impact of a change in employment status during a 
recession on outdoor recreation, we need a counterfactual estimate on what the recreationists in 
the treatment group would have done were they not affected by an employment shock during the 
recession. The weak ignorability assumptions below, a weaker assumption compared to that 
stated in equation 5 and 6, imply that conditional on the propensity of being in the treatment 
group, there is no difference in recreation behavior between the treatment and control absent the 
treatment occurs. Accordingly, recreation behavior of households in the control group in 2009 
will be the counterfactual recreation for households in the treatment group, both at the intensive 
and extensive margin. 
𝐸[𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑝0,𝑌09|𝑃(𝑿), 𝑇 = 1] = 𝐸[𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑝0,𝑌09  |𝑃
(𝑿), 𝑇 = 0] = 𝐸[𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑝0,𝑌09|𝑃(𝑿)].   (7) 
𝐸[𝑁𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑝0,𝑌09|𝑃(𝑿), 𝑇 = 1] = 𝐸[𝑁𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑝0,𝑌09  |𝑃
(𝑿), 𝑇 = 0] = 𝐸[𝑁𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑝0,𝑌09|𝑃(𝑿)].   (8) 
Estimation: We estimate the impact of a change in employment status during the recession on 
recreation adopting the following average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) estimators- 
𝐴𝑇?̂?𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒 =
1
𝑁𝑇
[∑ [𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑝1,𝑌09 − ∑ (?̂?𝑖𝑗)𝑗∈𝐼0 𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑝0,𝑌09
̂ ]𝑖∈𝐼1∩𝑆𝑝 ]                            (9) 
and, 
𝐴𝑇?̂?𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒 =
1
𝑁𝑇
[∑ [𝑁𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑝1,𝑌09 − ∑ (?̂?𝑖𝑗)𝑗∈𝐼0 𝑁𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑝0,𝑌09
̂  ]𝑖∈𝐼1∩𝑆𝑝 ].             (10) 
                                                 
6 This is also termed as balancing of covariates, 𝑿, which also indicates the quality of the matching estimator. We 
perform this balancing test after each round of matching done to check if the ignorability condition is satisfied. 
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where 𝐼1is the set of treated observations, 𝐼0 is the set of control observations, 𝑆𝑝 is the region of 
common support, and 𝑁𝑇 is the number of observations who belong to the set 𝐼1 ∩ 𝑆𝑝. 𝑇𝑟𝑖?̂?0,𝑌09 
is the matched outcome of control observation for treatment “i”, which actually is constructed as 
the weighted average of all of the matched non-treatment outcomes. Similarly,  ?̂?𝑖𝑗 is the weight 
assigned to each matched control “j” corresponding to the treatment observation “i”. Weight will 
depend on the distance between the propensity scores of treatment “i” and match “j”, and the 
number of matches as well. For unmatched observations, weight is zero. We applied five 
different matching algorithms.7 
Difference-in-difference matching to control for time-invariant unobservables: The estimators 
stated in equation 9 and 10 will give the true estimate of a recessionary change in employment 
status on one’s recreation behavior if selection into such employment change is due to 
observable factors X. However, still there may exist unobservable factors, both time-variant as 
well as time-invariant in nature, that affect both the likelihood of an individual’s exposure to 
employment change during a recession as well as her recreation behavior. For example, in our 
context, geographic factors (such as distance to lake, local amenities, local labor market 
conditions etc.) might confound the results.  
Households residing near lakes but not used to taking any lake trip for recreation before a 
recession may find it relatively easier and cheaper to take some trips after experiencing an 
employment change during the recession due to more available time and negligible cost of a 
local trip. On the other hand, one who is living at a place with no lakes in the surrounding 
                                                 
7 In nearest neighbor matching, for each treatment, we pick the control with the closest propensity score, both with 
and without replacement. Nearest five neighbors matching picks the five controls with the closest propensity score. 
Radius matching: for each exposed individual, we pick all the controls whose propensity score lies within a radius 
distance of ½ and 1/4th of standard deviation of the estimated propensity score. 
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amenities, but was used to taking trips before recession may find it relatively expensive to make 
trips after being affected by employment change during a recession. Let us call the former 
individual as type A, and the later as type B. Without taking into account the influences of 
location and distance, if we match a type B treatment with a control that lives in a lake-rich 
locality and is used to taking lake trips anyway, we will not capture true changes in recreation 
behavior from change in employment status. Similarly, we may end up matching a type A 
treatment with controls who are dissimilar in terms of locational attributes. Note that we cannot 
include all potential time-invariant controls, such as one’s residence amenities or local attributes, 
in the propensity score estimation stage. Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997), and Smith and 
Todd (2005) strongly recommends using difference-in-difference approach when geographic and 
other individual specific fixed factors might play potentially confounding role. Since we have a 
panel, by applying difference (DID) matching estimators we are able to difference out time-
invariant unobservable factors.  
Compared to a simple propensity score matching estimator, the DID matching estimator 
will estimate the treatment effect on the differences of outcome variable, which requires 
redefining the outcome variables by taking differences in recreation pattern across pre-recession 
and recession years.8 Next, the DID estimators for out setting are: 
𝐷𝐼𝐷𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒 = 𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑌09̂𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒 −  𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑌05̂ 𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒 ,                  (11) 
𝐷𝐼𝐷𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒 = 𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑌09̂ 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒 −  𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑌05̂ 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒,                  (12) 
where 𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑌09̂𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒 and 𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑌05̂ 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒 have similar interpretation as in equation 9 and 10.  
                                                 
8 The difference in participation in lake recreation (extensive margin) for the treatment group is ∆𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑝1 =
𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑝1,𝑌09 − 𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑝1,𝑌05 while that for the control group is  ∆𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑝0 = 𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑝0,𝑌09 − 𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑝0,𝑌05. Total number of lake trips 
(intensive margin) is similarly redefined for the treatment group as  ∆N𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑝1 = 𝑁𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑝1,𝑌09 − 𝑁𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑝1,𝑌05 and for 
the control group as ∆N𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑝0 = 𝑁𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑝0,𝑌09 − 𝑁𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑝0,𝑌05. 
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4. Iowa Lake Survey  
In this study we utilize data from the Iowa lake survey, a random population survey, 
which collects a rich set of information on Iowan’s lake visitation pattern as well as 
demographics on gender, age, education, employment status, income, and household 
composition. The survey has been administered five times in total, once in each of the four 
consecutive years 2002-2005, and the latest is in 2009.9 The surveys in 2005 and 2009 together 
comprises a panel of 2773 individuals whom we can observe both before and during the 
recession in terms of their recreation behavior (both participation and number of trips) and 
relevant demographics. We first identify the group of people who have experienced a change in 
employment status during the recession besides those who have not to construct the treatment 
and control group for our study. Table one presents the employment information across the year 
2005 and 2009.  
In the 2005-2009 panel, 64.12% of the respondents provided the employment status 
information for both years. Approximately 6.5% of the people, who were full time employed in 
2005, have reported either unemployment or a fall in working hours in 2009. In addition, 10% of 
the previously full-time employed people have retired in 2009. In the sample, 32.5% of the 
respondents (900 individuals) do not provide any information on employment status in 2009, 
which is quite high compared to similar nonresponse in 2005 (5.27%). Again, 52% of these 900 
individuals were full-time employed in the pre-recession year 2009.10 However, a simple mean 
comparison reveals that total number of trips in 2009 of the group with missing employment 
                                                 
9 The survey in 2009 was sent to 10,000 people out of which 4500 were those who responded to a similar survey 
conducted in 2005. The survey response rate in 2009 was around 60%. 
10 There is possibility that individuals who have experienced employment shock during the recession are unwilling 
to share this information. Since in this study, we construct our sample based on individuals’ employment status, 
significant numbers of respondents are dropping out due to this missing data on employment. 
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information is not statistically different from that with non-missing employment information.11 
This gives us confidence of not being trapped into sample selection bias due to missing data. 
Following the definitions given in equations 1-3, we construct the treatment and control 
groups for our analysis. Table 2 shows the composition of the control and three treatment 
groups.12 In the analysis we include those who report at most 52 trips in either of the years.13 
Among the three, treatment group 1 is the largest in size consisting of 155 observations in total, 
as it includes retired people besides unemployed and part-time employed. Information on 
participation, average number of trips, and demographics across treatment and control groups are 
reported in Table 3. Participation on average remains unchanged for the control group people 
across the years of 2005 and 2009. However, unlike the treatment group 3, treatment group 1 and 
2 increase participation in lake recreation in 2009. For total number of trips, the pattern is little 
different. For the control group, treatment group1, and treatment group 3, mean number of trips 
fall in 2009 compared to 2005.  In contrast, treatment group 2 exhibits an increase in mean 
number of trips in 2009. This gives us an indication of possible differences in recreation behavior 
across the retired and unemployed people. 
Based on the available information in Iowa Lake Survey, the covariates we include while 
estimating the propensity score are age, polynomials of age, education, gender, number of 
children in the household, interaction terms between education, age, and gender, recreation 
patterns in the previous years, and boat ownership. All covariates assume values from the pre-
recession period, the survey round in 2005. Education, age, and their interaction terms are 
                                                 
11 Similar comparison between the two groups in year 2003, 2004, and 2005 reveal the same pattern as well. 
12 For comparison, an investigation into a similar panel from 2004-2005 shows that 3.5% of the full time employed 
people in 2004 becomes unemployed/ part time employed in the year 2005, and 2.5% of the full-employed people in 
2004 have retired in 2005. 
13 Restriction of 52 trips in one year is to account for explicit day trips. Because some survey respondents might live 
near a lake, casually visit the lake while passing, and report inflated number of total trips.  
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motivated by the earning function estimation in the labor economics literature [Mincer 1974; 
Heckman, Lochner and Todd 2007].14 We assume that factors that determine one’s earnings are 
also strong predictors for his/her labor market status as well. An individual with a college degree 
and considerable experience is less likely to be exposed to an employment shock during the 
recession compared to an individual of similar experience but with only a high school degree. 
Iowa lake surveys also contain information on households’ residence county and zip code. We 
match this with the rural-urban commuting area (RUCA) codes maintained by ERS, USDA to 
classify households by four different types of residence location.15The bottom panel of Table 3 
presents summary statistics on various demographics, residence location, and recreation 
preference variables observed in pre-recession year for each of the treatment and control groups.  
Some potentially useful variables to capture the intensity of exposure to recessionary shock, 
such as household income and work hours, are excluded due to widespread non-response. The 
idea of habit persistence [Adamowicz 1994; Moeltner and Englin 2004] suggests that pre-
recession recreation behavior might influence one’s recreation choices during the recession. 
Information on past recreation usage, such as total number of day trips and overnight trips taken 
in the pre-recession year are chosen to group households with similar preferences for recreation 
or common interest in activity types. Some lake recreation activities, such as fishing, boating and 
                                                 
14 In the labor economics literature experience is often captured by a quadratic of age variable. 
15 Detail documentation o RUCA code are available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/rural-urban-
commuting-area-codes/documentation.aspx#.Uu8l9fldWlI (last accessed on July20th, 2015).  As the site notes: “The 
rural-urban commuting area (RUCA) codes, a detailed and flexible scheme for delineating sub-county components 
of rural and urban areas, have been updated using data from the 2010 decennial census and the 2006-10 American 
Community Survey (ACS). RUCA codes are based on the same theoretical concepts used by the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) to define county-level metropolitan and micropolitan areas. We applied similar 
criteria to measures of population density, urbanization, and daily commuting to identify urban cores and adjacent 
territory that is economically integrated with those cores.” 
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hunting are included since these will capture preference similarities among recreationists in more 
subtle manner.16  
5. Results & Discussions 
We start with a simple OLS model for each of the three treatment groups.17 The OLS estimates 
reveal that for treatment group 2(unemployed and part-time employed), treatment status and 
participation in lake recreation are positively associated, which is statistically significant. In 
contrast, no such association is observed for treatment group 1 and treatment group 3. However, 
since we are concerned about selection problem with changes in employment status during the 
recession, we cannot interpret the estimates from OLS in a causal manner.   
5.1 Propensity score estimation 
Table 4 reports propensity score estimation results for each of the three treatment groups. 
For treatment group one, education, number of children, age, interaction between age and 
education, rural area residence, participation in fishing and boat activities turn out to be 
significant predictor of ones probability of experiencing a change in employment status during a 
recession. For treatment group 2, number of children, participation in fishing, and total number 
of trips taken in pre-recession year exhibit statistical significance. Similarly, for treatment group 
3, education, interaction between age, education and gender, number of children, rural or small-
town residence location, participation in fishing and boat activities turn out to be statistically 
significant predictors of one’s chance of being retired during the recession.18  
                                                 
16 Boating is a dummy variable which assumes value of 1 if a household owns a boat or participates in any of these 
boating activities such as jet skiing, canoeing, boating and sailing. 
17 In OLS exercises, the outcome variables are participation and total number of trips taken in 2009 whereas the 
explanatory variables include the same set of variables used in the matching exercises in addition to the treatment 
group indicator. We do not report the OLS results here to save space. 
18 Since the purpose of these regression estimates is to obtain propensity scores, based on which we will conduct 
matching, we are not focusing here interpreting the parameters. 
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Based on the estimated propensity score, in each of the cases, we match the treatment 
with the control applying five matching algorithms (i) nearest neighbor matching without 
replacement, (ii) nearest neighbor with replacement, (iii) nearest 5 neighbors, (iv) radius 
matching within a caliper of 1/4th of standard deviation of propensity score, and (v) radius 
matching within a caliper of 1/2 of standard deviation of propensity score.19 For each matching 
algorithm, the balancing of covariates is assessed based on two criterions: (i) the difference 
between mean of treated and matched control group, and (ii) standardized mean difference of the 
covariates between the treatment and control group.20 Prior to matching, as seen in Table A1, 
statistically significant differences across the treatment and control group are common. After 
matching is completed, the covariates balance well. As reported in Table A2-A4 in the appendix 
A, across treatment groups and matching algorithms, after a matching is conducted, more than 
99.5% covariate balance well.21  
To satisfy the overlapping condition, while estimating the treatment effects we exclude 
the treatments that are out of the common support. Table E1 in the appendix A shows the number 
of matched as well as non-matched treatment in each matching process for each of the three 
treatment groups. In 95% or more cases, treatments lie in common support region, or, find a 
comparable counterfactual from the control group.22  
                                                 
19 All of the matching estimation is conducted utilizing package “psmatch2” in STATA 12.  
20 The standardized difference of means is calculated as: =
𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑−𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙   
  √
1
2
∗(𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 +𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙)
 . Following 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) we consider a standardized difference of means of 20 as large. 
21 For the treatment group two, one covariate, gender, did not balance when nearest neighbor matching is conducted. 
Similarly, for the retired group, the covariate education exhibit large standardized difference in the case of nearest 
neighbor matching without replacement.  
22 For treatment group 2 and 3, total 3 treated observations, while for treatment group 1, 2 to 5 treatment 
observations do not find any counterfactual in the common support region. 
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5.2 Impact on participation  
Table 5 presents the impact of change in employment status during a recession on 
participation in lake recreation. Note that a simple mean comparison across the treatment and 
unmatched control shows statistically no significant difference in lake recreation at the extensive 
margin. For treatment group 1, out of the five matching estimators used, two (nearest five 
neighbors matching and radius matching within 0.5 SD of propensity score) show that the 
treatment group participates more in outdoor lake recreation during the recession. These 
estimates suggest that households who become unemployed or retired during the recession are 
8.3-10.9 percentage points more likely to participate in at least one lake-trip compared to the 
households who remain full-time employed across the pre-recession and recession period.23 
The retired individuals may have distinct recreation preference compared to the 
unemployed. Panel b in Table 5 reveals that for the treatment group with employed and part-time 
employed people, five matching techniques indicate statistically significant positive impact of 
unemployment during the recession on participation in lake recreation. The estimates imply that 
an average household that was employed in 2005 but become unemployed in 2009 is 14 to 25 
percentage points more likely to recreate in any of the Iowa lakes compared to what s/he would 
have done if were still full-time employed during the recession year. The bottom panel in Table 
5, panel c, reports the results for the retired people. All of the five ATT estimates turn out to be 
statistically insignificant, which suggests that people who become retired during the recession do 
not start participating more in lake recreation. Note that in the analysis with treatment group two, 
                                                 
23 In this paper we report the treatment effect (ATT) is statistical significant only if the p value is at least less than or 
equal to 0.1. In calculating the p-value, the standard errors are constructed based on 1000 replication of 
bootstrapping sample. Each bootstrap sample calculates the propensity score and matching in that sample is done 
based on that score.  
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all of the mean differences between the treatment and the control group are bigger in size 
compared to those we observe for treatment group one. A comparison of estimates across the 
three treatment groups suggests that the statistically significant impact we obtain for treatment 
group 1 is driven by the stronger and larger effect from the unemployed and part-time employed 
group, i.e., treatment group 2.   
In the matching results discussed above, although we assume no selection on observables, 
there can still be unobservable time-invariant confounding factors hiding the true causal 
relationship between employment change during a recession and participation in lake recreation, 
for example distance of lakes from one’s residence. In difference-in-difference matching, we will 
use the information on a household’s participation in lake recreation both before and during the 
recession, which will net-out the effects of such time-invariant unobservable factors. 
The difference-in-difference matching results for participation are presented in last two 
columns in Table 5. For treatment group 1, the results are similar to those for participation on the 
level. From nearest five neighbors and radius matching difference-in-difference estimates, we 
notice that households who experience a change in employment status during the recession take 
more lake visits. When we exclude the retired group and conduct difference-in-difference 
matching on unemployed and part-time employed people only (treatment group 2), all nearest 
neighbor matching processes show significant positive impact. However, in contrast to the case 
of matching on the level, radius matching algorithms do not show statistical significance. The 
bottom panel in Table 5 depicts that none of the matching processes indicate statistically any 
significant impact of retirement during recession on participation in lake recreation.  
This positive effect on participation in lake recreation during the recession by households 
in treatment group 2 might be attributed to a couple of factors discussed in section 2 and 3. These 
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households may consider lake recreation as an inferior good, or may have switched from stay at 
home option to outdoor lake recreation due to reduced opportunity cost of time. But we cannot 
exactly disentangle which factors are working and to what extent. 
5.3 Impact on total number of trips 
From our arguments presented in sections on literature review and theoretical motivations, 
we infer that total number of trips may increase, decrease, or remain unchanged. However, in the 
propensity score matching analysis, none of the treatment groups show any significant impact of 
employment change during the recession on total number of trips. Table 6 reports the findings. 
Although the differences across the treatment and control group are not statistically significant, 
the positive estimates of average treatment effect on the treated indicates that mean number of trips 
for the treatment group one and two are higher compared to their counterfactual number of trips. 
In contrast, the negative estimates for retired households indicate that their total number of lake 
visits during a recession is lower compared to their counterfactual frequency of visits.  
Similar to the arguments presented for participation, we suspect the confounding effects 
from unobservable factors for total trips as well. To wipe out the mean effects from individually 
varying but time-invariant unobservable factors, we conduct DID matching estimator.  The last 
two columns in Table 6 report the DID matching results. For any of the three treatment groups, 
DID estimators does not show any statistically significant impact of employment change during 
the 2009 recession on frequencies of outdoor lake trips. The DID matching does not change this 
pattern that we observe for matching on the level. 
Contrary to the case for participation, unemployed or partially unemployed households do 
not increase frequencies of lake trips during the recession. Similar to the analysis for participation, 
the estimates do not suggest any impact of retirement during the recession on the total number of 
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trips. However, although the estimates are statistically insignificant, retired households take 
outdoor lake trips at low frequencies compared to its counterfactual outcome.  The finding is 
consistent across the matching estimators used. 
6. Robustness 
 
We conduct three robustness checks. First, we use a placebo recession year to check if our 
general assumption of no differential trend for treatment and control groups for DID matching 
estimator is valid in our setting. Second, we change the specification for propensity score 
estimation including a subset of covariates previously used: we exclude recreation preference 
variables. Third, we match each treatment observation with controls from the same geographic 
region to control for unobservable factors that are time-variant in a spatial manner.24  
6.1 Placebo exercise 
The objective of the placebo exercise is to check whether it is unemployment during the 
recession or some pre-existing unobservable factors working differently across the treatment and 
control group are driving our results. If the treatment  and control group exhibit differentiated trend 
in the pre-recession years, and recession truly has no impact on recreation, the DID matching 
estimator picks up this difference in trend as impact of the change in employment during recession. 
For the placebo exercise, we assume year 2003 as placebo recession year.25 Table B1-B3 in the 
appendix A report that balancing of covariate is satisfied in all cases except for only one covariate 
in one matching process for treatment group one.  We report the estimates from the Placebo 
exercise in Table 7 and 8. In all matching processes, neither participation nor frequencies of trips 
                                                 
24 Rural and urban areas may be affected differently during a recession. 
25Although Iowa lake project survey was conducted in 2003 and 2004 as well, we have a matched non-missing sample 
for all of our treatment and control group observations in year 2003. In the survey year 2004 , we have missing 
information for 8 treatments and 52 controls from the sample of 971 observations that we are using for our base 
estimation 
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in lake recreation turned out to be statistically different across the treatment and control groups in 
2003. This finding gives us confidence in saying that our analysis based on matching exercises as 
reported in the previous section are not contaminated due to differential group trend. 
6.2 Specification without recreation preference variable 
We estimate the propensity score excluding the recreation preference variables and including 
only demographics and type of region for residence in the pre-recession year. Table 9 reports the 
estimates for participation.26 For treatment group 1 and 3, the treatment effect estimates on 
participation in lake recreation follows the same pattern that we observe previously in Table 5. For 
these two treatment groups, the difference-in-difference matching estimates are also robust to this 
different set of observables covariates. Panel b in Table 9 reveals that unemployed and part-time 
employed households (treatment group 2) participate more in lake recreation during the recession 
compared to what they would have done had they been employed. Note that, for the DID matching, 
previously in Table 5, radius matching estimators did not show any statistical significance but 
under the new setting, all five matching algorithms exhibit statistical significance.  For matching 
on the level of participation, only radius matching estimators show statistical significance whereas 
previously in Table 5 all five matching estimators turned out to be statistically significant.  
For the frequency of lake trips, the results are reported in Table 10. With the new set of 
covariates, none of the matching estimators across the three treatment groups exhibit statistically 
any significant effect of a change in employment status during recession on frequencies of trips. 
Our previous finding that frequencies of lake trips do not change due to unemployment or 
retirement during the recession is robust to the choice of covariates. 
                                                 
26 Covariates balancing results, as reported in table C1-C3 in the appendix, reveal that quality of the match is good. 
Except for one variable for treatment group one in one estimation process, all other covariates balance well.  
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6.3 Matching within RUCA cell 
Although we have accounted for the effects of mean time-invariant unobservable through 
matching on the differences, we recognize that we still might end up finding estimates confounded 
by unobservable fixed factors that vary  across regions with time. For example, rural and 
metropolitan areas may be affected differently during a recession year and exhibit different 
economic environment. Employment statistics in a rural agricultural county may not change during 
the recession while employment in the metropolitan area usually drops sharply during the 
economic crisis. Although we incorporate information on one’s residence location while 
estimating the propensity score, we still may end up matching a rural treatment with an urban 
control. Our DID matching estimators cannot control for such region-specific time-variant 
unobservable confounding factors.  So matching individuals within region can control for such 
time-variant confounding effects.  
To control for such possible regionally time-variant confounders, we match each treatment 
observation with controls from the same RUCA region. An individual from a small town 
experiencing employment shock during the recession is matched with counterfactuals from a small 
town area rather than from a metropolitan or rural area. Since we will match exactly within RUCA 
cell, in the first step, we estimate propensity score excluding variables on geographic regions. The 
results are reported in Table 11 and Table 12. Table D1-D3 report covariate balance for the cell 
matching. In contrast to the previous exercises, quality of the matches is not satisfactory here for 
the treatment group one and three since some covariates do not balance after matching. However, 
covariates balance well for the treatment group two- the unemployed group. 
The estimates in Table11 reveals that when matching is done within the RUCA cell, only one 
out of five matching estimators for treatment group 1, and none for treatment group 3 show 
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statistically significant effect of change in employment status on lake trips at the extensive margin. 
For treatment group two, two out of five matching estimators turn out to be statistically significant. 
However, once we apply the difference-in-difference matching, only for treatment group 1 the 
estimates display statistical significance. For treatment group 2 and 3, all five matching estimators 
are statistically insignificant. It suggests that for the unemployed and part-time employed group, 
positive impact of the recession on participation in lake recreation is not robust once we control 
for spatially time-variant confounders. In the case of frequencies of lake trips, as can be seen in 
Table 12, matching within RUCA cell generates similar estimates as before. However, since 
matching within rural-urban region causes quality of matching to be low, we are cautious in 
interpreting the estimates for treatment group one and three. 
7. Extension 
We extend the analysis in two ways. First, we include time-variant lake specific water quality 
measures to check if improved water quality is not actually driving the rise in lake recreation in 
2009, which we have attributed to unemployment during the recession. Second, we investigate 
the lake recreation during recession by exploiting cross county-cross period variation in county 
unemployment rate.  
7.1 Water quality, employment status, and lake recreation behavior during recession 
Water quality varies across lakes and time periods. Water quality can be a major 
determinant of Iowans’ choice of lake for outdoor recreation [Egan et al. 2009]. Detail water 
quality data on 131 major lakes in Iowa are available from Iowa State University’s limnology 
lab.27 The water quality data is well coordinated as well as temporally and spatially matched with 
                                                 
27 http://www.card.iastate.edu/lakes/ (last accessed on June 30th, 2015). 
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the recreation data that we are utilizing for this analysis.  In general, the measures reveal that 
average water quality has improved in 2009 compared to 2005 across the lakes in our sample. 
The objective of this extension is to examine whether water quality improvement is playing a 
confounding role and biasing our estimates reported in the previous sections. Following Egan et 
al. (2009), we have considered six water quality indicators: secchi depth, total nitrogen, total 
phosphorus, inorganic suspended solid, volatile suspended solid, and chlorophyll. Among all of 
these indicators, secchi depth, a measure of water clarity, is the most perceptible and direct water 
quality indicator to the recreationists.  
We estimate the following specification including six water quality indicators 
𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼0 ∑ 𝑊𝑄𝑘𝑗𝑡
6
𝑘=1 + 𝛼1 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑗 + 𝛼2 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 +
                    𝛼3 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛼4𝑿 +∈𝑖𝑗𝑡 ,  
where i =1,2,…,971 denotes households,  j=1,2,3,…131 denotes lakes, and t=2005,2009 denotes 
time periods. Recession is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 in 2009, and the vector 𝑿 
contains a set of demographics. For each of the three treatment groups, we estimated the above 
specification twice: (a) including the demographics, and (b) including individual fixed effects. In 
the fixed effects model 𝛼1 will not be identified. However, the statistical significance of  𝛼2 will 
reveal if unemployment effect during recession is robust to the water quality improvement.   
The results are reported in Table 13. In general, water quality indicators turn out to be 
small in magnitude and always statistically insignificant. The key coefficient, interaction 
between treatment status and recession indicator, is consistently positive and statistically 
significant for combined treatment group’s participation and count of total trips. After 
controlling for the water quality changes, the treatment group consisting of unemployed 
households seems to participate more and take more trips during the recession year compared to 
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their counterfactual case. The retired group does not exhibit different participation behavior 
during the recession year.  However, their frequency of trips dropped during the recession. 
Overall, our findings in the previous section that unemployment during recession lead a 
household to participate more in lake recreation is not altered when we address the water quality 
improvement in lakes in Iowa.28 
7.2 County unemployment and recreation 
In this section, we adopt an alternative approach to investigating the impact of the recession 
on participation in lake recreation. Although Iowa lake project surveys were conducted in 2002-
2005 and 2009, in the matching exercises we utilized surveys from the recession year and the 
nearest pre-recession year including individuals who provide complete information on 
employment status. In all of the survey rounds, many respondents did not respond to the 
questions on employment status and household income.29 One way, we may still use their 
information is by using some proxy for their employment/economic status. Economics literature 
investigating the relationship between individual health behavior and recession have utilized 
group variable such as state level unemployment rate to represent business cycle [Ruhm (2000, 
2005), Dehejia and Lleras-Muney (2004)]. 
We utilize a panel spanning the years 2002-2005 and 2009 to estimate a fixed effect model 
on how county level unemployment rate affect individual participation in lake recreation. In our 
setting, county unemployment rate is a good proxy for local economic condition. Since one 
cannot influence economic activities at the county level, household’s trip participation is less 
                                                 
28 The estimates obtained in this subsection are not directly comparable with the matching estimates since the later 
are more conservative. However, the smaller magnitude of water quality coefficients from a relatively less-restricted 
model imply that improved water quality is not playing a confounding role in our case. 
29 In 2009, 853 individuals were silent about employment status although they provided relevant employment 
information in year 2005. 
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likely to affect county unemployment rate. The fixed effect model takes care of all individual 
specific time-invariant unobservable.30 In the lake surveys, 3040 observations from year 2009 
have a matching observation in at least one of the year 2002-2005. Out of them, 1498 individual 
responded across all the years 2002-2009 to form a balanced panel. We estimate the following 
specification 
𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑡 = (𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑌𝑟)𝛽1 + (𝑈𝑛𝑐𝑡)𝛽2 + (𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑌𝑟 ∗ 𝑈𝑛𝑐𝑡)𝛽3 + 𝛾𝑐𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖𝑐𝑡, 
where 𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑡 is a binary variable indicating whether individual “i” in county “c” takes any lake 
trip in year “t” or not, 𝑈𝑛𝑐𝑡 indicates unemployment in county “c” in year “t”, 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑌𝑟 is an indicator 
variable assuming a value of 1 if year “t” is a recession year, 𝛾𝑖 are individual specific fixed effects 
which take care of time-invariant demographics, such as race, gender, education, preference for 
recreation or work, risk attitudes etc.,  𝜸𝒄𝒕 are county-specific time trends.
31 We are interested in 
the sign of the parameter 𝛽3 on the interaction term between county level unemployment and 
indicator for recession.  After controlling for the level effect of recession and county level 
unemployment along with individual fixed effect as well as various trends, if we find 𝛽3 > 0 and 
statistically significant, we interpret it as a positive effect of unemployment during recession on 
participation in outdoor lake recreation. Since county level economic condition might exhibit 
correlation cross years, standard errors are clustered at county-year level [Wooldridge (2002)]. 
Table 14 shows the fixed effect estimates on the impact of county unemployment rate on 
recreation participation. Panel (a) in the Table reports results for the sample we use in matching 
exercises in previous section, while panel b and c report results for the unbalanced and a balanced 
panel respectively. We gradually increase controls. Column I does not incorporate any trend while 
                                                 
30 For instance if one’s preference for recreation is time-invariant; FE model would control for it.   
31 We have tried to control time trends by including both of county specific linear and quadratic time trends. Instead 
of including year specific fixed effects we include a dummy variable for the recession year to disentangle the 
recession year effect from a normal year effect. 
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column II and III include linear and quadratic trend. Instead of general linear or quadratic trends, 
columns IV and V incorporate county specific linear and quadratic trends. The coefficients of 
county unemployment rate and recession turn out to be negative and statistically significant. The 
estimates in columns II-IV in Table 14 reveal that in a recession year, participation in outdoor lake 
recreation decreases in the range of 14 to 20 percentage points compared to a non-recession year. 
 Similarly, in a particular year, individuals from a high unemployment county participate less 
in outdoor lake recreation compared to an individual from a low unemployment county. A one 
percentage point increase in local county level unemployment rate decreases participation in lake 
recreation by 1.72 to 4.73 percentage points based on the specifications we have used. This pattern 
is common across all specifications except that with county level quadratic trend (specification V). 
Note that in specification V, none of the variables display statistical significance-it seems like all 
variation in lake participation is absorbed by the county specific quadratic trend. 
The coefficient of the interaction term between county level unemployment and recession year, 
after controlling for level effect of unemployment and recession, turns out to be positive and 
statistically significant in most of the cases(except for specification V consistently in all three 
samples). We interpret the statistically significant, and positive coefficient of the interaction term 
as a positive association between recessionary unemployment and outdoor recreation participation. 
An individual from a county with high unemployment rate during the recession year of 2009 is 
more likely to participate in lake recreation compared to one from a low unemployment county.   
Although unemployment, on its own, reduces participation in lake recreation, the recessionary 
unemployment affects participation in outdoor recreation in an opposite manner. This pattern is 
consistent across the balanced sample as well, as can be observed in panel c. Our findings overall 
34 
 
 
 
suggest that participation in lake recreation responds to unemployment in a different manner 
depending on whether the time is recessionary. 
8. Conclusion 
 In this paper we utilize a panel from Iowa lake Survey to investigate how change in 
employment during a recession alters lake recreation behavior. Exploiting semi-parametric 
matching techniques, including difference-in-difference matching that utilizes the same 
individual’s information before and during the recession, our analysis shows that retirement 
during the recession has no impact on recreation behavior, either at the extensive or intensive 
margin. In contrast, there is some evidence that people who become unemployed during the 
recession participate more in lake recreation. However, such increases are not consistent once we 
control for spatial factors- geographic and region specific unobservables- through conducting an 
exact matching within rural, urban, micropolitan and metropolitan cell. The extension of the 
analysis, where we replace individual employment status by county level unemployment to 
capture local economic condition, in an individual fixed effect framework, reveals that 
households from counties with high unemployment during a recession participate more in lake-
based recreation. It reinforces the findings from matching exercises that participation in lake 
recreation at least did not decrease during the 2009 recession. Facing unemployment during the 
recession households might have substituted relatively exotic trips for local lake-based recreation 
that might be one possible reason behind observing an increase in lake recreation pattern during 
the 2009 recession. 
Overall, the findings suggest that changes in employment status during the 2009 
recession did not affect demand for lake-based recreation trips: Iowans are visiting lakes as 
frequently as they were before the recession. The finding implies that the demand for outdoor 
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recreations in lakes is stable and unaffected by business cycle shocks such as a recession. It will 
inform public officials that public amenity-based, rural, non-farm economic activities and 
employment are resilient to a recession. 
Outdoor recreation plays a significant role in Iowa’s economy as it generates local 
spending of approximately $3.1 billion annually and 31000 jobs (Otto, Tylka, and Erickson, 
2012). Besides, there are indirect benefits from improved health and new investments through 
increased opportunities for recreational activities. Being a predominantly farm state, Iowa often 
faces the challenge in encouraging other natural resource based industries compromising 
agriculture. The finding from this study reemphasizes the importance of outdoor recreation, 
another natural resource based stable non-agricultural sector that can be affected by negative 
spillover effects from agriculture. Natural-resource centered development programs including 
investment in public goods such as water quality improvement by controlling emission from 
various point and non-point sources, and development of public facilities such as local roads, 
lakes and parks may generate higher net social return compared to other local public goods. 
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Table 1: Number of survey respondents by employment status in 2005 and 2009 
 
Employment Status 
in 2005 
Employment Status in 2009  
Full-time Part-time Student Unemployed Retired Total 
Full-time 848 43 4 23 100 1,018 
Part-time 29 69 2 8 37 145 
Student 8 0 2 1 1 12 
Unemployed 17 6 1 20 13 57 
Retired 14 24 1 1 506 546 
Total 916 142 10 53 657 1778 
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Table 2: Size and decomposition of Treatment and Control Groups 
Treatment group Employment Status in 
year 2009 
Number of 
Treatment 
Observations 
Number of Control 
Observations 
1 Unemployed 42  
Part-time Employed 21  
Retired 92  
Total 155 816 
2 Unemployed 42  
Part-time Employed 21  
Total 63 816 
3 Retired 92 816 
Total 92 816 
Note: In table 2 we exclude all respondents who report more than 52 trips in one single year. Compared to table 1, 
this reduces the control group size from 848 to 816. Similarly we adjust the treatment group sizes as well. 
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Table 3: Participation, Total Trips, Demographics and Recreation Activities across Treatment 
Groups by Baseline and Treatment Years 
 Control Group Treatment Group 
1 
Treatment Group 
2 
Treatment Group 
3 
 Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Participation 
Participation in 2005 0.675 0.469 0.600 0.491 0.571 0.499 0.620 0.488 
Participation in 2009 0.675 0.469 0.665 0.474 0.746 0.439 0.609 0.491 
Total Trip 
Total Trip in 2005 7.354 10.188 7.071 11.635 4.698 7.370 8.696 13.620 
Total Trip In 2009 6.933 9.927 6.806 9.771 5.619 7.458 7.620 11.046 
Pre-recession Year: 2005 
Demographics 
Age 4.433 0.750 5.161 0.802 4.746 0.842 5.446 0.635 
Gender 1.246 0.431 1.355 0.480 1.429 0.499 1.304 0.463 
Education 3.384 1.002 3.271 1.089 3.175 1.025 3.337 1.132 
Number of Children 
in the household 
0.939 1.210 0.310 0.717 0.492 0.840 0.185 0.592 
Rural Residence 0.153 0.360 0.103 0.305 0.095 0.296 0.109 0.313 
Small Town 
Residence 
0.211 0.408 0.213 0.411 0.302 0.463 0.152 0.361 
Micropolitan 
Residence 
0.132 0.339 0.148 0.357 0.175 0.383 0.130 0.339 
Metropolitan 
Residence 
0.504 0.500 0.535 0.500 0.429 0.499 0.609 0.491 
Recreation Preference Variables 
Boat Activities 0.553 0.498 0.426 0.496 0.429 0.499 0.424 0.497 
Hunting  0.065 0.247 0.039 0.194 0.016 0.126 0.054 0.228 
Fishing  0.512 0.500 0.503 0.502 0.492 0.504 0.511 0.503 
Total Number of 
Trips 
7.354 10.188 7.071 11.635 4.698 7.370 8.696 13.620 
Take overnight Trips 0.456 0.498 0.374 0.485 0.270 0.447 0.446 0.500 
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Table 4: Propensity Score Estimation Results from Probit Model 
 Treatment Group 1 Treatment Group 2 Treatment Group 3 
 Coefficient p 
value 
Coefficient p value Coefficient p value 
Age -0.831 0.211 -0.386 0.576 0.468 0.752 
Age square 0.171** 0.011 0.080 0.280 0.081 0.567 
Gender 0.002 0.994 0.218 0.376 -0.241 0.360 
Education 0.176 0.222 0.085 0.582 0.365** 0.040 
Age*Education -0.060** 0.034 -0.046 0.146 -0.090*** 0.008 
Education*Gender 0.083 0.129 0.042 0.526 0.118* 0.085 
Number of Children in 
Household 
-0.158** 0.019 -0.125* 0.071 -0.198* 0.092 
Rural -0.436** 0.013 -0.291 0.213 -0.522** 0.018 
Small Town -0.082 0.553 0.199 0.225 -0.376* 0.052 
Micropolitan 0.018 0.908 0.166 0.389 -0.199 0.312 
Boat Activity -0.226* 0.054 -0.159 0.292 -0.288* 0.042 
Hunting -0.251 0.318 -0.497 0.255 -0.144 0.620 
Fishing 0.270** 0.023 0.271* 0.075 0.281* 0.067 
Total Number of Trips -0.001 0.928 -0.014* 0.065 0.008 0.197 
Take overnight Trips -0.031 0.794 -0.249 0.119 0.178 0.230 
constant -0.841 0.615 -1.291 0.449 -5.411 0.163 
Model Statistics 
Number of observations 971 879  908  
Log pseudolikelihood -353.617 -205.079  -213.674  
Wald chi2(15) 127.620 44.270  133.500  
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000  0.000  
Pseudo R2 0.171 0.096  0.283  
Note: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1.  
The propensity score equation has incorporated all the variables from our available information set that 
might be relevant for outcome equation as well as determining ones probability of being in the treatment 
group. Some interaction terms and polynomials are included in the propensity score estimation process 
so that matching based on those scores satisfies conditional independence assumption. 
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Table 5: Estimates of Average Treatment Effect on the Treated for Participation in Lake 
Recreation 
 (I) Participation (II) Difference in Participation 
Panel (a): Unemployed, Part-time Employed, and Retired People 
Matching Algorithm Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. 
Nearest Neighbor  without 
replacement 
0.059 0.055 0.033 0.060 
Nearest Neighbor  with replacement 0.091 0.075 0.052 0.076 
Nearest 5 Neighbors with 
replacement 
0.109* 0.060 0.101* 0.060 
Radius Matching ( caliper 
=0.5*SD) 
0.083* 0.047 0.102** 0.051 
Radius Matching ( caliper 
=0.25*SD) 
0.077 0.050 0.097* 0.053 
Panel (b): Unemployed and Part-time Employed People 
 Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. 
Nearest Neighbor  without 
replacement 
0.25*** 0.088 0.20* 0.105 
Nearest Neighbor  with replacement 0.26*** 0.102 0.26** 0.118 
Nearest 5 Neighbors with 
replacement 
0.16** 0.081 0.18* 0.096 
Radius Matching ( caliper 
=0.5*SD) 
0.14** 0.064 0.130 0.081 
Radius Matching ( caliper 
=0.25*SD) 
0.14** 0.067 0.110 0.084 
Panel (c):Retired People 
 Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. 
Nearest Neighbor  without 
replacement 
-0.045 0.073 0.022 0.077 
Nearest Neighbor  with replacement -0.011 0.095 0.045 0.089 
Nearest 5 Neighbors with 
replacement 
0.029 0.074 0.037 0.074 
Radius Matching ( caliper 
=0.5*SD) 
0.008 0.059 0.049 0.066 
Radius Matching ( caliper 
=0.25*SD) 
0.014 0.063 0.060 0.069 
Note: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1.Caliper is chosen as 1/2 of standard deviation of propensity 
score, and ¼ of standard deviation of propensity score. Standard errors reported are obtained from 
bootstrapping with 1000 replications. 
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Table 6: Estimates of Average Treatment Effect on the Treated for Total Number of Lake-Trips 
 (I) Total Trip (II) Difference in Total Trip 
Panel (a):Unemployed, Part-time Employed, and Retired People 
Matching Algorithm Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. 
Nearest Neighbor  without 
replacement 
0.118 1.021 0.150 0.920 
Nearest Neighbor  with replacement 0.605 1.381 0.645 1.233 
Nearest 5 Neighbors with 
replacement 
0.958 1.061 -0.048 0.939 
Radius Matching ( caliper =0.5*SD) 0.716 0.782 0.433 0.731 
Radius Matching ( caliper 
=0.25*SD) 
0.408 0.828 0.117 0.745 
Panel (b): Unemployed and Part-time Employed 
 Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. 
Nearest Neighbor  without 
replacement 
1.117 1.433 0.900 1.223 
Nearest Neighbor  with replacement 0.761 1.661 1.161 1.423 
Nearest 5 Neighbors with 
replacement 
0.191 1.287 0.324 1.136 
Radius Matching ( caliper =0.5*SD) 0.432 0.972 0.482 0.919 
Radius Matching ( caliper 
=0.25*SD) 
0.567 1.000 0.318 0.938 
Panel (c):Retired People 
 Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. 
Nearest Neighbor  without 
replacement 
-0.775 1.388 0.584 1.355 
Nearest Neighbor  with replacement -0.970 2.006 0.907 1.846 
Nearest 5 Neighbors with 
replacement 
-0.923 1.536 -0.065 1.416 
Radius Matching ( caliper =0.5*SD) -0.496 1.183 -0.213 1.099 
Radius Matching ( caliper 
=0.25*SD) 
-0.567 1.311 -0.063 1.193 
Note: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1.Caliper is chosen as 1/2 of standard deviation of propensity 
score, and ¼ of standard deviation of propensity score. Standard errors reported are obtained from 
bootstrapping with 1000 replications.  
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Table 7: Placebo Effect -Estimates of Average Treatment Effect on the Treated for Participation 
in Lake Recreation 
 (I) Participation in 
Placebo recession 
year 
(II) Difference in 
Participation between 
2003(Placebo recession 
year) and 2005 
Panel (a): Unemployed, Part-time Employed, and Retired People 
Matching Algorithm Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. 
Nearest Neighbor  without 
replacement 
0.007 0.054 0.000 0.060 
Nearest Neighbor  with 
replacement 
-0.005 0.076 0.037 0.077 
Nearest 5 Neighbors with 
replacement 
0.025 0.060 -0.035 0.065 
Radius Matching ( caliper 
=0.5*SD) 
0.006 0.048 -0.020 0.053 
Radius Matching ( caliper 
=0.25*SD) 
0.020 0.050 -0.043 0.056 
Panel (b): Unemployed and Part-time Employed People 
 Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. 
Nearest Neighbor  without 
replacement 
0.017 0.090 0.067 0.096 
Nearest Neighbor  with 
replacement 
-0.017 0.106 0.100 0.114 
Nearest 5 Neighbors with 
replacement 
0.080 0.082 -0.094 0.088 
Radius Matching ( caliper 
=0.5*SD) 
0.088 0.065 -0.075 0.069 
Radius Matching ( caliper 
=0.25*SD) 
0.080 0.066 -0.051 0.072 
Panel (c):Retired People 
 Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. 
Nearest Neighbor  without 
replacement 
0.034 0.072 -0.023 0.079 
Nearest Neighbor  with 
replacement 
0.045 0.092 0.023 0.097 
Nearest 5 Neighbors with 
replacement 
-0.016 0.073 0.002 0.082 
Radius Matching ( caliper 
=0.5*SD) 
-0.058 0.059 0.014 0.066 
Radius Matching ( caliper 
=0.25*SD) 
-0.051 0.063 0.016 0.070 
Note: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1.Caliper is chosen as 1/2 of standard deviation of propensity 
score, and ¼ of standard deviation of propensity score. Standard errors reported are obtained from 
bootstrapping with 1000 replications. 
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Table 8: Placebo Effects-Estimates of Average Treatment Effect on the Treated for Total 
Number of Lake-Trips 
 (II) Participation in 
Placebo 
recession year 
(II)Difference in 
Participation between 2003 
and 2005 
Panel (a):Unemployed, Part-time Employed, and Retired People 
Matching Algorithm Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. 
Nearest Neighbor  without 
replacement 
0.209 0.885 0.209 0.855 
Nearest Neighbor  with replacement 0.006 1.230 -0.326 1.276 
Nearest 5 Neighbors with 
replacement 
0.116 0.936 0.449 0.936 
Radius Matching ( caliper 
=0.5*SD) 
-0.129 0.716 0.243 0.695 
Radius Matching ( caliper 
=0.25*SD) 
0.076 0.764 0.171 0.741 
Panel (b): Unemployed and Part-time Employed 
 Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. 
Nearest Neighbor  without 
replacement 
0.100 1.233 0.267 1.133 
Nearest Neighbor  with replacement -0.144 1.511 0.528 1.409 
Nearest 5 Neighbors with 
replacement 
0.154 1.086 -0.064 0.996 
Radius Matching ( caliper 
=0.5*SD) 
0.487 0.772 -0.496 0.648 
Radius Matching ( caliper 
=0.25*SD) 
0.494 0.816 -0.278 0.683 
Panel (c):Retired People 
 Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. 
Nearest Neighbor  without 
replacement 
0.670 1.282 0.648 1.264 
Nearest Neighbor  with replacement 0.736 1.736 -0.406 1.852 
Nearest 5 Neighbors with 
replacement 
-0.594 1.327 0.650 1.393 
Radius Matching ( caliper 
=0.5*SD) 
-0.541 1.081 0.286 1.044 
Radius Matching ( caliper 
=0.25*SD) 
-0.469 1.157 0.415 1.145 
Note: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1.Caliper is chosen as 1/2 of standard deviation of propensity 
score, and ¼ of standard deviation of propensity score. Standard errors reported are obtained from 
bootstrapping with 1000 replication
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Table 9: Robustness Check of Estimates of Average Treatment Effect on the Treated for Participation in 
Lake Recreation (with different group of Covariates) 
 
 Participation Difference in Participation 
Panel (a):Unemployed and Retired People 
Matching Algorithm Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. 
Nearest Neighbor  without 
replacement 
0.046 0.056 0.059 0.058 
Nearest Neighbor  with 
replacement 
0.065 0.064 0.075 0.058 
Nearest 5 Neighbors with 
replacement 
0.084 0.059 0.094* 0.056 
Radius Matching ( caliper 
=0.5*SD) 
0.083* 0.050 0.104** 0.050 
Radius Matching ( caliper 
=0.25*SD) 
0.089* 0.051 0.105** 0.050 
Panel (b): Unemployed and Part-time Employed 
 Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. 
Nearest Neighbor  without 
replacement 
0.129 0.087 0.177* 0.096 
Nearest Neighbor  with 
replacement 
0.089 0.088 0.160* 0.095 
Nearest 5 Neighbors with 
replacement 
0.126 0.078 0.172** 0.088 
Radius Matching ( caliper 
=0.5*SD) 
0.115* 0.069 0.163** 0.081 
Radius Matching ( caliper 
=0.25*SD) 
0.118* 0.067 0.165** 0.080 
Panel (c):Retired 
 Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. 
Nearest Neighbor  without 
replacement 
0.065 0.080 0.048 0.073 
Nearest Neighbor  with 
replacement 
0.061 0.072 0.029 0.071 
Nearest 5 Neighbors with 
replacement 
0.057 0.065 0.036 0.063 
Radius Matching ( caliper 
=0.5*SD) 
0.069 0.066 0.024 0.065 
Radius Matching ( caliper 
=0.25*SD) 
0.065 0.080 0.048 0.073 
Note: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1.Caliper is chosen as 1/2 of standard deviation of propensity 
score, and ¼ of standard deviation of propensity score. Standard errors reported are obtained from 
bootstrapping with 1000 replications. 
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Table 10: Robustness Check of Estimates of Average Treatment Effect on the Treated for Total 
Number of Trips (with different group of Covariates) 
 
 Total Trip Difference in Total Trip 
Panel (a):Unemployed and Retired People 
Matching Algorithm Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. 
Nearest Neighbor  without 
replacement 
-0.791 1.093 -0.098 1.020 
Nearest Neighbor  with replacement -0.026 1.275 -0.017 1.067 
Nearest 5 Neighbors with 
replacement 
0.711 1.141 0.212 1.012 
Radius Matching ( caliper 
=0.5*SD) 
0.265 0.982 0.398 0.883 
Radius Matching ( caliper 
=0.25*SD) 
0.490 1.014 0.571 0.908 
Panel (b): Unemployed and Part-time Employed 
 Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. 
Nearest Neighbor  without 
replacement 
-1.855 1.639 1.597 1.455 
Nearest Neighbor  with replacement -2.472 1.656 1.213 1.416 
Nearest 5 Neighbors with 
replacement 
-1.141 1.424 1.565 1.297 
Radius Matching ( caliper 
=0.5*SD) 
-0.964 1.164 1.648 1.049 
Radius Matching ( caliper 
=0.25*SD) 
-1.089 1.125 1.337 1.017 
Panel (c):Retired 
 Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. 
Nearest Neighbor  without 
replacement 
0.789 1.529 -0.544 1.385 
Nearest Neighbor  with replacement 1.944 1.603 -0.393 1.425 
Nearest 5 Neighbors with 
replacement 
1.969 1.476 -0.063 1.356 
Radius Matching ( caliper 
=0.5*SD) 
1.248 1.421 -0.263 1.226 
Radius Matching ( caliper 
=0.25*SD) 
1.605 1.470 -0.447 1.289 
Note: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1.Caliper is chosen as 1/2 of standard deviation of propensity 
score, and ¼ of standard deviation of propensity score. Standard errors reported are obtained from 
bootstrapping with 1000 replications. 
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Table 11: Robustness Check of Estimates of Average Treatment Effect on the Treated for 
Participation in Lake Recreation (Matching within Rural, Small Town, Micropolitan, and 
Metropolitan cell) 
 
 Participation Difference in Participation 
Panel (a):Unemployed and Retired People 
Matching Algorithm Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. 
Nearest Neighbor  without 
replacement 
0.071 0.048 0.096* 0.051 
Nearest Neighbor  with replacement 0.120* 0.071 0.114 0.070 
Nearest 5 Neighbors with 
replacement 
0.078 0.059 0.096* 0.059 
Radius Matching ( caliper 
=0.5*SD) 
0.077 0.052 0.113** 0.053 
Radius Matching ( caliper 
=0.25*SD) 
0.077 0.052 0.094* 0.053 
Panel (b): Unemployed and Part-time Employed 
 Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. 
Nearest Neighbor  without 
replacement 
0.164** 0.080 0.131 0.089 
Nearest Neighbor  with replacement 0.147 0.100 0.097 0.112 
Nearest 5 Neighbors with 
replacement 
0.129 0.080 0.142 0.091 
Radius Matching ( caliper 
=0.5*SD) 
0.133* 0.071 0.116 0.083 
Radius Matching ( caliper 
=0.25*SD) 
0.095 0.072 0.094 0.087 
Panel (c):Retired 
 Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. 
Nearest Neighbor  without 
replacement 
0.017 0.059 -0.023 0.061 
Nearest Neighbor  with replacement 0.025 0.090 0.044 0.079 
Nearest 5 Neighbors with 
replacement 
0.053 0.076 0.016 0.069 
Radius Matching ( caliper 
=0.5*SD) 
0.058 0.070 0.020 0.067 
Radius Matching ( caliper 
=0.25*SD) 
0.055 0.077 0.015 0.068 
Note: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1.Caliper is chosen as 1/2 of standard deviation of propensity 
score, and ¼ of standard deviation of propensity score. Standard errors reported are obtained from 
bootstrapping with 1000 replications. 
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Table 12: Robustness Check of Estimates of Average Treatment Effect on the Treated for Total 
Number of Trips (Matching within Rural, Small Town, Micropolitan, and Metropolitan cell) 
 
 Total Trip Difference in Total Trip 
Panel (a):Unemployed and Retired People 
Matching Algorithm Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. 
Nearest Neighbor  without 
replacement 
0.750 0.938 0.750 0.863 
Nearest Neighbor  with replacement 0.795 1.365 0.660 1.327 
Nearest 5 Neighbors with 
replacement 
0.227 1.160 -0.023 1.004 
Radius Matching ( caliper =0.5*SD) 0.302 0.977 0.219 0.844 
Radius Matching ( caliper =0.25*SD) 0.148 0.994 -0.217 0.843 
Panel (b): Unemployed and Part-time Employed 
 Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. 
Nearest Neighbor  without 
replacement 
0.950 1.222 1.767 1.191 
Nearest Neighbor  with replacement 1.200 1.594 1.983 1.483 
Nearest 5 Neighbors with 
replacement 
0.146 1.239 0.617 1.188 
Radius Matching ( caliper =0.5*SD) 0.059 1.151 0.321 1.026 
Radius Matching ( caliper =0.25*SD) -0.168 1.272 -0.245 1.110 
Panel (c):Retired 
 Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. 
Nearest Neighbor  without 
replacement 
0.659 1.379 -0.970 1.199 
Nearest Neighbor  with replacement 0.999 1.663 -0.838 1.502 
Nearest 5 Neighbors with 
replacement 
2.015 1.478 -0.114 1.368 
Radius Matching ( caliper =0.5*SD) 1.651 1.424 -0.333 1.256 
Radius Matching ( caliper =0.25*SD) 1.664 1.608 -0.818 1.320 
Note: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1.Caliper is chosen as 1/2 of standard deviation of propensity 
score, and ¼ of standard deviation of propensity score. Standard errors reported are obtained from 
bootstrapping with 1000 replications. 
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Table 13: Water Quality at the Destination Lakes, Employment Status, and Trip taking Behavior  
 
Variables Participation Total Number of Trips 
 All 
(Unemployed 
and retired) 
Unemployed 
Only 
Retired 
Only 
All 
(Unemployed 
and retired) 
Unemployed 
Only 
Retired 
Only 
Panel(a): Include Fixed Effects 
Treatment* Recession 
(standard error) 
0.069*** 
( 0.003) 
0.166***  
(0.005) 
0.002  
(0.003) 
0.143***  
(0.048) 
1.32*** 
(0.059) 
-0.68***   
(0.067) 
Recession +(sig) +(sig) +(sig) -(sig) (-sig) (-sig) 
Secchi Depth +( insig) -( insig) +(insig) +(insig) +(insig) +(insig) 
Total Nitrogen +( insig) -( insig) +(insig) +(insig) -(insig) -(insig) 
Total Phosphorus -( insig ) +( insig) -( insig) -( insig) -( insig) -( insig) 
Inorganic Suspended 
Solid 
+( insig) -( insig) -( insig) +( insig) +( insig) +( insig) 
Volatile Suspended 
Solid 
+( insig) -( insig) +(insig) -(insig) -(insig) -(insig) 
Chlorophyll +( insig) -( insig) +(insig) +(insig) +(insig) +(insig) 
Individual FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Panel(b): Include Demographics 
Treatment*Recession 
(standard error) 
0.073*** 
(0.003) 
0.18*** 
(0.005) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
0.299***  
(0.047) 
1.399*** 
(0.059) 
-0.484***  
(0.065) 
Recession +(sig) +(sig) +(sig) -(sig) (-sig) (-sig) 
Secchi Depth - (insig) - (insig) - (insig) - (insig) - (insig) - (insig) 
Total Nitrogen - (insig) - (insig) - (insig) - (insig) - (insig) - (insig) 
Total Phosphorus +(insig) +(insig) +(insig) -(insig) -(insig) +(insig) 
Inorganic Suspended 
Solid 
-(insig) -(insig) -(insig) -(insig) +(insig) +(insig) 
Volatile Suspended 
Solid   
+(insig) +(insig) +(insig) -(insig) -(insig) -(insig) 
Chlorophyll -(insig) -(insig) -(insig) -(insig) -(insig) -(insig) 
Age -(sig) -(sig) -(sig) -(sig) -(sig) -(sig) 
Education +(sig) +(sig) +(sig) +(sig) -(sig) +(sig) 
Child -(sig) -(sig) -(sig) -(sig) -(sig) -(sig) 
Adults +(sig) +(sig) +(sig) +(sig) +(sig) +(sig) 
Note: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1. Demographics include age, education, children under age 2 and number of 
adults in the households. Since the magnitude of water quality indicators are extremely low in magnitude, we report 
their sign and statistical significance for convenience. All specifications estimate a recession indicator. In the fixed 
effect framework, treatment indicator is dropped. Although not reported here, we estimate models with three-way 
interaction among water quality measures, treatment indicator, and recession year. The estimate on the three-way 
interaction term never turned out to be significant but the interaction term between treatment indicator and 
recession year remain unaltered. 
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Table 14: County level Unemployment and Participation in Lake Recreation 
Panel (a): Sample used in DID matching estimator 
 I II III IV V 
County  Unemployment  Rate -0.059*** 
[0.014] 
-0.0454*** 
[0.013] 
-0.0168 
[0.014] 
-0.0380*** 
[0.013] 
0.044 
[0.027] 
Recession Year -0.165*** 
[0.056] 
-0.0895 
[0.056] 
-0.143* 
[0.059] 
-0.0117 
[0.069] 
0.114 
[0.113] 
Recession*County 
Unemployment rate 
0.0371** 
[0.012] 
0.0287** 
[0.011] 
0.0113 
[0.012] 
0.0139 
[0.013] 
-0.0550** 
[0.026] 
Constant 0.975*** 
[0.060] 
0.951*** 
[0.053] 
0.867** 
[0.052] 
0.919*** 
[0.054] 
0.628*** 
[0.103] 
Linear Trend  YES    
Quadratic Trend   YES   
County specific linear trend    YES  
County specific quadratic trend    YES 
Sample Size 971 971 971 971 971 
Panel (b): Balanced Sample 
 I II III IV V 
Recession Year -0.222 
[0.047] 
-0.136** 
[0.048] 
-0.182*** 
[0.048] 
-0.115* 
[0.052] 
-0.011 
[0.077] 
County  Unemployment  Rate -0.061 
[0.010] 
-0.0428*** 
[0.010] 
-0.020 
[0.012] 
-0.0479*** 
[0.010] 
-0.008 
[0.018] 
Recession*County 
Unemployment rate 
0.045 
[0.009] 
0.0336*** 
[0.009] 
0.0192* 
[0.010] 
0.0315** 
[0.010] 
-0.013 
[0.017] 
Linear Trend  YES    
Quadratic Trend   YES   
county specific trend    YES  
county specific quadratic 
trend 
    YES 
constant 0.956 
[0.042] 
0.926*** 
[-0.040] 
0.933*** 
[-0.039] 
0.947*** 
[-0.041] 
0.897*** 
[-0.056] 
Sample Size 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 
Panel(c): Unbalanced Sample 
 I II III IV V 
Recession Year -0.221*** 
[0.038] 
-0.146*** 
[0.038] 
-0.198*** 
[0.038] 
-0.138** 
[0.042] 
-0.105 
[0.072] 
County  Unemployment Rate -0.055*** 
[0.008] 
-0.042*** 
[0.008] 
-0.017* 
(0.009) 
-0.045*** 
(0.009) 
-0.011 
(0.015) 
Recession*County 
Unemployment rate 
0.042*** 
[0.008] 
0.034*** 
[0.007] 
0.019* 
[0.008] 
0.033*** 
[0.008] 
0.002 
[0.015] 
Linear Trend  YES    
Quadratic Trend   YES   
county specific trend    YES  
county specific quadratic trend     YES 
Constant 0.931*** 
[0.037] 
0.926*** 
[0.032] 
0.947*** 
[0.030] 
0.942*** 
[0.036] 
0.930*** 
[0.049] 
Sample Size 3020 3020 3020 3020 3020 
Note: Standard errors are reported in bracket. ***, **, and * indicates significance at 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 
percent level.
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APPENDIX A. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 2 
Table A1: Difference between treatment and control groups before matching 
 
    
Group 1(Unemployed and Retired) 
  
  
 
Group 2(Unemployed) 
 
Group 3(Retired) 
Variable Mean 
Treated 
Mean 
Control 
%bias P 
value 
 
Mean 
Treated 
Mean 
Control 
%bias P 
value 
 
Mean 
Control 
Mean 
Treated 
%bias P 
value 
 
             
 Age 5.16 4.43 93.90 0.00 4.75 4.43 39.30 0.00 4.43 5.45 145.80 0.00 
Age square 27.28 20.21 95.80 0.00 23.22 20.21 40.90 0.00 20.21 30.05 146.50 0.00 
Gender 1.35 1.25 23.80 0.01 1.43 1.25 39.10 0.00 1.25 1.30 13.00 0.23 
Education 3.27 3.38 -10.80 0.21 3.17 3.38 -20.60 0.11 3.38 3.34 -4.40 0.68 
Age*Education 16.52 14.87 28.90 0.00 14.70 14.87 -3.10 0.81 14.87 17.76 50.30 0.00 
Education*Gender 4.31 4.11 9.40 0.27 4.43 4.11 14.70 0.24 4.11 4.23 5.60 0.61 
Number of 
Children in 
Household 
0.31 0.94 -63.30 0.00 0.49 0.94 -42.90 0.00 0.94 0.18 -79.20 0.00 
Rural 0.10 0.15 -15.00 0.11 0.10 0.15 -17.60 0.21 0.15 0.11 -13.20 0.26 
Small Town 0.21 0.21 0.50 0.95 0.30 0.21 20.80 0.09 0.21 0.15 -15.20 0.19 
Micropolitan 0.15 0.13 4.60 0.59 0.17 0.13 11.70 0.35 0.13 0.13 -0.60 0.96 
Boat Activity 0.43 0.55 -25.50 0.00 0.43 0.55 -24.90 0.06 0.55 0.42 -25.90 0.02 
Hunting 0.04 0.06 -11.80 0.21 0.02 0.06 -25.10 0.12 0.06 0.05 -4.50 0.69 
Fishing 0.50 0.51 -1.80 0.84 0.49 0.51 -4.00 0.76 0.51 0.51 -0.30 0.98 
Total Number of 
Trips 
7.07 7.35 -2.60 0.76 4.70 7.35 -29.90 0.04 7.35 8.70 11.20 0.25 
Take overnight 
Trips 
0.37 0.46 -16.60 0.06 0.27 0.46 -39.30 0.00 0.46 0.45 -2.00 0.85 
Mean Bias 27.0 24.9 34.5 
Median Bias 15.00 24.9 13.00 
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Table A2: Balancing for Matching with all Covariates for Treatment Group Consisting Unemployed and Retired (Group Two) 
 
Nearest Neighbor  without replacement Nearest Neighbor with replacement Nearest 5 Neighbors with replacement 
 
 
Mean 
Treated 
Mean 
Control 
%bias P value Mean 
Treated 
Mean 
Control 
%bias P 
value 
Mean 
Treated 
Mean 
Control 
%bias P 
value 
Age 5.14 5.16 -1.70 0.88 5.14 5.20 -6.70 0.56 5.14 5.15 -1.10 0.93 
Age square 27.08 27.16 -1.10 0.93 27.08 27.58 -6.70 0.57 27.08 27.15 -1.00 0.94 
Gender 1.35 1.29 14.30 0.22 1.35 1.33 4.30 0.72 1.35 1.36 -1.90 0.87 
Education 3.27 3.37 -9.40 0.43 3.27 3.33 -5.60 0.64 3.27 3.40 -11.60 0.33 
Age*Education 16.55 17.11 -9.90 0.43 16.55 17.28 -12.70 0.31 16.55 17.26 -12.60 0.32 
Education*Gender 4.31 4.22 4.70 0.71 4.31 4.35 -1.90 0.88 4.31 4.58 -12.70 0.32 
No of Children in Household 0.31 0.31 0.70 0.94 0.31 0.27 4.60 0.57 0.31 0.31 0.30 0.97 
Rural 0.10 0.11 -2.00 0.85 0.10 0.08 5.90 0.56 0.10 0.10 2.00 0.85 
Small Town 0.22 0.22 -1.60 0.89 0.22 0.20 4.80 0.67 0.22 0.20 4.00 0.72 
Micropolitan 0.15 0.14 1.90 0.87 0.15 0.16 -3.80 0.75 0.15 0.13 6.50 0.57 
Boat Activity 0.43 0.50 -13.20 0.25 0.43 0.48 -9.20 0.42 0.43 0.42 1.60 0.89 
Hunting 0.04 0.05 -2.90 0.78 0.04 0.04 0.00 1.00 0.04 0.06 -11.20 0.33 
Fishing 0.51 0.50 2.60 0.82 0.51 0.43 15.70 0.17 0.51 0.46 9.70 0.40 
Total Number of Trips 7.15 7.18 -0.30 0.98 7.15 7.19 -0.40 0.98 7.15 6.14 9.20 0.42 
Take overnight Trips 0.38 0.35 5.30 0.64 0.38 0.34 8.00 0.48 0.38 0.34 8.40 0.45 
Mean Bias 4.80 6.00 6.30 
Median Bias 2.60 5.60 6.50 
Radius Matching ( caliper =0.5*SD) Radius Matching ( caliper =0.25*SD) 
Mean  
Treated 
Mean  
Control 
%bias P value Mean  
Treated 
Mean  
Control 
%bias P 
value 
5.13 5.10 2.90 0.80 5.13 5.07 8.40 0.48 
26.90 26.69 2.80 0.82 26.96 26.36 8.10 0.51 
1.34 1.38 -8.10 0.51 1.34 1.36 -2.30 0.85 
3.29 3.44 -14.20 0.24 3.29 3.36 -6.70 0.58 
16.56 17.31 -13.20 0.30 16.61 16.75 -2.50 0.84 
4.29 4.68 -18.40 0.16 4.32 4.49 -8.20 0.52 
0.32 0.34 -2.40 0.78 0.32 0.40 -8.00 0.38 
0.11 0.10 0.70 0.95 0.11 0.11 -1.30 0.90 
0.22 0.19 6.70 0.56 0.22 0.20 5.70 0.62 
0.15 0.15 -1.50 0.90 0.15 0.15 -2.60 0.83 
0.44 0.43 2.10 0.86 0.44 0.45 -2.50 0.83 
0.04 0.06 -6.90 0.53 0.04 0.05 -5.70 0.60 
0.50 0.47 6.80 0.56 0.50 0.48 5.30 0.64 
5.13 6.85 2.70 0.82 5.13 6.90 2.40 0.83 
26.90 0.38 0.60 0.96 26.96 0.38 0.60 0.96 
6.00 6.00 
2.90 2.90 
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Table A3: Balancing for Matching with all Covariates for treatment group consisting unemployed (group two) 
 Nearest Neighbor  without replacement Nearest Neighbor with replacement Nearest 5 Neighbors with replacement 
 Mean  
Treated 
Mean  
Control 
%bias P value Mean 
Treated 
Mean 
Control 
%bias P value Mean 
Treated 
Mean 
Control 
%bias P value 
Age 4.68 4.67 2.10 0.91 4.68 4.68 0.00 1.00 4.68 4.67 2.10 0.91 
Age square 22.58 22.47 1.60 0.93 22.58 22.58 0.00 1.00 22.58 22.41 2.30 0.90 
Gender 1.40 1.52 -25.00 0.20 1.40 1.52 -25.00 0.20 1.40 1.43 -6.40 0.74 
Education 3.23 3.22 1.60 0.93 3.23 3.28 -4.90 0.77 3.23 3.18 5.30 0.78 
Age*Education 14.83 14.83 0.00 1.00 14.83 15.30 -8.70 0.65 14.83 14.50 6.10 0.75 
Education*Gender 4.45 4.82 -17.00 0.39 4.45 4.88 -20.10 0.29 4.45 4.45 0.00 1.00 
No of Children in Household 0.52 0.50 1.60 0.92 0.52 0.48 3.20 0.84 0.52 0.49 2.70 0.86 
Rural 0.10 0.10 0.00 1.00 0.10 0.10 0.00 1.00 0.10 0.13 -8.10 0.65 
Small Town 0.28 0.22 15.30 0.40 0.28 0.22 15.30 0.40 0.28 0.22 15.00 0.41 
Micropolitan 0.17 0.20 -9.20 0.64 0.17 0.23 -18.40 0.37 0.17 0.18 -2.80 0.89 
Boat Activity 0.42 0.50 -16.70 0.36 0.42 0.45 -6.70 0.72 0.42 0.44 -4.30 0.81 
Hunting 0.02 0.03 -8.50 0.56 0.02 0.03 -8.50 0.56 0.02 0.02 -3.40 0.80 
Fishing 0.48 0.48 0.00 1.00 0.48 0.48 0.00 1.00 0.48 0.54 -12.2 0.51 
Total Number of Trips 4.78 4.57 2.40 0.87 4.78 5.18 -4.50 0.77 4.78 4.92 -1.50 0.92 
Take overnight Trips 0.28 0.33 -10.60 0.56 0.28 0.32 -7.00 0.69 0.28 0.30 -3.10 0.86 
Mean Bias 7.40 8.20 5.00 
Median Bias 2.40 6.70 3.40 
Radius Matching ( caliper =0.5*SD) Radius Matching ( caliper =0.25*SD) 
Mean  
Treated 
Mean  
Control 
%bias P value Mean  
Treated 
Mean  
Control 
%bias P value 
4.68 4.66 2.80 0.88 4.68 4.66 2.50 0.89 
22.54 22.32 3.00 0.88 22.58 22.40 2.50 0.90 
1.41 1.40 2.50 0.90 1.40 1.39 1.80 0.93 
3.24 3.25 -0.90 0.96 3.23 3.26 -2.20 0.91 
15.09 14.91 3.20 0.86 14.83 15.01 -3.20 0.87 
4.53 4.43 4.70 0.81 4.45 4.44 0.30 0.99 
0.53 0.52 0.20 0.99 0.52 0.55 -3.10 0.84 
0.10 0.09 2.40 0.89 0.10 0.10 1.40 0.93 
0.27 0.28 -2.30 0.90 0.28 0.28 -0.10 1.00 
0.17 0.16 1.30 0.95 0.17 0.16 0.70 0.97 
0.41 0.45 -8.90 0.63 0.42 0.45 -6.10 0.74 
0.02 0.02 -3.10 0.82 0.02 0.03 -4.50 0.74 
0.47 0.50 -5.10 0.78 0.48 0.51 -5.00 0.79 
4.86 4.62 2.80 0.86 4.78 4.83 -0.60 0.97 
0.29 0.30 -3.40 0.85 0.28 0.31 -5.70 0.75 
3.10 2.60 
2.80 2.50 
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Table A4: Balancing for Matching with all Covariates for Treatment Group Consisting Retired (group three) 
 Nearest Neighbor  without replacement Nearest Neighbor with replacement Nearest 5 Neighbors with replacement 
 Mean  
Treated 
Mean  
Control 
%bias P value Mean 
Treated 
Mean 
Control 
%bias P  
value 
Mean 
Treated 
Mean 
Control 
%bias P value 
 
Age 5.42 5.37 6.50 0.61 5.42 5.37 6.50 0.61 5.42 5.38 5.10 0.69 
Age square 29.71 29.15 8.40 0.54 29.71 29.15 8.40 0.54 29.71 29.29 6.30 0.66 
Gender 1.29 1.31 -5.00 0.75 1.29 1.33 -7.50 0.63 1.29 1.27 4.90 0.75 
Education 3.34 3.56 -21.00 0.17 3.34 3.47 -12.60 0.42 3.34 3.52 -17.5 0.27 
Age*Education 17.78 18.80 -17.80 0.26 17.78 18.58 -14.10 0.36 17.78 18.34 -9.80 0.56 
Education*Gender 4.19 4.56 -17.90 0.26 4.19 4.56 -17.90 0.26 4.19 4.37 -8.70 0.60 
No of Children in Household 0.19 0.24 -4.70 0.61 0.19 0.25 -5.90 0.52 0.19 0.24 -4.90 0.61 
Rural 0.11 0.06 16.60 0.18 0.11 0.06 16.60 0.18 0.11 0.10 3.40 0.80 
Small Town 0.16 0.20 -11.70 0.44 0.16 0.18 -5.80 0.69 0.16 0.17 -4.10 0.78 
Micropolitan 0.13 0.12 3.30 0.82 0.13 0.11 6.60 0.65 0.13 0.13 2.50 0.87 
Boat Activity 0.44 0.42 4.50 0.76 0.44 0.42 4.50 0.76 0.44 0.43 1.80 0.90 
Hunting 0.06 0.06 0.00 1.00 0.06 0.10 -18.90 0.27 0.06 0.05 1.60 0.91 
Fishing 0.52 0.49 4.50 0.77 0.52 0.57 -11.20 0.46 0.52 0.52 0.00 1.00 
Total Number of Trips 8.84 10.20 -11.30 0.50 8.84 10.72 -15.60 0.36 8.84 9.70 -7.10 0.67 
Take overnight Trips 0.45 0.46 -2.30 0.88 0.45 0.49 -9.00 0.55 0.45 0.45 -0.50 0.98 
Mean Bias 9 10.7 5.2 
Median Bias 6.5 9 4.9 
Radius Matching ( caliper =0.5*SD) Radius Matching ( caliper =0.25*SD) 
Mean  
Treated 
Mean  
Control 
%bias P value Mean  
Treated 
Mean  
Control 
%bias P value 
 
5.42 5.38 4.50 0.74 5.42 5.38 4.50 0.74 
29.71 29.39 4.80 0.74 29.71 29.39 4.80 0.74 
1.29 1.28 2.50 0.87 1.29 1.28 2.50 0.87 
3.34 3.49 -14.00 0.37 3.34 3.49 -14.00 0.37 
17.78 18.40 -10.90 0.50 17.78 18.40 -10.90 0.50 
4.19 4.39 -9.40 0.56 4.19 4.39 -9.40 0.56 
0.19 0.22 -3.00 0.75 0.19 0.22 -3.00 0.75 
0.11 0.12 -0.80 0.96 0.11 0.12 -0.80 0.96 
0.16 0.18 -5.90 0.69 0.16 0.18 -5.90 0.69 
0.13 0.12 2.90 0.84 0.13 0.12 2.90 0.84 
0.44 0.44 0.30 0.98 0.44 0.44 0.30 0.98 
0.06 0.06 -3.60 0.81 0.06 0.06 -3.60 0.81 
0.52 0.51 1.50 0.92 0.52 0.51 1.50 0.92 
8.84 9.28 -3.60 0.83 8.84 9.28 -3.60 0.83 
0.45 0.49 -7.80 0.61 0.45 0.49 -7.80 0.61 
5 6.1 
3.6 4.5 
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Table B1: Placebo Exercise-Difference between Placebo Treatment and Control groups Before Matching 
 
    
Group 1(Unemployed and Retired) 
  
  
 
Group 2(Unemployed) 
 
Group 3(Retired) 
Variable Mean 
Treated 
Mean 
Control 
%bias p value 
 
Mean 
Treated 
Mean 
Control 
%bias p value 
 
Mean 
Control 
Mean 
Treated 
%bias p value 
 
             
Age 5.16 4.44 93.10 0.00 4.75 4.44 38.40 0.00 5.45 4.44 145.10 0.00 
Age square 27.28 20.27 95.00 0.00 23.22 20.27 40.00 0.00 30.05 20.27 145.60 0.00 
Gender 1.35 1.25 23.30 0.01 1.43 1.25 38.60 0.00 1.30 1.25 12.50 0.24 
Education 3.27 3.39 -11.4 0.18 3.17 3.39 -21.3 0.10 3.34 3.39 -5.00 0.63 
Age*Education 16.52 14.93 27.80 0.00 14.70 14.93 -4.20 0.75 17.76 14.93 49.20 0.00 
Education*Gender 4.31 4.12 9.00 0.29 4.43 4.12 14.40 0.25 4.23 4.12 5.20 0.63 
No of Children in 
Household 
0.31 0.93 -63.0 0.00 0.49 0.93 -42.6 0.00 0.18 0.93 -78.90 0.00 
Rural 0.10 0.15 -14.9 0.11 0.10 0.15 -17.5 0.22 0.11 0.15 -13.20 0.26 
Small Town 0.21 0.21 0.50 0.95 0.30 0.21 20.80 0.09 0.15 0.21 -15.20 0.19 
Micropolitan 0.15 0.13 5.90 0.49 0.17 0.13 13.00 0.29 0.13 0.13 0.70 0.95 
Boat Activity 0.43 0.55 -24.9 0.01 0.43 0.55 -24.3 0.06 0.42 0.55 -25.30 0.02 
Hunting 0.04 0.06 -9.40 0.32 0.02 0.06 -22.8 0.15 0.05 0.06 -2.00 0.86 
Fishing 0.50 0.51 -0.50 0.96 0.49 0.51 -2.70 0.84 0.51 0.51 1.00 0.93 
Total Number of 
Trips 
7.07 6.82 2.40 0.77 4.70 6.82 -25.0 0.08 8.70 6.82 16.00 0.09 
Take overnight 
Trips 
0.37 0.45 -15.5 0.08 0.27 0.45 -38.2 0.01 0.45 0.45 -1.00 0.93 
Mean Bias 26.4 24.3 34.4 
Median Bias 14.9 22.8 13.2 
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Table B2: Placebo Exercise-Balancing for Matching with all Covariates for Treatment Group 1(Unemployed and Retired) 
 Nearest Neighbor  without replacement Nearest Neighbor with replacement Nearest 5 Neighbors with replacement 
 Mean  
Treated 
Mean  
Control 
%bias P 
value 
Mean 
Treated 
Mean 
Control 
%bias P value Mean 
Treated 
Mean 
Control 
%bias P 
value 
Age 5.14 5.14 0.00 1.00 5.14 5.16 -1.70 0.88 5.14 5.14 5.7 0.94 
Age square 27.08 27.04 0.50 0.97 27.08 27.18 -1.40 0.91 27.08 26.99 6.1 0.92 
Gender 1.35 1.30 11.40 0.33 1.35 1.40 -10.00 0.41 1.35 1.39 -1.9 0.56 
Education 3.27 3.42 -14.40 0.23 3.27 3.44 -15.60 0.19 3.27 3.40 5.2 0.30 
Age*Education 16.55 17.28 -12.80 0.31 16.55 17.55 -17.50 0.15 16.55 17.15 8.2 0.40 
Education*Gender 4.31 4.44 -5.90 0.63 4.31 4.86 -25.80 0.05 4.31 4.66 5.5 0.20 
No of Children in Household 0.31 0.31 0.00 1.00 0.31 0.29 2.00 0.81 0.31 0.31 1.4 0.98 
Rural 0.10 0.10 2.00 0.85 0.10 0.11 -2.00 0.85 0.10 0.11 -2 0.97 
Small Town 0.22 0.22 -1.60 0.89 0.22 0.18 8.00 0.48 0.22 0.19 6 0.66 
Micropolitan 0.15 0.16 -1.90 0.88 0.15 0.16 -3.80 0.75 0.15 0.14 -1.9 0.83 
Boat Activity 0.43 0.48 -10.5 0.36 0.43 0.44 -1.30 0.91 0.43 0.42 -5.8 0.86 
Hunting 0.04 0.05 -6.10 0.59 0.04 0.07 -12.1 0.31 0.04 0.06 -1.8 0.38 
Fishing 0.51 0.45 11.70 0.31 0.51 0.44 14.40 0.21 0.51 0.48 -10 0.55 
Total Number of Trips 7.15 6.73 3.90 0.73 7.15 7.52 -3.50 0.79 7.15 6.57 1.6 0.64 
Take overnight Trips 0.38 0.39 -1.30 0.91 0.38 0.41 -5.30 0.64 0.38 0.36 -0.3 0.73 
Mean Bias 5.6 8.3 5.7 
Median Bias 3.9 5.3 5.1 
Radius Matching (caliper =0.5*SD) Radius Matching (caliper =0.25*SD) 
Mean  
Treated 
Mean  
Control 
%bias P 
value 
Mean  
Treated 
Mean  
Control 
%bias P value 
5.14 5.09 7.50 0.53 5.13 5.10 3.30 0.78 
27.08 26.56 7.00 0.57 26.90 26.67 3.20 0.80 
1.35 1.35 -0.30 0.98 1.34 1.38 -8.70 0.48 
3.27 3.37 -9.30 0.43 3.29 3.43 -14.00 0.24 
16.55 16.89 -5.90 0.64 16.56 17.28 -12.60 0.32 
4.31 4.50 -8.80 0.48 4.29 4.69 -18.90 0.15 
0.31 0.39 -7.80 0.38 0.32 0.35 -2.60 0.77 
0.10 0.11 -2.40 0.82 0.11 0.11 -0.40 0.97 
0.22 0.20 3.20 0.78 0.22 0.19 6.70 0.56 
0.15 0.16 -3.00 0.80 0.15 0.15 -1.80 0.88 
0.43 0.45 -4.10 0.72 0.44 0.43 2.20 0.85 
0.04 0.05 -4.70 0.67 0.04 0.05 -5.80 0.61 
0.51 0.48 5.10 0.66 0.50 0.47 6.70 0.56 
7.15 7.10 0.50 0.97 7.14 6.93 2.00 0.87 
0.38 0.38 0.10 0.99 0.38 0.37 1.60 0.89 
6 4.6 
3.3 4.7 
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Table B3: Placebo Exercise-Balancing for Matching with all Covariates for Treatment Group Consisting Unemployed (Group 2) 
 Nearest Neighbor  without replacement Nearest Neighbor with replacement Nearest 5 Neighbors with replacement 
 Mean  
Treated 
Mean  
Control 
%bias P value Mean 
Treated 
Mean 
Control 
%bias P value Mean 
Treated 
Mean 
Control 
%bias P 
value 
Age 4.68 4.67 2.10 0.91 4.68 4.68 0.00 1.00 4.68 4.64 5.70 0.76 
Age square 22.58 22.47 1.60 0.93 22.58 22.62 -0.50 0.98 22.58 22.13 6.10 0.74 
Gender 1.40 1.42 -3.60 0.85 1.40 1.37 7.10 0.71 1.40 1.41 -1.90 0.92 
Education 3.23 3.12 11.50 0.52 3.23 3.15 8.20 0.65 3.23 3.18 5.20 0.78 
Age*Education 14.83 14.60 4.30 0.82 14.83 14.80 0.60 0.97 14.83 14.39 8.20 0.67 
Education*Gender 4.45 4.43 0.80 0.97 4.45 4.35 4.70 0.81 4.45 4.33 5.50 0.78 
No of Children in Household 0.52 0.68 -16.0 0.35 0.52 0.70 -17.60 0.30 0.52 0.50 1.40 0.93 
Rural 0.10 0.08 5.10 0.75 0.10 0.08 5.10 0.75 0.10 0.11 -2.00 0.91 
Small Town 0.28 0.25 7.60 0.68 0.28 0.27 3.80 0.84 0.28 0.26 6.00 0.75 
Micropolitan 0.17 0.23 -18.6 0.37 0.17 0.23 -18.60 0.37 0.17 0.17 -1.90 0.92 
Boat Activity 0.42 0.48 -13.4 0.47 0.42 0.45 -6.70 0.72 0.42 0.45 -5.80 0.75 
Hunting 0.02 0.00 8.80 0.32 0.02 0.00 8.80 0.32 0.02 0.02 -1.80 0.89 
Fishing 0.48 0.50 -3.30 0.86 0.48 0.50 -3.30 0.86 0.48 0.53 -10.00 0.59 
Total Number of Trips 4.78 4.42 4.30 0.79 4.78 4.40 4.50 0.79 4.78 4.65 1.60 0.92 
Take overnight Trips 0.28 0.27 3.50 0.84 0.28 0.23 10.60 0.54 0.28 0.28 -0.30 0.99 
Mean Bias 7 6.7 4.2 
Median Bias 4.3 5.1 5.2 
Radius Matching ( caliper =0.5*SD) Radius Matching ( caliper =0.25*SD) 
Mean  
Treated 
Mean  
Control 
%bias P value Mean  
Treated 
Mean  
Control 
%bias P value 
4.68 4.65 3.20 0.87 4.68 4.66 3.10 0.87 
22.54 22.29 3.40 0.86 22.58 22.36 3.10 0.87 
1.41 1.40 1.60 0.93 1.40 1.40 0.50 0.98 
3.24 3.26 -1.80 0.92 3.23 3.25 -1.30 0.95 
15.09 14.94 2.60 0.89 14.83 14.94 -2.00 0.92 
4.53 4.46 3.30 0.87 4.45 4.44 0.30 0.99 
0.53 0.53 -0.40 0.98 0.52 0.54 -2.70 0.87 
0.10 0.09 2.40 0.89 0.10 0.09 1.70 0.92 
0.27 0.28 -2.80 0.88 0.28 0.29 -0.50 0.98 
0.17 0.17 0.90 0.96 0.17 0.16 1.90 0.92 
0.41 0.45 -9.00 0.63 0.42 0.45 -5.80 0.75 
0.02 0.02 -3.20 0.82 0.02 0.02 -4.40 0.75 
0.47 0.50 -5.90 0.75 0.48 0.50 -4.00 0.83 
4.86 4.61 3.00 0.86 4.78 4.78 0.00 1.00 
0.29 0.30 -3.50 0.85 0.28 0.31 -5.70 0.75 
2.5 3.1 
2 3 
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Table B4: Placebo Exercise-Balancing for Matching with all Covariates for Treatment Group Consisting Unemployed (Group Two) 
 Nearest Neighbor  without replacement Nearest Neighbor with replacement Nearest 5 Neighbors with replacement 
 Mean  
Treated 
Mean  
Control 
%bias P 
value 
Mean 
Treated 
Mean 
Control 
%bias P 
value 
Mean 
Treated 
Mean 
Control 
%bias P 
value 
Age 5.41 5.41 0.00 1.00 5.41 5.43 -3.30 0.80 5.41 5.39 3.20 0.81 
Age square 29.64 29.55 1.40 0.92 29.64 29.80 -2.40 0.86 29.64 29.39 3.70 0.80 
Gender 1.30 1.28 2.50 0.87 1.30 1.31 -2.50 0.87 1.30 1.26 8.10 0.60 
Education 3.33 3.47 -12.80 0.40 3.33 3.43 -9.60 0.52 3.33 3.51 -17.0 0.29 
Age*Education 17.71 18.42 -12.40 0.42 17.71 18.53 -14.4 0.31 17.71 18.47 -13.2 0.42 
Education*Gender 4.19 4.38 -8.80 0.59 4.19 4.45 -12.6 0.42 4.19 4.41 -10.3 0.54 
No of Children in Household 0.19 0.24 -4.80 0.64 0.19 0.24 -4.80 0.66 0.19 0.21 -1.30 0.89 
Rural 0.11 0.11 0.00 1.00 0.11 0.14 -6.70 0.65 0.11 0.10 3.80 0.79 
Small Town 0.16 0.14 5.90 0.67 0.16 0.13 8.80 0.52 0.16 0.18 -5.30 0.72 
Micropolitan 0.14 0.15 -3.40 0.83 0.14 0.14 0.00 1.00 0.14 0.12 4.70 0.75 
Boat Activity 0.43 0.41 4.60 0.76 0.43 0.36 13.70 0.36 0.43 0.43 -0.40 0.98 
Hunting 0.06 0.03 9.80 0.47 0.06 0.01 19.60 0.10 0.06 0.06 -2.20 0.89 
Fishing 0.51 0.48 6.80 0.65 0.51 0.44 13.60 0.37 0.51 0.49 3.70 0.81 
Total Number of Trips 8.44 7.19 10.70 0.49 8.44 8.22 1.90 0.91 8.44 8.52 -0.60 0.97 
Take overnight Trips 0.44 0.41 6.80 0.65 0.44 0.39 11.40 0.45 0.44 0.46 -4.00 0.79 
Mean Bias 6.00 8.40 5.40 
Median Bias 5.90 8.80 3.80 
Radius Matching ( caliper =0.5*SD) Radius Matching ( caliper =0.25*SD) 
Mean  
Treated 
Mean  
Control 
%bias P 
value 
Mean  
Treated 
Mean  
Control 
%bias P 
value 
5.41 5.33 10.70 0.45 5.41 5.38 4.10 0.76 
29.64 28.93 10.50 0.49 29.64 29.34 4.40 0.77 
1.30 1.27 5.50 0.72 1.30 1.27 5.30 0.73 
3.33 3.49 -14.90 0.34 3.33 3.51 -16.6 0.29 
17.71 18.22 -8.90 0.59 17.71 18.46 -13.1 0.42 
4.19 4.34 -6.90 0.67 4.19 4.38 -8.80 0.59 
0.19 0.26 -7.40 0.47 0.19 0.22 -3.30 0.73 
0.11 0.11 -0.40 0.98 0.11 0.10 2.80 0.84 
0.16 0.18 -4.50 0.76 0.16 0.18 -4.20 0.78 
0.14 0.13 2.90 0.85 0.14 0.13 1.80 0.91 
0.43 0.46 -6.30 0.68 0.43 0.44 -1.60 0.91 
0.06 0.06 0.30 0.98 0.06 0.06 -2.50 0.87 
0.51 0.49 4.30 0.78 0.51 0.50 2.10 0.89 
8.44 8.77 -2.80 0.87 8.44 8.55 -0.90 0.96 
0.44 0.46 -4.30 0.78 0.44 0.47 -4.90 0.74 
6 5.1 
5.5 4.1 
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Table C1: Balancing for Matching with all Covariates for Treatment Group Consisting Unemployed and Retired (Group One) 
 
 Nearest Neighbor  without replacement Nearest Neighbor with replacement Nearest 5 Neighbors with 
replacement 
 Mean  
Treated 
Mean  
Control 
%bias P value Mean 
Treated 
Mean 
Control 
%bias P 
value 
Mean 
Treated 
Mean 
Control 
%bias P 
value 
Age 5.14 5.16 -1.70 0.88 5.14 5.16 -2.50 0.83 5.14 5.16 -2.50 0.83 
Age square 27.08 27.17 -1.20 0.92 27.08 27.24 -2.20 0.85 27.08 27.22 -2.00 0.87 
Gender 1.35 1.30 11.50 0.33 1.35 1.35 1.40 0.91 1.35 1.34 2.90 0.81 
Education 3.27 3.54 -25.0 0.04 3.27 3.37 -9.40 0.42 3.27 3.43 -14.9 0.20 
Age*Education 16.55 17.87 -23.2 0.06 16.55 17.12 -10.1 0.38 16.55 17.60 -18.4 0.13 
Education*Gender 4.31 4.52 -9.60 0.43 4.31 4.47 -7.50 0.53 4.31 4.54 -10.8 0.37 
No of Children in 
Household 
0.31 0.38 -6.60 0.45 0.31 0.34 -2.60 0.76 0.31 0.29 2.50 0.76 
Rural 0.10 0.12 -3.90 0.72 0.10 0.11 -2.00 0.85 0.10 0.09 4.20 0.68 
Small Town 0.22 0.23 -3.20 0.78 0.22 0.20 3.20 0.78 0.22 0.20 3.80 0.74 
Micropolitan 0.15 0.14 3.80 0.75 0.15 0.13 5.60 0.62 0.15 0.12 7.40 0.52 
Mean Bias 9.00 4.70 6.90  
Median Bias 5.20 2.90 4.00  
Radius Matching ( caliper =0.5*SD) Radius Matching ( caliper =0.25*SD) 
Mean  
Treated 
Mean  
Control 
%bias P value Mean  
Treated 
Mean  
Control 
%bias P 
value 
5.14 5.09 6.90 0.56 5.14 5.12 3.50 0.77 
27.08 26.60 6.50 0.60 27.08 26.83 3.40 0.78 
1.35 1.34 3.80 0.75 1.35 1.36 -0.90 0.94 
3.27 3.35 -7.10 0.55 3.27 3.42 -14.1 0.23 
16.55 16.75 -3.50 0.78 16.55 17.26 -12.5 0.32 
4.31 4.40 -3.90 0.75 4.31 4.57 -11.9 0.34 
0.31 0.41 -9.60 0.29 0.31 0.34 -2.80 0.74 
0.10 0.11 -2.70 0.80 0.10 0.09 5.50 0.59 
0.22 0.20 2.60 0.82 0.22 0.23 -2.60 0.83 
0.15 0.15 1.20 0.92 0.15 0.14 2.00 0.86 
48.00 5.90 
3.90 3.40 
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Table C2: Balancing for Matching with all Covariates for Treatment Group Consisting Unemployed (Group Two) 
 
 Nearest Neighbor  without replacement Nearest Neighbor with replacement Nearest 5 Neighbors with replacement 
 Mean  
Treated 
Mean  
Control 
%bias P value Mean 
Treated 
Mean 
Control 
%bias P value Mean 
Treated 
Mean 
Control 
%bias P 
value 
Age 4.726 4.839 -14.20 0.447 4.726 4.839 -14.20 0.447 4.726 4.833 -13.40 0.456 
Age square 23.016 24.065 -14.20 0.458 23.016 24.065 -14.20 0.458 23.016 23.928 -12.40 0.506 
Gender 1.419 1.403 3.500 0.857 1.419 1.403 3.500 0.857 1.419 1.353 14.30 0.450 
Education 3.210 3.097 11.10 0.527 3.210 3.097 11.10 0.527 3.210 3.081 12.70 0.486 
Age*Education 14.839 14.871 -0.600 0.972 14.839 14.871 -0.60 0.972 14.839 14.526 5.80 0.757 
Education*Gender 4.468 4.274 9.000 0.624 4.468 4.274 9.00 0.624 4.468 4.004 21.60 0.253 
No of Children in 
Household 
0.500 0.500 0.000 1.000 0.500 0.500 0.00 1.00 0.500 0.457 4.20 0.771 
Rural 0.097 0.129 -9.800 0.574 0.097 0.129 -9.80 0.574 0.097 0.103 -1.80 0.911 
Small Town 0.290 0.274 3.700 0.843 0.290 0.274 3.70 0.843 0.290 0.297 -1.60 0.934 
Micropolitan 0.177 0.145 8.900 0.629 0.177 0.145 8.90 0.629 0.177 0.133 12.40 0.496 
Mean Bias 7.50 7.50 10.00 
Median Bias 9.00 9.00 12.40 
Radius Matching ( caliper =0.5*SD) Radius Matching (caliper =0.25*SD) 
Mean  
Treated 
Mean  
Control 
%bias P value Mean  
Treated 
Mean  
Control 
%bias P value 
4.726 4.710 1.900 0.918 4.726 4.748 -2.800 0.884 
23.016 22.862 2.100 0.913 23.016 23.245 -3.100 0.872 
1.419 1.405 3.200 0.868 1.419 1.402 3.700 0.845 
3.210 3.202 0.700 0.968 3.210 3.214 -0.400 0.981 
14.839 14.760 1.500 0.936 14.839 15.029 -3.500 0.843 
4.468 4.368 4.600 0.808 4.468 4.426 1.900 0.919 
0.500 0.538 -3.700 0.812 0.500 0.496 0.300 0.982 
0.097 0.101 -1.400 0.934 0.097 0.093 1.200 0.941 
0.290 0.280 2.300 0.904 0.290 0.292 -0.400 0.984 
0.177 0.172 1.600 0.934 0.177 0.170 2.200 0.909 
2.3 2.0 
2.0 2.1 
 
 
 
 
6
2
 
63 
 
 
 
Table C3: Balancing for Matching with all Covariates for Treatment Group Consisting Retired (Group Three) 
 
 Nearest Neighbor  without replacement Nearest Neighbor with replacement Nearest 5 Neighbors with 
replacement 
 Mean  
Treated 
Mean  
Control 
%bias P 
value 
Mean 
Treated 
Mean 
Control 
%bias P 
value 
Mean 
Treated 
Mean 
Control 
%bias P 
value 
Age 5.422 5.422 0.000 1.000 5.422 5.422 0.000 1.000 5.422 5.423 -0.100 0.994 
Age square 29.778 29.778 0.000 1.000 29.778 29.778 0.000 1.000 29.778 29.777 0.000 0.999 
Gender 1.300 1.244 12.400 0.405 1.300 1.256 9.900 0.508 1.300 1.244 12.500 0.401 
Education 3.344 3.578 -21.80 0.161 3.344 3.489 -13.50 0.385 3.344 3.500 -14.60 0.364 
Age*Education 17.844 19.200 -23.50 0.132 17.844 18.733 -15.40 0.307 17.844 18.725 -15.30 0.347 
Education*Gender 4.233 4.378 -7.000 0.636 4.233 4.300 -3.200 0.825 4.233 4.294 -2.900 0.847 
No of Children in 
Household 
0.189 0.200 -1.200 0.903 0.189 0.189 0.000 1.000 0.189 0.175 1.500 0.875 
Rural 0.111 0.111 0.000 1.000 0.111 0.133 -6.600 0.651 0.111 0.141 -9.000 0.544 
Small Town 0.156 0.156 0.000 1.000 0.156 0.111 11.500 0.383 0.156 0.125 8.000 0.552 
Micropolitan 0.133 0.133 0.000 1.000 0.133 0.111 6.600 0.651 0.133 0.115 5.500 0.709 
Mean Bias 6.600 6.700 6.900 
Median Bias 0.600 6.600 6.000 
Radius Matching ( caliper =0.5*SD) Radius Matching ( caliper 
=0.25*SD) 
Mean  
Treated 
Mean  
Control 
%bias P 
value 
Mean  
Treated 
Mean  
Control 
%bias P 
value 
5.422 5.380 6.100 0.661 5.422 5.433 -1.60 0.904 
29.778 29.391 5.800 0.698 29.778 29.898 -1.80 0.900 
1.300 1.273 6.200 0.685 1.300 1.271 6.40 0.671 
3.344 3.429 -7.900 0.608 3.344 3.430 -8.00 0.608 
17.844 18.242 -6.900 0.665 17.844 18.495 -11.30 0.478 
4.233 4.285 -2.500 0.873 4.233 4.272 -1.90 0.904 
0.189 0.246 -6.000 0.543 0.189 0.222 -3.50 0.718 
0.111 0.112 -0.200 0.990 0.111 0.121 -2.80 0.844 
0.156 0.176 -5.300 0.714 0.156 0.162 -1.70 0.906 
0.133 0.142 -2.500 0.869 0.133 0.130 1.10 0.943 
4.900 4.000 
5.900 2.300 
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Table D1: Balancing of Covariates for Matching within Rural, Urban, Micropolitan and Metropolitan Cell (Group 1: Unemployed and Retired) 
 Nearest Neighbor  without replacement Nearest Neighbor with replacement Nearest 5 Neighbors with replacement 
 Mean  
Treated 
Mean  
Control 
%bias P value Mean 
Treated 
Mean 
Control 
%bias P 
value 
Mean 
Treated 
Mean 
Control 
%bias P value 
Age 5.16 5.12 5.00 0.66 5.16 5.16 0.00 1.00 5.16 5.16 -0.10 1.00 
Age square 27.28 26.77 6.80 0.56 27.28 27.27 0.20 0.99 27.28 27.27 0.10 0.99 
Gender 1.35 1.30 12.70 0.28 1.35 1.34 4.20 0.72 1.35 1.35 1.60 0.89 
Education 3.27 3.48 -19.70 0.09 3.27 3.32 -4.90 0.68 3.27 3.50 -22.1 0.06 
Age*Education 16.52 17.47 -16.60 0.18 16.52 16.50 0.30 0.98 16.52 17.91 -24.4 0.05 
Education*Gender 4.31 4.37 -3.10 0.81 4.31 4.22 4.30 0.73 4.31 4.67 -17.3 0.18 
No of Children in 
Household 
0.31 0.31 0.00 1.00 0.31 0.30 0.60 0.94 0.31 0.34 -2.60 0.76 
Boat Activity 0.43 0.51 -16.90 0.14 0.43 0.43 -1.30 0.91 0.43 0.45 -4.90 0.67 
Hunting 0.04 0.03 2.90 0.76 0.04 0.01 11.60 0.15 0.04 0.06 -8.70 0.43 
Fishing 0.50 0.49 2.60 0.82 0.50 0.39 21.90 0.05 0.50 0.48 4.30 0.71 
Total Number of Trips 7.07 7.07 0.00 1.00 7.07 6.94 1.20 0.91 7.07 6.82 2.30 0.84 
Take overnight Trips 0.37 0.39 -2.60 0.82 0.37 0.31 13.10 0.23 0.37 0.39 -2.30 0.84 
Mean Bias 7.40 5.30 7.60 
Median Bias 4.00 2.80 3.50 
Radius Matching ( caliper =0.5*SD) Radius Matching ( caliper =0.25*SD) 
Mean  
Treated 
Mean  
Control 
%bias P value Mean  
Treated 
Mean  
Control 
%bias P 
value 
5.11 5.06 5.70 0.64 5.08 5.07 1.50 0.90 
26.71 26.34 5.10 0.68 26.39 26.31 1.10 0.93 
1.33 1.31 5.90 0.62 1.33 1.35 -3.30 0.79 
3.29 3.39 -9.00 0.45 3.33 3.46 -11.9 0.33 
16.53 16.95 -7.30 0.56 16.65 17.35 -12.3 0.33 
4.28 4.37 -4.50 0.72 4.33 4.60 -12.8 0.33 
0.33 0.39 -6.80 0.46 0.34 0.37 -3.00 0.75 
0.44 0.46 -3.50 0.77 0.44 0.44 -0.20 0.99 
0.04 0.05 -6.00 0.59 0.04 0.05 -5.40 0.64 
0.50 0.48 3.80 0.75 0.50 0.47 6.50 0.59 
7.22 7.13 0.80 0.95 7.15 6.79 3.30 0.77 
0.39 0.39 -1.20 0.92 0.38 0.38 0.60 0.96 
5.00 5.20 
5.40 3.30 
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Table D2: Balancing of Covariates for Matching within Rural, Urban, Micropolitan and Metropolitan Cell (Group Two: Unemployed) 
 
 Nearest Neighbor  without replacement Nearest Neighbor with replacement Nearest 5 Neighbors with replacement 
 Mean  
Treated 
Mean  
Control 
%bias P value Mean 
Treated 
Mean 
Control 
%bias P value Mean 
Treated 
Mean 
Control 
%bias P value 
Age 4.700 4.733 -4.200 0.823 4.700 4.733 -4.200 0.818 4.700 4.710 -1.200 0.949 
Age square 22.767 23.033 -3.600 0.849 22.767 22.967 -2.700 0.884 22.767 22.794 -0.400 0.984 
Gender 1.417 1.417 0.000 1.000 1.417 1.400 3.600 0.854 1.417 1.400 3.500 0.858 
Education 3.233 3.217 1.600 0.928 3.233 3.150 8.200 0.649 3.233 3.208 2.500 0.893 
Age*Education 15.133 15.017 2.200 0.906 15.133 14.750 7.100 0.696 15.133 14.740 7.300 0.694 
Education*Gender 4.550 4.400 7.000 0.710 4.550 4.250 13.900 0.447 4.550 4.323 10.600 0.595 
No of Children in Household 0.517 0.450 6.400 0.676 0.517 0.417 9.600 0.531 0.517 0.450 6.400 0.675 
Boat Activity 0.417 0.383 6.700 0.712 0.417 0.383 6.700 0.712 0.417 0.431 -2.900 0.873 
Hunting 0.017 0.000 8.500 0.319 0.017 0.000 8.500 0.319 0.017 0.020 -1.700 0.893 
Fishing 0.483 0.417 13.300 0.467 0.483 0.417 13.300 0.467 0.483 0.482 0.200 0.990 
Total Number of Trips 4.783 5.600 -9.200 0.599 4.783 5.567 -8.800 0.617 4.783 5.254 -5.300 0.738 
Take overnight Trips 0.283 0.300 -3.500 0.842 0.283 0.267 3.500 0.840 0.283 0.317 -7.000 0.693 
Mean Bias 5.500 7.500 4.100 
Median Bias 5.300 7.700 3.200 
Radius Matching ( caliper =0.5*SD) Radius Matching ( caliper =0.25*SD) 
Mean 
Treated 
Mean 
Control 
%bias P value Mean 
Treated 
Mean 
Control 
%bias P value 
4.655 4.672 -2.100 0.913 4.700 4.694 0.800 0.968 
22.310 22.466 -2.100 0.912 22.767 22.705 0.800 0.966 
1.397 1.393 0.700 0.972 1.417 1.378 8.200 0.671 
3.241 3.232 0.900 0.960 3.233 3.210 2.300 0.899 
15.034 14.891 2.700 0.885 15.133 14.759 6.900 0.701 
4.500 4.392 5.000 0.795 4.550 4.301 11.600 0.542 
0.534 0.551 -1.600 0.920 0.517 0.567 -4.800 0.763 
0.431 0.485 -10.800 0.566 0.417 0.465 -9.700 0.596 
0.017 0.020 -1.400 0.912 0.017 0.026 -4.700 0.730 
0.500 0.496 0.900 0.963 0.483 0.480 0.600 0.974 
4.828 4.853 -0.300 0.985 4.783 5.045 -2.900 0.850 
0.293 0.310 -3.600 0.844 0.283 0.320 -7.700 0.666 
2.700 5.100 
1.800 4.700 
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Table D3: Balancing of Covariates for Matching within Region-Rural, Urban, Micropolitan and Metropolitan (Group Three: Retired) 
 
  Nearest Neighbor  without replacement Nearest Neighbor with replacement Nearest 5 Neighbors with replacement 
 Mean  
Treated 
Mean  
Control 
%bias P value Mean 
Treated 
Mean 
Control 
%bias P value Mean 
Treated 
Mean 
Control 
%bias P 
value 
Age 5.44 5.32 17.40 0.19 5.44 5.42 3.20 0.81 5.44 5.42 3.50 0.80 
Age square 29.99 28.64 20.10 0.16 29.99 29.73 3.90 0.79 29.99 29.70 4.40 0.76 
Gender 1.30 1.31 -2.50 0.87 1.30 1.33 -7.40 0.63 1.30 1.31 -3.10 0.84 
Education 3.35 3.70 -32.90 0.03 3.35 3.44 -8.20 0.59 3.35 3.52 -16.00 0.30 
Age*Education 17.96 19.59 -28.40 0.06 17.96 18.42 -8.00 0.59 17.96 18.88 -16.10 0.28 
Education*Gender 4.23 4.54 -14.80 0.36 4.23 4.58 -16.90 0.28 4.23 4.57 -16.20 0.30 
No of Children in Household 0.19 0.37 -19.60 0.07 0.19 0.18 1.20 0.89 0.19 0.15 3.50 0.67 
Boat Activity 0.43 0.51 -16.70 0.26 0.43 0.55 -24.30 0.10 0.43 0.48 -10.00 0.50 
Hunting 0.05 0.06 -3.60 0.81 0.05 0.13 -31.10 0.09 0.05 0.07 -7.70 0.62 
Fishing 0.52 0.39 25.80 0.08 0.52 0.46 10.70 0.47 0.52 0.38 27.20 0.07 
Total Number of Trips 8.79 7.16 13.50 0.37 8.79 6.95 15.30 0.28 8.79 6.66 17.70 0.23 
Take overnight Trips 0.45 0.44 1.90 0.90 0.45 0.38 14.00 0.34 0.45 0.39 11.90 0.42 
Mean Bias 16.40 12.00 11.40 
Median Bias 17.10 9.50 11.00 
Radius Matching ( caliper =0.5*SD) Radius Matching ( caliper =0.25*SD) 
Mean 
Treated 
Mean 
Control 
%bias P value Mean 
Treated 
Mean 
Control 
%bias P value 
5.43 5.36 11.20 0.44 5.41 5.39 3.50 0.81 
29.92 29.17 11.20 0.47 29.71 29.47 3.70 0.81 
1.29 1.30 -2.20 0.89 1.29 1.30 -3.10 0.84 
3.37 3.37 -0.40 0.98 3.36 3.42 -6.30 0.69 
18.02 17.82 3.50 0.82 17.89 18.25 -6.30 0.68 
4.23 4.26 -1.50 0.92 4.21 4.31 -4.90 0.75 
0.19 0.25 -6.00 0.54 0.20 0.21 -1.40 0.88 
0.43 0.51 -16.40 0.28 0.45 0.53 -16.60 0.28 
0.06 0.07 -5.60 0.71 0.06 0.08 -8.50 0.60 
0.51 0.43 17.10 0.25 0.53 0.40 25.00 0.10 
8.77 6.78 16.50 0.27 9.06 6.57 20.60 0.17 
0.46 0.38 14.40 0.33 0.47 0.40 14.00 0.36 
8.80 9.50 
8.60 6.30 
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Table E1: Validity of Common Support Condition- Number of Unmatched and Matched 
Treatments                             
 Unemployed and Retired 
(Group 1) 
Unemployed 
(Group 2) 
Retired 
(Group 3) 
 (a) Matching with all Covariates included 
 Unmatched Matched Total Unmatched Matched Total Unmatched Matched Total 
Nearest Neighbor  
without 
replacement 
2 153 155 3 60 63 3 89 92 
Nearest Neighbor  
with replacement 
2 153 155 3 60 63 3 89 92 
Nearest 5 
Neighbors with 
replacement 
2 153 155 3 60 63 3 89 92 
Radius Matching 
( caliper 
=0.5*SD) 
4 151 155 3 60 63 3 89 92 
Radius Matching 
( caliper 
=0.25*SD) 
5 150 155 4 59 63 3 89 92 
 (b) Matching with a subset of Covariates included 
 Unmatched matched Total Unmatched matched Total Unmatched matched Total 
Nearest Neighbor  
without 
replacement 
2 153 155 1 62 63 2 90 92 
Nearest Neighbor  
with replacement 
2 153 155 1 62 63 2 90 92 
Nearest 5 
Neighbors with 
replacement 
2 153 155 1 62 63 2 90 92 
Radius Matching 
( caliper 
=0.5*SD) 
2 153 155 1 62 63 2 90 92 
Radius Matching 
( caliper 
=0.25*SD) 
2 153 155 1 62 63 2 90 92 
 (c) Matching within Rural, Urban, Micropolitan and Metropolitan Cell 
 Unmatched matched Total Unmatched matched Total Unmatched matched Total 
Nearest Neighbor  
without 
replacement 
0 155 155 3 60 63 1 91 92 
Nearest Neighbor  
with replacement 
0 155 155 3 60 63 1 91 92 
Nearest 5 
Neighbors with 
replacement 
0 155 155 3 60 63 1 91 92 
Radius Matching 
( caliper 
=0.5*SD) 
8 147 155 4 59 63 2 90 92 
Radius Matching 
( caliper 
=0.25*SD) 
13 142 155 6 57 63 5 87 92 
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CHAPTER 3. DOES JOB LOSS DURING RECESSION AFFECT 
RECREATIONEXPENDITURE? AN INVESTIGATION INTO PANEL 
STUDY OF INCOME DYNAMICS DATA 
 
1. Introduction 
The 2008–2009 recession affected individual economic well-being through job loss, stock 
market crashes, and falling real estate prices, which generated low consumer confidence. Job loss 
almost always causes household income to shrink, and in response to reduced income, spending 
on normal goods is supposed to fall. However, unemployment also reduces the opportunity cost 
of time, and, for some household members allows more time to spend on time-intensive 
activities, such as recreation. This opposing effects of lower income and cheaper time motivates 
the research question of how households experiencing a job loss during a recession change 
expenditures on time-intensive trips and recreation.  
The association between recessionary job loss and recreation expenditure is a relatively 
untapped area. This paper is one of the few to investigate the impact of unemployment and 
retirement during a recession on household recreation, and is the first in exploiting a national 
longitudinal dataset to address this research question. To the best of our knowledge, this is also 
the first endeavor in framing the recession as a quasi-experimental setting and applying treatment 
effect framework to study households’ counterfactual behaviors. A number of studies examined 
the impact of great recession on physical and mental health (Ruhm 2000; 2005; Dehejia and 
Lleras-Muney 2004; Currie and Schwandt 2014; Currie and Tekin 2014), where, in most cases 
the authors captured the intensity of recession through variation in aggregate unemployment over 
time and across states, metropolitan statistical areas, or county. Only recently have studies begun 
to address for individual heterogeneity (McInerney, Mellor, and Nicholas 2013; Marcus 2013; 
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Currie, Duque, and Garfinkel 2015). Although outdoor recreation is an important part of 
Americans’ daily lives and the industry is comparable to that of the automobile industry in size 
(OIF 2010; Loomis and Keske 2012), similar studies focusing on recreation are not common.  
Our economics literature search suggests that Loomis and Keske (2012) is the only study 
that explored the relationship between recession and recreation. Exploiting two intercept surveys 
conducted in 2006 and 2009 on Quandary Peak, they did not find any significant impact of 
recession on total visits, travel expenditure, and willingness to pay for visits. However, since the 
respondent groups studied before and after the recession are different in their study, it is not clear 
whether the survey respondents experienced any employment or wealth shock during the 
recessionary period. In a companion paper where we utilized “Iowa Lakes Project” panel data—a 
rich dataset containing detailed information on household demographics, employment, and 
recreation expenditure both before and after the recession—we found that Iowans who became 
unemployed or retired during the recession did not reduce outdoor recreation at lake sites during 
the recession of 2009. Since the study was based on data restricted to Iowa and frequency of 
trips, this study will utilize a nationally representative Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) 
dataset to examine the question in a broader context. Instead of trip frequency and local 
recreation, we focus on total household expenditure on recreation and trips. Facing a job loss, a 
household might choose a stay-at-home option (Egan, Herriges, and Kling 2009) and substitute 
their expensive recreation for relatively cheaper options including local outdoor recreation. This 
hypothesis would be better captured through examining households’ recreation expenditures.  
The PSID data contains detailed household-level information on broad expenditure items 
including trips exclusively for recreation purposes, employment status, income, wealth, and a 
rich set of socioeconomic factors. Being longitudinal data, it also allows observation of the same 
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households’ recreation expenditures and employment statuses both before and during the 
recession. We utilize four rounds of PSID surveys spanning the period 2004–2010. Although, 
officially, the recession ends in June of 2009, for our empirical design, we consider both 2008 
and 2010 as recessionary periods since aggregate unemployment was high throughout 2010 and 
2011. Note that aggregate national unemployment rate was less than 5% at the beginning of 
recession, reached at its peak at 10% in October 2009, and was above 9% until the third quarter 
of 2011 (US Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). 2015).  
Following other literature studying the relationship between recession and wellbeing, we 
started the investigation by a household fixed-effect model that attempts to explain variation in 
household recreation expenditure by state unemployment rate, which controls for household-
level heterogeneity. However, since state-level unemployment captures overall economic 
condition, we cannot disentangle the impact of job loss at the household level. To learn the true 
impact of job losses during the recession on recreation expenditure, we need to know the 
counterfactual behavior—how much households would spend on recreation had they not lost 
their jobs. One challenge in this regard is the potential selection issue with job loss. Although 
recession affects everyone, not all households are affected in a similar fashion. We adopted 
Rubin’s (1983) potential outcome framework to address the selection issue and derive 
counterfactual outcome.  
Studies focusing on the 2008–2009 recession documented that unmarried, black, and 
Hispanic individuals with low education levels were disadvantaged during the recession and 
suffered more from unemployment and poor health (Hoynes, Miller, and Schaller 2012; Currie, 
Duque, and Garfinkel 2015). We address the selection issues related to job loss during the 
recession by using propensity score matching (PSM) method to identify a household that is 
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similar to the treatment but did not suffer job loss during the recession. Our information set is not 
exhaustive—there is a possibility that PSM cannot account for all observable characteristics that 
determine employment loss during recession. There can still be both time-variant and time-
invariant unobservable household characteristics that PSM cannot control for. However, since 
PSID provides information on households’ pre-recession recreation expenditures, a difference-
in-difference approach would take care of time-invariant confounders. The difference-in-
difference approach, in contrast to the household fixed-effect model with state unemployment 
rate, can disentangle the individual impact of unemployment.  
In the empirical analysis, we define the treatment status based on both household head’s 
and spouse’s employment status in a pre-recession and recession year. We consider both 
unemployment and retirement during the recession as evidence of job loss to form a combined 
treatment group. We then split the treatment group recognizing that the retiree might be different 
from the unemployed group. We conduct several recommended tests and placebo exercises to 
test the validity of the key underlying assumptions behind matching framework. 
Empirical results reveal that aggregate unemployment provides a different picture on the impact 
of recessionary job loss on recreation expenditure. Findings based on household-level 
unemployment show that households losing jobs during a recession did not change recreation 
expenditure at the intensive margin. However, estimates at the extensive margin shows that 
unemployment during the recession led some households to completely stop recreating. 
2. Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) Data 
We use PSID data to investigate the impact of unemployment during recession on trip 
expenditure. PSID, a longitudinal study conducted by the University of Michigan, began 
interviewing 18,000 individuals from 5,000 families in 1968. Annual interview of this nationally 
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representative sample and descendants from the original families continued until 1997. After 
1997, the survey was conducted on a biennial basis. The survey collected detail household 
information including employment, education, income, wealth, health, and expenditures, along 
with many other socioeconomic factors. Eventually, the surveys incorporated questions to 
address scientific and policy needs. The interviews always collected detail information on the 
household head, and spouses as well, if applicable.  
To answer the research question, we draw on the data from PSID survey rounds of 2005, 
2007, 2009, and 2011. We begin with 2005 because that year is the first time PSID included 
questions on recreation trip expenditure.32 In any survey year, PSID collects information on 
consumption expenditure incurred or employment status from the previous calendar year (e.g., 
recreation expenditure enumerated in 2009 survey was incurred by the household in 2008). In 
this paper, we state the expenditure or employment status by the year it took place.  
The 19 calendar-month-long recession in the US, according the national Bureau of 
Economic Research, started in December of 2007 and ended in June of 2009. Based on those 
dates, the 2009 survey round exactly matches with the recession year, and represents the 
treatment year in our research. Although it officially ended in June of 2009, the recession was 
still widespread after the official end date, as the economy recovered slowly. Because of the slow 
recovery, households did not regain confidence to spend at pre-recession levels, which leads us 
to consider 2010 a recession year.  
Drawing on samples from the survey rounds, we include households that provided 
information to conduct the analysis following empirical strategy and methods proposed in the 
                                                 
32 PSID asked the respondents “How much did you (and your family living there) spend altogether in 2008 on trips 
and vacations, including transportation, accommodations, and recreational expenses on trips?” 
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previous section. In the fixed-effect framework, where the fixed effect is assumed on the 
households, the data requirement is minimal. Since we only need recreation trip expenditure and 
state identification, we include all households that provided complete information on these two 
items, allowing us to utilize the maximum number of survey households. Our tabulation of the 
data reveals that 11,387 households appear at least once with complete information on recreation 
trips in survey rounds from 2005 to 2011. Out of these responses, 9,123 households appear at 
least twice and 5,603 households appear across all four rounds with complete information on 
recreation expenditure. Additionally, 809 households, 8.38% of the original sample, reported a 
different state of residence across survey rounds. While they might be different from those not 
changing states, we keep them in the sample. We match these 11,387 households with the 
average yearly unemployment rate in their state of residence and utilize them in the fixed-effect 
regression analysis. The state-level yearly average unemployment rate is drawn from the Local 
Area Unemployment Statistics provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  
Figure 1 plots state-level unemployment rates, participation in recreation, and total 
expenditure in recreation trips for all households that provided trip expenditure information at 
least once. We observe an opposite movement of participation and trip expenditure against state-
level unemployment rate. Figure 2, a replication of Figure 1 with households that appear in our 
fixed-effect exercise, depicts that both participation and average expenditure on trips across 
years are higher compared to the corresponding averages of those households utilized in Figure 
1. In Figure 2, the pattern of movement of both participation and trip expenditure and state-level 
unemployment rate remains the same as in Figure 1, except in 2006, where we observe a rise in 
participation with a fall in the state-level unemployment rate. The pattern in Figure 1 remains 
unchanged if we focus only on the balanced sample comprising 5,587 households. 
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For the matching and difference-in-difference exercises, we include all households that 
provided complete information on employment status and trip-expenditure in both of the pre-
recession year and recession year, but provided complete socioeconomic factors only in the pre-
recession year. The total number of treatment and control households are presented in Table 1. 
Between 2006 and 2008, out of 4,627 households with complete information, 83.66% revealed 
that both spouses were employed in both 2006 and 2008, forming the control. Of the respondent 
households, 16.34% reported at least one spouse who became unemployed or retired during the 
recession year 2008, forming treatment group one. Treatment group one is split to form treatment 
group two, consisting only of those who became unemployed (11.89%), and treatment group 
three, consisting only of retirees (4.5%). Following a similar approach, we have a sample of 
4,129 households from the years 2006 and 2010, of which 80.55% form the control group, 19.5% 
form treatment group one, 11.12% form treatment group two, and 8.5% from treatment group 
three. Finally, between the years 2008 and 2010, 14.22% household respondents out of 4,422 
became either unemployed or retired (treatment group one), 9.7% became unemployed 
(treatment group two), and 4.55% retired (treatment group three).33  
In the matching framework, we consider 2006 as the baseline year in the analysis of 2006 
vs. 2008 and 2006 vs. 2010; while in the analysis of 2008 and 2010, we consider 2008 as the 
baseline year. The summary statistics of the covariate used in the baseline years of 2006 and 
2008 are presented in Table 2. In our sample, household heads are, on average, 42.5 years old, 
and the average spousal age is 25.5 years. The sample consists of  62% white, 30% black, and 
                                                 
33 Note that treatment group two (unemployed) and three (retired) do not sum to treatment group one (unemployed 
and retired). In a few household cases, spouses experienced both retirement and unemployment. For example, a 
husband became unemployed while a wife retired from a fulltime employment position in the pre-recession year. 
Since the percentage of such households in this sample are small, instead of discarding them, we include them in our 
analysis. 
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8% from other races, 56% are married, the average family size is 2.74, and 14% of households 
have children under the age of two. The schooling profile indicates that 11% of respondents did 
not complete high school, 28% are high school graduates, and 28% have some college education. 
In our sample, approximately 76% of households reside in urban areas and 3% reside in rural 
areas. Around 65% of the households own a house and 93% own a vehicle. Average household 
wealth is a little over $200,000 but there is huge variation across households. The standard 
deviation of household wealth is $12.44 million USD. Most households are employed in 
manufacturing, retail trade, and services sectors. The construction industry employed 7% of the 
households, and around 10% were employed in agriculture and public administration, two of the 
relatively less-affected industries during the 2009 recession. A majority of the households come 
from states in the southern US. The overall health status of the sample seems good—89% self-
reported good health, 65% are involved in physical activities, and only 20% are smokers. 
The averages of the covariates are almost the same in the baseline year of 2008, as presented 
in Table 2, except those on household wealth. Since, in 2008, households were already affected 
by the recession, we expect the average household wealth to fall. Accordingly, we observe that 
average household wealth in 2008 is approximately 7% lower than in 2006, and standard 
deviation of household wealth increases by 1.43 times in the recession year.  
3. Empirical Design and Strategy 
We investigate the impact of employment shock during a recession on recreation expenditure 
both at the extensive and intensive margin. The extensive margin results will reveal if more 
households stop or start recreating during the recession, while the intensive margin results will 
show the magnitude of change. We adopt two different empirical approaches. First, we apply a 
linear fixed-effect model with fixed effects assumed at the household level. We exploit variation 
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in state-level unemployment rate to capture the recession and estimate how changes in state-level 
unemployment rate affect household recreation expenditure. Although state-level unemployment 
rate reflects the overall macroeconomic conditions, it will not inform us how changes in 
employment status alters average recreation behavior. To investigate the role of changes in 
individual employment status on recreation, we apply the treatment effect framework 
(Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983), where we consider recession as a quasi-experiment and define 
treatment and control status based on household members’ exposure to employment shock 
during the recession.34 
3.1 Linear fixed-effect model 
One advantage of using state unemployment rate in studying household recreation 
expenditure is that it is less likely to be endogenous to household decision making on various 
consumption expenditures when compared to household members’ labor market status. Several 
studies investigating the relationship between individual health behavior and recession have 
utilized group variables such as state-level unemployment rate to represent business cycles 
(Ruhm 2000; 2005; Dehejia and Lleras-Muney 2004; Currie and Schwandt 2014). In our setting 
for household-level analysis, state-level unemployment rate varies across states and years, but is 
invariant for households within the state in a particular year. We estimate the following reduced 
form specification: 
𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗𝑠𝑡 = 𝛿1𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡 + 𝛿2𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 + 𝛿3 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡 ∗
                                      𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 + 𝛾𝑗 + 𝛾𝑠𝑡 + 𝜇𝑡 +∈𝑗𝑠𝑡.                          (1) 
                                                 
34 The empirical framework adopted here follows the same strategy applied in our companion paper “Is Outdoor 
Recreation Recession-Proof? An investigation on Lake Recreation Behavior During 2009 Recession”  in chapter 
one, and this section heavily draws from there. 
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𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑝𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑠𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡  + 𝛽3𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡 ∗
                                           𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 + 𝛾𝑗 + 𝛾𝑠𝑡 + 𝜇𝑡 + ϑ𝑗𝑠𝑡.               (2) 
where 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗𝑠𝑡 is a binary variable indicating whether household “j” in state “s” takes 
any recreation trip in year “t” or not, 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡 stands for unemployment rate in state 
“s” in year “t,” 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 is an indicator variable assuming a value of 1 if year “t” is a 
recession year and 0 otherwise, 𝛾𝑗 are household-specific fixed effects which take care of time-
invariant demographics such as race, gender, education, preference for recreation or work, risk 
attitudes etc., 𝛿𝑡 are year fixed effects to address time-varying, but household-level invariant, 
factors such as national and global economic condition, cost of living, commodity prices 
(including gas prices, etc.), 𝛾𝑠𝑡 are state-specific time trends, and ∈𝑗𝑠𝑡 and ϑ𝑗𝑠𝑡 are error terms 
that are assumed to be uncorrelated with the explanatory variables in the above specifications. 
Note that including both recession effects and year dummies will drop the recession year while 
estimating the individual year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered within the household to 
allow the errors to be correlated within the household across years.  
Fixed effects model can control for household-level time-invariant characteristics that 
might be correlated with the probability of employment shock exposure during a recession, or 
living in a state with high unemployment, and with recreation behavior. We are interested in the 
sign of the parameters 𝛿3 and 𝛽3, the coefficients on the interaction term between state-level 
unemployment and a recession indicator. Under the household fixed-effect framework, the 
identification of 𝛿3 and 𝛽3 comes from within-state variation in unemployment rate across years. 
If state-level unemployment exerts a notable effect on average household recreation expenditure 
in a recession year compared to a typical year, it will be is reflected through 𝛿3 and 𝛽3. 
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3.2 Treatment effect framework 
We model the impact of employment change during recession on recreation expenditure in a 
non-experimental design. Our treatment group includes those who experience a recessionary 
change in employment. In contrast to an experimental setting exposure to recession is non-
random—there are selections on who is affected during a recession and to what extent. Recent 
studies find evidence that during a recession the intensity of losses is high among young and 
less-educated workers, minorities, unmarried, black, and Hispanic populations; men were more 
affected than women and their recovery was faster (Hoynes, Miller, and Schaller 2012; Currie, 
Duque, and Garfinkel forthcoming). Selection due to such non-random treatment assignment 
might hide the true causal effect of a change in employment status during a recession on 
recreation expenditure.  
We want to learn how recessionary job loss alters affected households’ recreation 
expenditure patterns. This requires knowing the counterfactual expenditure of the households 
that lost jobs during the recession. This behavior is not observable since we can observe only one 
outcome in one state. Propensity Score Matching is a widely used method (Rosenbaum Rubin 
1983; Dehejia and Wahba 2002; Jalan and Ravallion 2003; Greenstone 2004; List et al. 2003; 
Imbens and Woolridge 2009; Ferret and Subervie 2013) that derives the missing counterfactual 
outcome in a non-experimental setting under certain assumptions and conditioning on 
observables. In the first step of a two-step procedure, the method estimates a propensity score 
(one’s probability of being in the treatment) conditioned on observed covariates. Based on the 
estimated metric in the second step, it matches the treatment observations with similar control to 
estimates the impact of treatment on outcome of interest.  
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The study periods for this analysis are 2004–2010, out of which the pre-recession years are 
2004 and 2006, and the recession years are 2008 and 2010. Officially the recession was over in 
June 2009 but its affect was still in full swing in 2010. The economy was sluggish to recover and 
job creation was insignificant, which leads us to consider both 2008 and 2010 as recession years. 
Our empirical design involves the comparison of recreation expenditure between the treatment 
and control across a pre-recession and the recession year. We draw an analysis across each of the 
three pairs of years: (a) 2006 vs. 2008, (b) 2006 vs. 2010, and (c) 2008 vs. 2010. In our 
household-level setting, treatment status 𝑇𝑗 for household “j” is defined as  
𝑇𝑗  = {
1  𝑖𝑓 i was fulltime employed in 𝑡 − 1 but Unemployedd or Retired  in year 𝑡
0                                         𝑖𝑓 i was fulltime employed in year 𝑡 − 1 and 𝑡             
 . 
The treatment group includes all households where at least one spouse became unemployed or 
retired during the recession but was employed before the recession, while the control group 
contains those households where at least one spouse had been employed full time and 
employment status of the other spouse remained unchanged across the pre-recession and 
recession year. Recognizing the possible differences between unemployed and retirees, we split 
the combined treatment group into three separate groups, including and excluding the retirees. 
The outcome variable for household “j” in year “t,” following specifications one and two, 
assume a binary indicator 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 and a continuous variable 𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑝𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑡 to 
represent recreation expenditure at the extensive and intensive margin, respectively. 
The next step involves constructing the propensity score based on observable covariates, 
conditioned on which the treatment and control group will be matched so that the two groups 
look similar like an experimental setting. There is no clear set of standards on variables to 
include in the propensity score equation while constructing the propensity score measure, so our 
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strategy is to include a vector of covariates that make the treatment and control groups similar. 
The literature suggests incorporating all important and necessary variables from the pre-
treatment period that might influence outcome and treatment variables (Heckman, Ichimura, and 
Todd 1997; Smith and Todd 2005; Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008). Accordingly, economic theory, 
previous research, and institutional setting can help to characterize the covariates.  
Incorporating the treatment status as a dependent variable and the covariate 𝑿 in a probit 
model, we estimate the probability of being unemployed or retired during the recession and 
obtain the propensity score 𝑃(𝑿). To identify the true impact of job loss during the recession, the 
following three assumptions are critical for the counterfactual framework described above: 
Identification Assumption 1: Conditional Independence Assumption 
Conditional on the observables, there does not exist any selection effects (i.e., no difference in 
potential recreation expenditure between the treatment and control absent the treatment), which 
can be expressed as:  
𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑝𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑗,𝑡
0  , 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡
0  ┴ 𝑇|𝑃(𝑋).            (3)     
Identification Assumption 2: Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA) 
Treatment households do not affect the recreation behavior of control households. This 
assumption is to rule out interaction across households and any general equilibrium effect.  
Identification Assumption 3: Common Support Assumption 
In the sample, treatment households have corresponding control households. For households 
with respondents that have become unemployed or retired, there must exist households with 
respondents that are still employed, but are otherwise similar with respect to other 
characteristics. This is also known as overlapping condition. 
𝑃(𝑇 = 1|𝑋) > 0, ∀ 𝑗𝜖{𝑖: 𝑇𝑖 = 0}. 
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The conditional independence assumption, stated in equation (3), implies the following 
mean independence condition, which provides the counterfactual observation for the treatment. 
𝐸[𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡
0 |𝑃(𝑋), 𝑇 = 1] = 𝐸[𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡
0 |𝑃(𝑋), 𝑇 = 0], and  
𝐸[𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑝𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑗,𝑡
0 |𝑃(𝑋), 𝑇 = 1] = 𝐸[𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑝𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑗,𝑡
0 |𝑃(𝑋), 𝑇 = 0].  
We estimate the impact of a change in employment status during the recession on recreation 
adopting the following average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) estimators: 
𝐴𝑇?̂?𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒    = 𝐸 [𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡
1 − 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡
0 | 𝑇 = 1]]  
=𝐸[𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡
1 | 𝑇 = 1] − 𝐸[𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡
0 |𝑃(𝑋), 𝑇 = 1]  
= 𝐸[𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡
1 | 𝑇 = 1] − 𝐸[𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡
0 |𝑃(𝑋), 𝑇 = 0]35.        (4)  
For trip expenditure, the estimator is  
𝐴𝑇?̂?𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒 = 𝐸[𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑝𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑗,𝑡
1 | 𝑇 = 1] − 𝐸[𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑝𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑗,𝑡
0 |𝑃(𝑋), 𝑇 = 0].        (5) 
We apply three different matching algorithms to ensure that results are not driven by any 
particular procedure, and to facilitate comparison across procedures.36 While matching is 
conducted we discard all treatments that lie outside the common support to ensure that 
identification assumption two is satisfied. The conditional independence assumption is also 
testable drawing a comparison of covariates’ means across the treatment and matched control 
groups. Standard errors are estimated following Abadie and Imbens (2008) for nearest-neighbor 
matching algorithms, and bootstrapped procedure for radius matching estimator. 
                                                 
35 Note that we replace the counterfactual participation of the treatment households by participation of similar 
households from the control group. 
36 In nearest-neighbor matching, for each treatment, we pick the control with the closest propensity score with a 
replacement. Nearest-five-neighbors matching picks the five controls with the closest propensity score. Radius 
matching: for each exposed individual, we pick all the controls whose propensity score lies within a radius distance 
of ½ of standard deviation of the estimated propensity score. 
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Selection on Unobservables: If the selection into change in employment status is due to 
unobservables rather than observable factors, the PSM estimators will not reveal the true impact 
of recession. In such cases, difference-in-difference (DID) matching estimators is highly 
recommended (Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd 1997; Heckman, et al. 1998; Smith and Todd 2005; 
Abadie 2005; Imbens and Woolrdige 2009). For example, poor mental health condition is common 
during a recession (Currie and Tekin 2014) and can affect employability as well as willingness to 
take recreation trips. Similarly, if wages go down below one’s reservation wage during the 
recession, s/he might choose a voluntary unemployment and spend time on vacation and trips. If 
we can observe the households both before and during the recession, we can net-out such factors 
by a simple first differencing with respect to the pre-treatment period. Combining propensity score 
matching with DID makes the treatment and control similar both in terms of observables as well 
as unobservables. The panel setting of our data allows us to implement this technique to control 
for all potential time-invariant unobservable factors that might be associated both with recreation 
expenditure and change in employment status.  
The estimation procedure for the DID matching estimator is the same as the propensity 
score matching estimators stated above, except that we will conduct the matching on differences 
of recreation expenditure and differences of participation across pre-recession periods. However, 
the DID matching estimators must satisfy one additional identifying assumption relative to the 
matching estimators: the parallel trend. 
Parallel Trend Assumption: In the absence of recessionary unemployment, the average change in 
recreation expenditure across periods is the same for the treatment and control households.  
𝐸[𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−1
0 − 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−2
0 |𝑃(𝑿), 𝑇 = 1] 
= 𝐸[𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−1
0 − 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−2
0 |𝑃(𝑿), 𝑇 = 0].        (6) 
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Similarly, for total recreation expenditures, 
𝐸[𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑝𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑗,𝑡−1
0 − 𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑝𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑗,𝑡−2
0 |𝑃(𝑿), 𝑇 = 1] 
= 𝐸[𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑝𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑗,𝑡−1
0 − 𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑝𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑗,𝑡−2
0 |𝑃(𝑿), 𝑇 = 0].    (7) 
The common trend assumption is testable if multiple pre-treatment period’s data is available. 
We have recreation expenditure data available for two pre-recession periods, 2004 and 2006. We 
conduct a placebo exercise across 2004 and 2006 to test if the parallel trend conditions holds for 
the analysis across 2006 and 2008, which will reveal if DID matching estimates are unbiased. 
We also conduct a placebo exercise for the matching estimates to test if the treatment and control 
groups are similar in terms of pre-treatment outcome. 
We adopt three matching estimators to check the robustness of the estimates of impact of 
recessionary job loss on recreation spending during the recession. In addition, we apply doubly 
robust (DR) estimators (Imbens and Woolridge 2009; Woolrdige 2010) as an additional 
robustness check. The DR estimator exploits the same specification for both propensity score 
estimation and outcome equation. While estimating the outcome equation, DR weights by the 
inverse probability obtained from the propensity score estimation stage. The argument for DR 
estimator is that if one of the two specifications is wrong, estimates are still consistent. This 
seems appealing when we do not know much about the treatment assignment equation. 
4. Results and Interpretation 
4.1 State unemployment and recreation expenditure 
The estimates from regression specifications one and two are presented in Tables 3 and 4. 
We report estimates from five different specifications, where specifications gradually increase 
control by including various combinations of household, state, year fixed effects, and trends. 
Specification one does not include household fixed effect to accommodate state fixed effects. 
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Specifications four and five are the most restricted specifications since they control for either or 
both of year fixed effect and state-specific linear trend to control for time-varying factors. 
Panel (a) in Table 3 reports results for participation assuming 2008 as a recession year, 
panel (b) reports results assuming 2010 as a recession year, while panels (c) and (d) report the 
estimates assuming 2004 and 2006 as placebo recession years. The coefficient of state 
unemployment rate is negative and statistically insignificant in all cases, except when we 
consider 2010 as the recession year. The statistical significance does not persist once we control 
for time-varying factors by including year fixed effects and state trends. The coefficient on 
recession is statistically insignificant in most of the cases. The coefficient on the interaction term 
between state unemployment and recession, 𝛿3, consistently fails to exhibit statistical 
significance, except in two specifications under the assumption of 2010 as a recession year. 
Overall, results suggest that higher state unemployment during the recession, assumed different 
from a normal year, does not exhibit any statistically significant relationship with recreation 
participation. 
In contrast to participation, recreation expenditure at the intensive margin (Table 4) 
exhibits different patterns based on the specified recession year. When we consider 2008 the 
recession year, in three out of five specifications, including specification four, which includes 
year fixed effect, state unemployment rate exhibits a negative, statistically significant 
relationship with recreation expenditure. If 2008 is considered the recession year, the recession 
indicator is always negative and statistically significant, but switches sign, and is not consistently 
significant when 2010 is considered as the recession year. The unemployment and recession 
coefficients are never significant under placebo recession years. The coefficient on the 
interaction term between unemployment and recession indicator, 𝛽3, is always positive and 
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statistically significant if 2008 is assumed as the recession year. However, if 2010 is assumed the 
recession year, 𝛽3 exhibits a negative and statistically significant relationship in specification 
two with quadratic trend, and specification five, which controls for year fixed effect and state 
linear trend. Under the assumption that 2004 or 2006 is the placebo recession year, 𝛽3 is 
consistently found to be statistically insignificant across all specifications. 
After controlling for the level effect of state-level unemployment, recession, household 
fixed effects, and various trends, the consistent finding of 𝛽3 > 0 suggests that state 
unemployment in 2008 had a differentiated effect on recreation expenditure compared to state 
unemployment in any other year. Since the entire calendar year 2008 was part of an officially 
announced recession year, there is some evidence that recessionary high state unemployment 
increases recreation expenditure.  
4.2 Job loss within household during recession and recreation expenditure 
We present the ATT estimates here (i.e., the impact of household members’ job loss on 
recreation expenditure). Before reporting these results, we report the estimates from propensity 
score estimation and evaluate the quality of matching. For convenience, we will name the ATT 
estimates from propensity score matching estimators as “matching estimates” and difference-in-
difference matching estimates as “DID estimates.” 
Propensity score estimation 
Table 5 presents propensity score estimates. Across each pair of years, we ran a separate 
probit regression for each of the three treatment groups: (a) combining all who lost jobs during a 
recession year, (b) including only those who were unemployed, and (c) including the retired. The 
objective of these estimations is to obtain propensity score metrics, and therefore, we are not 
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interpreting the estimates in greater detail. Overall, the estimates suggest that being Hispanic, 
black, unmarried, less educated, not owning a house and car, smoking, and self-reporting good 
health are positively associated with unemployment during a recession. In addition, working in 
the agricultural sector and living in the south are found to be negatively associated with 
unemployment. Retirement status is negatively associated with linear component of age, larger 
family size, living in the south, and not self-reporting good health. On the other hand, being 
black, less educated, a smoker, and working in public administration increases the likelihood of 
unemployment during a recession.  
Quality of matching 
The matching quality is assessed based on whether assumptions 1–3, as laid out in the 
previous section, are satisfied. One implication of the conditional mean independence 
assumption is that the treatment and matched control groups look similar in terms of observables. 
The standardized mean difference of the covariates between the treatment and matched control 
group indicates whether this similarity holds.37 We consider a standardized difference of means 
of 20 as large (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983; Imbens and Woolridge 2009). Overall, matching has 
been successful. Although there were significant differences across treatment and control groups 
with respect to observables before matching, the difference goes away in the matched sample. In 
a few nearest-neighbor matching cases, around 5% of the covariates exhibited standardized mean 
difference above 20. We find no such violation across nearest-five-neighbor matching and radius 
matching estimators. The results are reported in Table A1-A9 in the appendix B.  
                                                 
37 The formula for standardized difference in means is   
𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 − 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙
√0.5(𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑+𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙)
 . 
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The overlapping condition, as stated in assumption 2, is satisfied as well. While matching 
is conducted, we exclude all treatments that do not find similar control. Table A10 in the 
appendix B presents the results. Across the matching algorithms exercised, less than 2% of 
treatments fail to find a matching counterfactual. Finally, SUTVA is less likely to be violated in 
our framework. Since our empirical design models household’s recreation expenditure, where 
decisions are made at the household setting and incorporates both spouse’s employment while 
constructing a treatment and control status, such spillover effect is less likely to take place. All 
these are crucial to interpret the treatment effect in a causal manner. The parallel trend results for 
DID matching are discussed later. 
2006 as pre-recession and 2008 as recession year 
Table 6 reports the estimates on how households that experienced a job loss during the 
2008 recession changed recreation participation and expenditures during 2008. Panel (a) in Table 
6 shows that treatment households recreated less during the recession. The matching estimators 
reveal that recreation participation falls in the range of 7.8 to 11.6 percentage points. DID 
estimates are smaller in magnitude and lie in the range of 6.2 to 10.4 percentage points. All 
estimates exhibit statistical significance. Panels (b) and (c) suggests that the decline in recreation 
participation is mainly driven by the unemployed and not retired households. The DID estimates 
reveal that unemployed households’ participation in recreation in 2008 fell by 8.2 to 9.2 
percentage points. We also report the recreation participation in post-recession year 2010.  
For a subsample of the sample utilized in 2006 and 2008, recreation information in 2010 
is available. We use this information to observe how the treatment groups from 2008 change 
participation in recreation in 2010 compared to the control group of 2008. All matching 
estimates as well as DID estimates reveal that treatment households’ participation is significantly 
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lower even in the post-recession year. The estimates are larger in magnitude compared to those 
obtained for recreation in the treatment year 2008, and the decline in participation consistently 
comes from the unemployed group. Retired households in 2008 would not have changed 
recreation participation in 2010 had they been employed full time during the recession of 2008. 
However, for the retired households in 2008, when we take differences in participation between 
2008 and 2010, all of the DID estimates suggest decreased participation in recreation in post-
treatment years. 
 Note that the level and DID estimates obtained for the post-treatment years cannot be 
interpreted as ATT since many households in the sample experience a change in employment 
status in 2010. This suggests that the treatment and control status have also changed for some 
households between 2008 and 2010. In this context, the decline in recreation participation in the 
post-recession years by the households with respondents that were unemployed in 2008 cannot 
be attributed to recessionary unemployment. 
Table 6 also presents how the households with employed respondents in 2006 that lost 
jobs in 2008 changed recreation expenditures during the recession and post-recession years. The 
matching estimates suggests that treatment households experienced a decrease in recreation 
expenditure in the recession year of 2008 compared to the control households. The magnitude of 
the ATT estimates indicate that household respondents who became unemployed during the 
recession spent $249–$344 less on recreation expenditure compared to what they would have 
spent had they not been unemployed. However, the DID estimates do not support this fall in 
recreation expenditure caused by recessionary unemployment, all the three estimators fail to 
exhibit statistical significance. None of the ATT estimates for the retired groups exhibit 
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statistical significance. The retired households, as the matching estimates as well as DID 
estimates suggest, did not change recreation expenditure in 2008 due to recessionary retirement.  
There is some evidence that household respondents who became unemployed during the 
recession spent less on recreation expenditure during the post-treatment year of 2010. Both 
matching and DID estimates for the unemployed group suggest this. However, due to the change 
in employment status between 2008 and 2010, we will not attribute this fall in recreation 
expenditure to recessionary unemployment in 2008.  
2006 as pre-recession and 2010 as recession year 
Table 7 reports how households respondents that were employed in 2006 but became 
unemployed or retired in 2010 changed participation in recreation and recreation spending during 
the recession year of 2010. The matching estimates suggest that treatment households 
participated less in 2010. The unemployed households’ participation shrank by 14.6 to 17.3 
percentage points while that for the retired shrank by around 7 percentage points. The DID 
estimates also suggest that the unemployed households’ participation in 2010 fell compared to 
what it would have been were they not exposed to recessionary unemployment. For retired 
households, DID estimates support recessionary retirement causing reduced recreation 
participation in 2010. Matching estimates suggest both treatment groups participated less in 2008 
compared to their employed counterparts, but DID estimates do not support this evidence.  
At the intensive margin, the matching estimates suggest that treatment household 
respondents that became unemployed reduced recreation expenditure in the treatment year 2010, 
but none of the DID estimates provide support in favor of that finding. Retired households are 
spending the same in 2008 as their counterfactual spending. We did not notice any significant 
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difference in mean spending in 2008, relative to spending absent the treatment, for the 
unemployed or retired group. 
2008 as pre-recession and 2010 as recession year 
Table 8 presents findings on recreation participation and expenditure for the treatment 
household respondents employed in 2008 that lost jobs during 2010.38 The matching estimates 
suggest that both participation and spending in recreation in 2010 drop for treatment group two, 
but DID estimates do not consistently agree with this—only one out of three DID estimates 
supports a fall in spending.  
Retirees do not exhibit any change in recreation behavior in 2010 at the extensive or 
intensive margin. Unemployed households, as matching estimates reveal, exhibited significantly 
less participation in recreation in 2008 compared to their corresponding controls. In contrast to 
participation, there is no strong evidence that respondents who became unemployed during the 
recession year 2010 spent less in 2008. 
Placebo exercises 
Table 9 presents the results from the placebo exercise implemented as laid out in Section 
3. For the analysis between 2006 and 2008, the exercise incorporating 2004 as a placebo 
recession year suggests that the treatment and control group was similar in terms of their 
recreation participation and expenditure in 2004. Both for participation and expenditure, the DID 
matching estimates between 2004 and 2006 confirm that the parallel trend assumption is 
                                                 
38 Treatment households in this sample did not lose jobs in 2008, but became unemployed or retired in 2010, after 
the recession. 
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satisfied. The parallel trend assumption is satisfied as well for the DID estimates obtained from 
the analysis across “2006 and 2010,” and “2008 and 2010.”39  
Across the comparison pairs “2006 and 2010” and “2008 and 2010,” matching estimates 
suggest that the treatment group consisting of unemployed households exhibited a significant 
difference in participation compared to their corresponding controls in the placebo year, which is 
concerning as the PSM method attempts to make the two groups identical even in terms of the 
baseline outcome. One indication of such difference is the possible existence of unobserved 
confounders that can make the two groups different. This suggests that the DID matching 
estimates, which control for household-specific fixed effects, will be more reliable. Therefore, 
we are more confident in interpreting the difference-in-difference results as a causal effect of 
recessionary job loss on recreation expenditure. Note that for the retirement group as well as for 
recreation at the intensive margin, difference in outcome in the placebo year is not evident.  
Robustness 
The DR estimates will indicate: (a) if the negative impact of recessionary unemployment on 
recreation participation during the recession is robust, and (b) the placebo estimates obtained for 
the unemployed treatment exhibit any statistical significance under DR method. Table 10 reports 
the DR estimates for the treatment household respondents that became unemployed during a 
recession year. The DR estimates exhibit similar patterns as the matching and DID matching 
estimates reported previously. However, the magnitude of the DR estimates for participation in 
recreation during a recession year is larger compared to the matching estimates. The magnitude 
of the estimates is comparable with matching estimates obtained for expenditure and DID 
                                                 
39 In a comparison pair of years for each of the treatment groups, at most one out of three DID estimators exhibit 
statistical significance. Nine percent (5 out of 54) of the DID matching estimates violated parallel trend assumption.  
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matching estimates for participation and expenditure. The DR estimates suggest that our finding 
that households’ unemployment during a recession causes a drop in household participation in 
recreation spending is robust. Moreover, the DR estimates on placebo exercises support that the 
parallel trend assumption is satisfied. However, the treatment and control group in “2006 vs. 
2010” and “2008 vs. 2010” still exhibit significant difference in terms of placebo year 
participation in recreation, which imply the plausibility of confounding unobservables. 
5. Conclusion 
This study examines how the recession of 2008–2009 affected household recreation 
expenditure. We started with a household-specific fixed-effect mode that controls household-
level heterogeneity while explaining variation in recreation participation and spending by 
variation in yearly state unemployment rate. The results consistently reveal that the recessionary 
state unemployment rate does not matter for participation in recreation. Although we did not 
observe any consistent relationship of state unemployment with recreation spending, 
recessionary unemployment in 2008 appears to have exerted a positive influence on recreation 
spending. We are cautious interpreting this as an effect of unemployment, as state unemployment 
is a catch-all for overall macroeconomic conditions. Recognizing that state-level unemployment 
rate captures overall unemployment scenarios, uncertainty, consumer confidence, aggregate 
productivity loss, we applied treatment-effect framework to study the effects of unemployment 
on recreation spending at the household level. Several PSM estimators and DID matching 
estimators showed that average household respondents that became unemployed during the 
recession participated less in recreation during the recession. However, at the intensive margin, 
we do not find consistent and clear evidence of a drop in recreation spending during the 
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recession year. The retired households showed a mixed picture: they did not exhibit any change 
in participation in 2008 but there is some evidence that participation dropped in 2010. 
Overall, we do not observe any consistent impact of recessionary unemployment on 
recreation spending. However, this study suggests that the aggregate unemployment statistics 
and micro-unemployment indicate a different effect on recreation expenditure, the former at the 
intensive margin and the latter at the extensive margin. The findings imply the significance of 
exploiting unemployment at the household level in studying the impact of recessionary events on 
wellbeing. As a caveat, we recognize that unemployment is only one channel through which 
households are affected during the recession. Accordingly, our estimates cannot be interpreted as 
the impact of recession, but rather the impact of recessionary job loss. 
 
6. References 
 
Abadie, A. 2005. “Semiparametric Difference-in-Difference Estimators.” Review of Economic 
Studies 72(2005): 1–19. 
 
Abadie, A., and G.W. Imbens. 2008. “On the Failure of the Bootstrap for Matching Estimators.” 
Econometrica 76(2008): 1537–1557. 
 
Black, D., N. Kolesnikova, S. Sanders, and L. Taylor. 2013. “Are Children Normal?” Review of 
Economic and Statistics 95(1): 21–33. 
 
Caliendo, M., and S. Kopeinig. 2011.“Some Practical Guidance for the Implementation of 
Propensity Score Matching.” Journal of Economic Surveys 22(1): 31–72.  
 
Chabé-Ferret, S. and J. Subervie. 2013. “How Much Green for the Buck? Estimating Additional 
and Windfall Effects of French Agro-environmental Schemes by DID-matching.” Journal of 
Environmental Economics and Management 65(2013): 12–27.  
 
94 
 
 
 
Currie, J. and H. Schwandt. 2014. “Short- and Long-term Effects of Unemployment on 
Fertility.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 111(41): 14734–14739. 
 
Currie, J., V. Duque, V., and I. Garfinkel. Forthcoming. “The Great Recession and Mother’s 
Health.” Economic Journal. 
 
Currie, J., and E. Tekin. 2014. “Is there a Link between Foreclosure and Health?” American 
Economics Journals: Economic Policy January (2014). 
 
Dehejia, R., and Adriana Lleras-Muney. 2004. “Booms, Busts, and Babies’ Health.” Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 119(2004): 1091–1130.  
 
Dehejia R.H., and S. Wahba. 2002. “Propensity Score-matching Methods for Non-experimental 
Causal Studies.” Review of Economics and Statistics 84(2002): 151–161.  
 
Egan, Kevin J., J.A. Herriges, C.L. Kling, and J.A. Downing. 2009. “Valuing Water Quality as a 
Function of Water Quality Measures.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 91(2009): 
106–123. 
 
Greenstone, M. 2004. “Did the Clean Air Act Cause the Remarkable Decline in Sulfur Dioxide 
Concentrations?” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 47(2004): 585–611. 
 
Heckman, J., H. Ichimura, and P. Todd. 1997. “Matching as an Econometric Evaluation 
Estimator: Evidence from Evaluating a Job Training Programme.” Review of Economic Studies 
64(4): 605–654. 
 
———. 1998. “Characterizing Selection Bias Using Experimental Data.” Econometrica 66(5): 
1017–1098. 
 
Hoynes, Hilary, Douglas L. Miller, and Jessamyn Schaller. 2012. “Who Suffers during 
Recessions?” Journal of Economic Perspectives 26(3): 27–48. 
 
Imbens, G.W., and J.M. Woolridge. 2009. “Recent Developments in the Econometrics of 
Program Evaluation.” Journal of Economic Literature 47(1): 5–86. 
 
Jalan, J., and M. Ravallion. 2003. “Does Piped Water Reduce Diarrhea for Children in Rural  
95 
 
 
 
India?” Journal of Econometrics 112(2003): 153–173. 
 
List, John A., Daniel Millimet, Per Fredriksson, and Warren McHone. 2003. “Effects of  
Environmental Regulations on Manufacturing Plant Births: Evidence from a Propensity Score  
Matching Estimator,” Review of Economics and Statistics 85(2003): 944–952.  
 
Loomis, J., and C. Keske. 2012. “Did the Great Recession Reduce Visitors Spending and 
Willingness to Pay for Nature-based Recreation? Evidence from 2006 and 2009.” Contemporary 
Economic Policy 30(2012): 238–246. 
 
Marcus, J. 2013. “The Effect of Unemployment on the Mental Health of Spouses—Evidence 
from Plant Closures in Germany.” Journal of Health Economics 32: 546–558. 
 
McInerney, M., J.M. Mellor, and L.H. Nicholas. 2013. “Recession Depression: Mental Health 
Effects of the 2008 Stock Market Crash.” Journal of Health Economics 32: 1090–1104. 
 
Outdoor Industry Foundation (OIF). 2010. Outdoor Recreation Participation Report. Available 
at: http://www.outdoorindustry.org/images/researchfiles/TOF_ResearchParticipation2010.pdf?121. 
(last accessed on July20th, 2015). 
 
Rosenbaum, P.R., and D.B. Rubin. 1983. “The Central Role of the Propensity Score in 
Observational Studies for Causal Effects.” Biometrika 70(1983): 41–55.  
Ruhm, C.J. 2000. “Are Recessions Good for Your Health?” Quarterly Journal of Economics 115 
(2000): 617–650.  
 
———. 2000. “Healthy Living in Hard Times.” Journal of Health Economics 24(2005): 241–
364. 
  
Smith, J., and P. Todd. 2005. “Does Matching Overcome Lalonde’s Critique of Non-
experimental Estimators?” Journal of Econometrics 125(2005): 305–353. 
 
Wooldridge, J. 2010. Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data, 2nd edition. MIT 
Press: Cambridge.  
96 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: We include household respondents that appear at least once with trip expenditure information in the PSID 
survey rounds from 2005 to 2011. 
 
 
Figure 1. Average State Unemployment, Participation in Recreation, and Expenditures in 
Recreation Trips (in US$) 2004–2010
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Note: We include household respondents that appear at least twice with trip expenditure information in the PSID 
survey rounds from 2005 to 2011. The households we analyze here corresponds to the sample used in the fixed-effect 
model 
 
Figure 2. Average State Unemployment, Participation in Recreation Trips, and Total 
Expenditure in US$ on Recreation Trips from 2004 to 2010 
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Table 1. Treatment and Control Based on Employment Status across Years 
 Control Group 
(Employed) 
Treatment Group 1 
(Unemployed and Retired) 
Treatment Group 2 
(Unemployed) 
Treatment Group 3 
(Retired) 
 
Year 2006 and 2008 
 Both spouses are 
employed in 2008 
Either spouse is unemployed 
or retired in 2008 
Either spouse is 
unemployed in 2008 
Either spouse is 
retired in 2008 
Both spouses are 
employed in 2006  
3871 756 550 207 
 
Year 2006 and 2010 
 Both spouses are 
employed in 2010 
Either spouse is unemployed 
or retired in 2010 
Either spouse is 
unemployed in 2010 
Either spouse is 
retired in 2010 
Both spouses are 
employed in 2006  
3325 804 459 349 
 
Year 2008 and 2010 
 Both spouses are 
employed in 2010 
Either spouse is unemployed 
or retired in 2010 
Either spouse is 
unemployed in 2010 
Either spouse is 
retired in 2010 
Both spouses are 
employed in 2008  
3793 629 429 201 
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Table 2. Summary Statistics of Covariates Used in the Matching Exercises 
 
  Baseline Year 2006 Baseline Year 2008 
 Variable Mean std. dev Min Max Mean std. dev Min Max 
 
 
 
 
Demographics 
Age of Head 42.48 12.83 18.00 82.00 42.33 12.93 17.00 84.00 
Age of Wife 25.48 22.68 0.00 82.00 24.58 22.84 0.00 83.00 
Gender of Head 0.73 0.44 0.00 1.00 0.72 0.45 0.00 1.00 
Hispanic 0.08 0.26 0.00 1.00 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00 
Black 0.30 0.46 0.00 1.00 0.32 0.47 0.00 1.00 
Marital Status 0.56 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Family Size 2.74 1.40 1.00 9.00 2.70 1.43 1.00 12.00 
Child Under Age 2 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00 0.13 0.34 0.00 1.00 
 
Education of 
Households 
Less Than High School 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00 0.11 0.32 0.00 1.00 
High School Graduate 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00 
Some College 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00 0.27 0.44 0.00 1.00 
Housing, 
Wealth, and 
Vehicle 
Wealth in 2007 208250 1245408 -336269 49800000 194148 1790732 -1974000 100000000 
Own House 0.65 0.48 0.00 1.00 0.60 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Own Private Vehicle 0.93 0.25 0.00 1.00 0.92 0.28 0.00 1.00 
 
 
Industry  
Manufacturing  0.13 0.34 0.00 1.00 0.13 0.34 0.00 1.00 
Agriculture 0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00 0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00 
Construction 0.07 0.25 0.00 1.00 0.07 0.25 0.00 1.00 
Services 0.34 0.47 0.00 1.00 0.34 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Retail Trade 0.13 0.34 0.00 1.00 0.13 0.34 0.00 1.00 
Public Administration 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 
 
Geographic 
Region 
North East 0.15 0.35 0.00 1.00 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00 
Urban 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 
Metro 0.76 0.43 0.00 1.00 0.77 0.42 0.00 1.00 
South 0.42 0.49 0.00 1.00 0.43 0.49 0.00 1.00 
West 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00 
Health and 
Lifestyle 
Health Status of HD 0.89 0.32 0.00 1.00 0.89 0.31 0.00 1.00 
Smoker 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 
Physical Activity of HD 0.65 0.48 0.00 1.00 0.65 0.48 0.00 1.00 
 Total Number of 
Observations 
4627 4422 
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Table 3. State Unemployment and Household Participation in Recreation 
 2008 is Recession Year 2010 is Recession Year 
 I II III IV V I II III IV V 
State Unemployment -0.004* -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.008* -0.007* -0.009* -0.006 -0.008 
 [0.002] [0.002] [0.004] [0.002] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.006] [0.004] [0.006] 
Recession*Unemployment -0.002 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 0.006 0.008* 0.009* 0.007 0.008 
 [0.004] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.004] [0.004] [0.005] [0.004] [0.005] 
Recession 0.01 0.023 0.024 0.023 0.029 -0.04 -0.056 -0.079 -0.052 -0.057 
 [0.027] [0.030] [0.030] [0.030] [0.032] [0.034] [0.035] [0.049] [0.035] [0.036] 
Linear Trend YES YES YES No No YES YES YES No No 
Quadratic Trend No No YES No No No No YES No No 
State Specific Linear Trend No No No YES YES No No No YES YES 
State Fixed Effect No No No No YES No No No No YES 
Adjusted R-square 0.031 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.024 0.004 0.004 0.009 0.009 
 2004 is Placebo Recession Year 2006 is Placebo Recession Year 
 I II III IV V I II III IV V 
State Unemployment -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 
 [0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.003] [0.004] [0.002] [0.002] [0.004] [0.002] [0.004] 
Recession*Unemployment 0.053 0.068 0.07 0.06 0.054 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.007 -0.003 
 [0.051] [0.044] [0.046] [0.044] [0.055] [0.032] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.031] 
Recession -0.011 -0.013* -0.013* -0.012 -0.012 0.001 0 0 0.002 0.002 
 [0.009] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.007] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] 
Linear Trend YES YES No No No YES YES No No No 
Quadratic Trend No No YES No No No No YES No No 
State Specific Linear Trend No No No YES YES No No No YES YES 
State Fixed Effect YES No No No No No No No No No 
Year Fixed Effect No No No No YES No No No No YES 
Adjusted R-square 0.024 0.004 0.004 0.009 0.009 0.024 0.004 0.004 0.008 0.008 
Number of Households 11387 9086 9086 9086 9086 11387 9086 9086 9086 9086 
Note: Standard errors are reported in the bracket immediately under the estimates. Significance level can be read as * p≤0.05, ** p≤0.01, *** p≤0.001. 
Specification I does not include any household fixed effect to accommodate state fixed effects. 
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Table 4. State Unemployment and Household Recreation Expenditure in $ 
 2008 is the Recession Year 2010 is the Recession Year 
 I II III IV V I II III IV V 
State Unemployment -47.57*** -45.80** -5.80 -47.12** -3.54 -35.79 -47.05 45.35 -50.11 54.22 
 [15.833] [19.911] [35.954] [20.584] [39.368] [26.494] [35.829] [51.063] [37.562] [56.592] 
Recession*Unemployment 92.02*** 82.85** 77.10* 87.18** 83.03** -11.22 6.29 -52.68* 5.96 -58.60* 
 [27.977] [41.576] [40.063] [42.058] [40.885] [27.042] [30.566] [31.773] [30.629] [32.836] 
Recession -674.32*** -629.73*** -622.89*** -657.37*** -511.22** 211.95 108.44 993.10*** 122.38 394.76* 
 [187.834] [241.072] [238.717] [243.276] [218.922] [227.561] [240.707] [345.535] [241.530] [214.243] 
Linear Trend YES YES YES No No YES YES YES No No 
Quadratic Trend No No YES No No No No YES No No 
State Linear Trend No No No YES YES No No No YES YES 
State Fixed Effect No No No No YES No No No No YES 
Adjusted R-square 0.022 0.002 0.002 0.005 0.005 0.022 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.005 
 2004 is Placebo Recession Year 2006 is Placebo Recession Year 
 I II III IV V I II III IV V 
State Unemployment 24.58 29.27 -0.06 31.81 1.05 1.79 6.24 1.67 6.38 2.44 
 [25.794] [28.268] [36.935] [29.876] [40.183] [15.609] [16.968] [37.497] [17.471] [40.605] 
Recession*Unemployment 35.05 6.56 7.81 10.76 10.39 -23.79 -31.83 -31.11 -35.79 -35.35 
 [49.920] [48.442] [48.497] [48.575] [48.547] [31.797] [33.340] [34.586] [32.674] [33.726] 
Recession -492.04 -342.38 -562.84 -378.80 -6.07 274.03 317.537* 318.843* 338.651* 326.71 
 [330.436] [335.002] [368.173] [343.770] [432.097] [168.048] [186.759] [184.479] [183.626] [233.522] 
Linear Trend YES YES No No No YES YES No No No 
Quadratic Trend No No YES No No No No YES No No 
State Linear Trend No No No YES YES No No No YES YES 
State Fixed Effect YES No No No No YES No No No No 
Year Fixed Effect No No No No YES No No No No YES 
Adjusted R-square 0.022 0.002 0.002 0.005 0.005 0.022 0.002 0.002 0.005 0.005 
Number of Households 11387 9086 9086 9086 9086 11387 9086 9086 9086 9086 
Note: Standard errors are reported in the bracket immediately under the estimates. Significance level can be read as * p≤0.05, ** p≤0.01, *** p≤0.001. 
Specification I does not include any household fixed effect to accommodate state fixed effects.
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Table 5. Estimation of Propensity Score Equation 
 
 2008 and 2010 2006 and 2010 2006 and 2008 
 Unemployed 
& retired 
Retired Unemployed Unemployed & 
retired 
Retired Unemployed Unemployed 
& retired 
Retired Unemployed 
Age of Head -0.169*** -0.395*** -0.110* -0.181*** -0.38*** -0.076 -0.141*** -0.381** -0.049 
 [0.048] [0.151] [0.061] [0.051] [0.116] [0.066] [0.048] [0.150] [0.059] 
(Age of Head)^2 0.003*** 0.009*** 0.002 0.003*** 0.009*** 0.001 0.003** 0.009*** 0.001 
 [0.001] [0.003] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.003] [0.001] 
(Age of Head)^3 -0.000* -0.000*** 0 -0.000* -0.000*** 0 0 -0.00*** 0 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Age of Wife 0.012 -0.052 -0.001 0.013 -0.033 -0.005 0.022* -0.025 0.026* 
 [0.013] [0.047] [0.017] [0.014] [0.034] [0.019] [0.013] [0.041] [0.015] 
(Age of Wife)^2 0 0.002 0.001 0 0.002 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 
 [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] 
(Age of Wife)^3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Gender of Head 0.143* 0.19 0.137 0.148* 0.193 0.142 0.140* -0.011 0.176** 
 [0.085] [0.183] [0.091] [0.084] [0.150] [0.093] [0.081] [0.187] [0.086] 
Hispanic 0.158 -0.156 0.241** 0.122 -0.242 0.195* 0.197** 0.029 0.246** 
 [0.100] [0.244] [0.106] [0.096] [0.201] [0.105] [0.090] [0.205] [0.096] 
Black 0.367*** 0.242* 0.402*** 0.381*** 0.238** 0.441*** 0.325*** 0.205* 0.336*** 
 [0.065] [0.134] [0.070] [0.063] [0.108] [0.071] [0.061] [0.120] [0.066] 
Marital Status -0.132 0.241 -0.16 -0.366*** -0.182 -0.359*** -0.156 0.352 -0.191* 
 [0.106] [0.312] [0.110] [0.102] [0.223] [0.109] [0.098] [0.290] [0.102] 
Family Size 0.011 -0.169*** 0.033 -0.001 -0.161*** 0.033 0.016 -0.123** 0.040* 
 [0.023] [0.062] [0.025] [0.023] [0.049] [0.025] [0.022] [0.053] [0.023] 
Child Under Age of 2 0.028 -0.174 0.02 0.005 -0.075 -0.037 -0.138* 0.672*** -0.216** 
 [0.087] [0.461] [0.089] [0.089] [0.328] [0.092] [0.083] [0.245] [0.086] 
Urban -0.127 -0.15 -0.084 -0.004 -0.046 0.063 0.035 0.024 -0.008 
 [0.154] [0.279] [0.178] [0.154] [0.235] [0.191] [0.148] [0.289] [0.160] 
Metro -0.201 -0.266 -0.119 -0.163 -0.211 -0.042 -0.091 0.054 -0.128 
 [0.149] [0.271] [0.172] [0.150] [0.228] [0.187] [0.145] [0.284] [0.156] 
Less Than High School 0.265*** 0.311* 0.240** 0.296*** 0.001 0.378*** 0.306*** -0.11 0.373*** 
 [0.087] [0.167] [0.097] [0.083] [0.141] [0.094] [0.080] [0.169] [0.086] 
High School Graduate 0.140** -0.003 0.182** 0.059 -0.147 0.145* 0.125* 0.156 0.131* 
 [0.067] [0.124] [0.076] [0.066] [0.104] [0.078] [0.065] [0.117] [0.072] 
Some College -0.056 -0.069 -0.038 -0.041 -0.014 -0.051 0.044 0.169 0.032 
 [0.070] [0.125] [0.079] [0.068] [0.104] [0.082] [0.066] [0.116] [0.074] 
Wealth in 2007 0 0 0 0 0 -0.000** 0 0 0 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
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Table 5 Continued. 
 
 2008 and 2010 2006 and 2010 2006 and 2008 
 Unemployed 
& retired 
Retired Unemployed Unemployed & 
retired 
Retired Unemployed Unemployed 
& retired 
Retired Unemployed 
Own House -0.159** 0.16 -0.214*** -0.088 0.093 -0.112 -0.172*** 0.09 -0.219*** 
 [0.064] [0.143] [0.069]    [0.062] [0.117] [0.068]    [0.059] [0.133] [0.063]    
Own Private Vehicle -0.328*** -0.007 -0.372*** -0.147* 0.082 -0.187**  -0.390*** 0.126 -0.434*** 
 [0.085] [0.220] [0.088]    [0.088] [0.191] [0.094]    [0.083] [0.242] [0.086]    
Manufacturing Sector 0.022 0.014 0.018 0.028 -0.003 0.042 -0.07 0.026 -0.06 
 [0.084] [0.149] [0.095]    [0.082] [0.130] [0.096]    [0.080] [0.151] [0.087]    
Agriculture -0.363** -0.221 -0.371**  -0.275** -0.257 -0.188 -0.335** -0.238 -0.292**  
 [0.149] [0.234] [0.181]    [0.140] [0.220] [0.162]    [0.133] [0.256] [0.144]    
Construction -0.019 -0.108 -0.001 0.138 0.059 0.155 0.089 0.135 0.077 
 [0.108] [0.201] [0.122]    [0.103] [0.166] [0.119]    [0.097] [0.185] [0.107]    
Services -0.041 -0.054 -0.046 -0.01 0.003 -0.052 -0.127** 0.125 -0.203*** 
 [0.067] [0.137] [0.073]    [0.066] [0.115] [0.075]    [0.064] [0.132] [0.069]    
etail Trade -0.101 -0.14 -0.085 -0.051 -0.006 -0.094 0 0.323** -0.059 
 [0.088] [0.174] [0.096]    [0.086] [0.143] [0.099]    [0.079] [0.154] [0.086]    
Public Administration 0.034 0.328* -0.152 0.195* 0.343** 0.07 -0.142 0.121 -0.201 
 [0.111] [0.178] [0.139]    [0.105] [0.151] [0.131]    [0.108] [0.176] [0.127]    
North East -0.159* -0.184 -0.152 -0.159* -0.131 -0.153 -0.349*** -0.320** -0.326*** 
 [0.085] [0.143] [0.099]    [0.082] [0.125] [0.099]    [0.082] [0.151] [0.091]    
South -0.148** -0.330*** -0.085 -0.155** -0.182* -0.142**  -0.193*** -0.083 -0.207*** 
 [0.065] [0.121] [0.073]    [0.062] [0.102] [0.072]    [0.060] [0.114] [0.065]    
West -0.153* -0.193 -0.102 -0.017 -0.087 0.069 -0.086 0.038 -0.128 
 [0.080] [0.140] [0.092]    [0.075] [0.119] [0.088]    [0.073] [0.132] [0.081]    
Health Status of Head -0.044 -0.287** 0.087 -0.143** -0.287*** -0.077 -0.253*** -0.34*** -0.183**  
 [0.078] [0.123] [0.095]    [0.071] [0.104] [0.086]    [0.067] [0.110] [0.077]    
Smoker 0.228*** 0.068 0.262*** 0.308*** 0.276*** 0.301*** 0.289*** 0.356*** 0.244*** 
 [0.061] [0.132] [0.065]    [0.058] [0.101] [0.065]    [0.055] [0.110] [0.060]    
Physical Activity of 
Head 
-0.088* -0.072 -0.075 -0.099* -0.209*** -0.029 -0.082 -0.143 -0.064 
 [0.053] [0.097] [0.060]    [0.052] [0.081] [0.061]    [0.050] [0.091] [0.055]    
Constant 1.757** 2.53 0.538 1.790** 2.601 -0.025 1.545** 1.185 0.195 
 [0.693] [2.540] [0.843]    [0.721] [1.814] [0.890]    [0.680] [2.530] [0.802]    
N 4422 3994 4222 4129 3674 3784 4627 4078 4421 
Log Likelihood -1635.707 -473.88 -1269.84 -1773.5 -671.088 -1281 -1871.104 -519.764 -1511.28 
Pseudo R2 0.096 0.405 0.085 0.129 0.418 0.084 0.092 0.365 0.09 
chi2 345.915 645.623 235.093 524.138 964.637 233.91 378.106 597.768 298.607 
Note: Standard errors are reported in the bracket immediately under the estimates. Significance level can be read as * p≤0.05, ** p≤0.01, *** p≤0.001. 
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Table 6. Comparison of Recreation Participation and Expenditure across 2006(base) and 2008(treatment) 
 
 
 
Treatment 
Group 
 Participation Difference in Participation Trip Expenditure Difference in Trip Expenditure 
Matching 
Method 
2008 2010 
 
2006 & 
2008 
2006 & 
2010 
2008 & 
2010 
2008 2010 2006 & 
2008 
2006 & 
2010 
2008 & 
2010 
Treatment 
year 
Post 
treatment 
year 
Treatment 
year 
Post treatment years Treatment 
year 
post 
treatment 
year 
Treatment 
year 
Post treatment years 
Panel a 
Employed in 
2006 but 
Retired or 
Unemployed 
in 2008 
 
NN1 
 
-0.116*** -0.114*** -0.104** -0.102** 0.002 -393.86** -274.30 -246.403 -280.76 -96.968 
[0.037] [0.038] [0.041] [0.045] [0.047] [167.872] [232.036] [175.081] [216.41] [229.718] 
NN5 
 
-0.078*** -0.121*** -0.064** -0.11*** -0.043 -151.334 -185.75 -2.253 -138.07 -52.473 
[0.024] [0.024] [0.027] [0.027] [0.027] [106.348] [114.534] [117.240] [116.33] [103.518] 
Radius 
Caliper 
-0.098*** -0.117*** -0.062*** -0.09*** -0.039 -312.43*** -273.91** -109.68 -122.85 51.453 
[0.019] 0.022 [0.023] 0.025 0.026 [104.000] 134.667 [101.359] 120.74 110.468 
Panel b 
 
Employed in 
2006 but 
Unemployed   
in 2008 
NN1 
 
-0.102** -0.122*** -0.092* -0.112** -0.02 -249.211* -402.3*** -1.719 -24.20 -31.368 
[0.045] [0.044] [0.053] [0.051] [0.057] [140.068] [147.352] [181.820] [166.36] [169.035] 
NN5 
 
-0.118*** -0.127*** -0.082** -0.091** -0.009 -343.70*** -530.4*** -108.178 -387*** -242.73* 
[0.028] [0.029] [0.033] [0.036] [0.034] [96.406] [112.233] [119.131] [114.01] [134.086] 
Radius 
Caliper 
-0.135*** -0.157*** -0.084*** -0.12*** -0.03 -333.44*** -533.6*** -118.908 -275.9** -101.835 
[0.023] [0.026] [0.028] [0.033] [0.030] [92.227] [116.711] [106.272] [112.92] [123.271] 
Panel c 
 
Employed in 
2006 but 
Retired in 
2008 
NN1 
 
0.112* -0.039 0.151** 0 -0.151*** 312.854 423.066 215.051 -35.134 -220.753 
[0.063] [0.059] [0.065] [0.062] [0.057] [357.765] [361.443] [299.687] [363.06] [305.304] 
NN5 
 
0.054 -0.054 0.045 -0.063 -0.107** -90.168 -101.649 415.905 103.7 110.234 
[0.041] [0.040] [0.044] [0.040] [0.047] [276.097] [318.800] [289.615] [289.15] [235.404] 
Radius 
Caliper 
0.023 -0.057 0.02 -0.046 -0.091* -205.009 145.888 21.868 221.025 320.572 
[0.036] [0.040] [0.041] [0.044] [0.048] [309.553] [379.661] [255.212] [342.59] [234.424] 
Note: Standard errors are reported in the bracket immediately under the estimates. Significance level can be read as * p≤0.05, ** p≤0.01, *** p≤0.001. Standard 
errors for nearest neighbor matching estimates are Abadie-Imbens standard errors while those for radius matching are obtained from 1000 bootstrapped sample.  
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Table 7. Comparison of Recreation Participation and Expenditure across 2006(base) and 2010(treatment) 
 
 
 
Treatment 
Group 
 Participation Difference in Participation Trip Expenditure Difference in Trip Expenditure 
Matching 
Method 
2008 2010 
 
2006 & 2008 2006 & 
2010 
2008 & 
2010 
2008 2010 2006 & 
2008 
2006 & 
2010 
2008 & 
2010 
Non 
treatment 
years 
Treatment 
year 
Non 
treatment 
years 
Treatment 
year 
Non 
treatment 
years 
Non 
treatment 
year 
Treatment 
year 
Non 
treatment 
years 
Treatment 
year 
Non 
treatment 
years 
  Panel a 
Employed in 
2006 but 
Retired or 
Unemployed 
in 2010 
 
NN1 
 
-0.109*** -0.120*** -0.072* -0.060* -0.01 -13.209 -271.585 -9.943 -123.797 1.325 
[0.031] [0.032] [0.037] [0.036] [0.035] [182.087] [313.230] [202.073] [272.61] [174.806] 
NN5 
 
-0.089*** -0.117*** -0.046* -0.07*** -0.042* -3.235 -96.387 189.439 128.256 -86.947 
[0.022] [0.022] [0.025] [0.025] [0.025] [149.986] [141.165] [183.368] [147.59] [145.703] 
Radius 
Caliper 
-0.063*** -0.121*** -0.022 -0.072*** -0.054** -83.539 -89.699 109.718 103.558 -6.161 
[0.022] [0.020] [0.024] [0.024] [0.026] [156.971] [137.559] [187.467] [164.29] [154.932] 
     Panel b 
 
Employed in 
2006 but 
Unemployed   
in 2010 
NN1 
 
-0.046 -0.173*** 0.023 -0.088* -0.06 -161.41 -659.52*** 259.90 -73.83 -304.45 
[0.044] [0.044] [0.048] [0.050] [0.047] [219.713] [246.897] [269.864] [202.62] [228.686] 
NN5 
 
-0.087*** -0.146*** -0.006 -0.086*** -0.074** 32.67 -367.69*** 216.03 -177.38 -449.4** 
[0.029] [0.027] [0.033] [0.033] [0.033] [180.701] [107.460] [186.374] [123.75] [192.373] 
Radius 
Caliper 
-0.101*** -0.150*** -0.027 -0.087*** -0.065** -142.80 -359.56*** 182.27 -115.769 -306.17 
[0.028] [0.025] [0.033] [0.032] [0.032] [203.247] [81.731] [217.296] [98.530] [209.108] 
  Panel c 
 
Employed in 
2006 but 
Retired  in 
2010 
NN1 
 
-0.026 -0.066 -0.044 -0.092* -0.038 74.574 -19.897 113.429 -109.034 142.508 
[0.041] [0.046] [0.038] [0.051] [0.051] [291.852] [359.524] [389.236] [300.02] [290.977] 
NN5 
 
-0.076** -0.072** -0.056* -0.060* 0.013 21.927 36.169 214.249 208.863 127.538 
[0.030] [0.036] [0.033] [0.036] [0.041] [201.244] [326.022] [231.044] [294.97] [212.952] 
Radius 
Caliper 
-0.063** -0.075** -0.027 -0.047 -0.016 -117.587 94.48 106.039 335.911 183.825 
[0.032] [0.032] [0.035] [0.036] [0.038] [248.241] [291.276] [317.993] [331.03] [267.298] 
Note: Standard errors are reported in the bracket immediately under the estimates. Significance level can be read as * p≤0.05, ** p≤0.01, *** p≤0.001. Standard 
errors for nearest neighbor matching estimates are Abadie-Imbens standard errors while those for radius matching are obtained from 1000 bootstrapped sample.  
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Table 8. Comparison of Recreation Participation and Expenditure across 2008(base) and 2010(treatment) 
 
 
Treatment 
Group 
 Participation Trip Expenditure Trip Expenditure Difference in Trip Expenditure 
Matching 
Method 
2008 2010 
 
2006 & 2010 2008 & 2010 2008 2010 2006 & 2010 2008 & 2010 
Base year Treatment 
year 
Not treatment 
years 
Treatment 
year 
Base year Treatment 
year 
Not 
treatment 
years 
Treatment 
year 
 
Employed in 
2008 but 
Retired or 
Unemployed 
in 2010 
 
NN1 
 
-0.059 -0.081** -0.013 -0.022 263.879 -62.591 -25.955 -326.469 
[0.037] [0.038] [0.050] [0.042] [252.256] [192.955] [274.738] [254.523] 
NN5 
 
-0.035 -0.096*** -0.036 -0.060** 242.295 -129.698 115.822 -371.993* 
[0.023] [0.023] [0.028] [0.027] [229.072] [135.423] [169.486] [211.079] 
Radius 
Caliper 
-0.053** -0.093*** -0.03 -0.04 131.356 -137.135 80.9 -268.49 
[0.023] [0.024] [0.028] [0.027] [273.182] [129.464] [151.515] [238.321] 
 
 
Employed in 
2008 but 
Unemployed   
in 2010 
NN1 
 
-0.126*** -0.110** -0.068 0.016 -108.218 -132.798 -143.353 -24.58 
[0.042] [0.045] [0.049] [0.043] [223.843] [135.466] [150.989] [217.642] 
NN5 
 
-0.081*** -0.130*** -0.062* -0.049 -90.305 -362.187*** -136.231 -271.881 
[0.028] [0.028] [0.037] [0.034] [180.206] [90.922] [121.096] [179.079] 
Radius 
Caliper 
-0.065** -0.141*** -0.025 -0.077** -34.534 -422.120*** -127.352 -387.585* 
[0.027] [0.026] [0.034] [0.034] [210.916] [98.402] [119.372] [220.930] 
 
 
Employed in 
2008 but 
Retired in 
2010 
NN1 
 
-0.015 -0.02 0.051 -0.005 448.427 -177.295 443.974 -625.722 
[0.064] [0.056] [0.061] [0.081] [712.435] [643.834] [391.704] [705.144] 
NN5 
 
-0.064* -0.019 -0.057 0.045 503.345 251.691 313.659 -251.655 
[0.033] [0.039] [0.044] [0.046] [602.634] [353.388] [406.265] [509.426] 
Radius 
Caliper 
-0.044 -0.028 -0.041 0.016 384.959 167.094 334.378 -217.865 
[0.038] [0.042] [0.043] [0.045] [648.075] [386.700] [400.686] [574.775] 
Note: Standard errors are reported in the bracket immediately under the estimates. Significance level can be read as * p≤0.05, ** p≤0.01, *** p≤0.001. Standard errors for 
nearest neighbor matching estimates are Abadie-Imbens standard errors while those for radius matching are obtained from 1000 bootstrapped sample. 
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Table 9. Estimates from Placebo Exercises & Testing the Parallel Trend Assumption 
 
 T
re
at
m
en
t 
G
ro
u
p
 
 Participation Difference in Participation Trip Expenditure Difference in Trip Expenditure 
 
Analysis 
across 
2006 
vs. 
2008 
2006 
vs. 
2010 
2008 
vs. 
2010 
2006 
vs. 
2008 
2006 
vs. 
2010 
2008 
vs. 
2010 
2006 
vs. 
2008 
2006 
vs. 
2010 
2008 
vs. 
2010 
2006 
vs. 
2008 
2006 
vs. 
2010 
2008 
vs. 
2010 
M
a
tc
h
in
g
 
M
et
h
o
d
 
Placebo 
year is 
2004 
Placebo 
year is 
2004 
Placebo 
year is 
2006 
Placebo 
across 
2004 & 
2006 
Placebo 
across 
2004 & 
2006 
Placebo 
across 
2006 & 
2008 
Placebo 
year is 
2004 
Placebo 
year is 
2004 
Placebo 
year is 
2006 
Placebo 
across 
2004 & 
2006 
Placebo 
across 
2004 & 
2006 
Placebo 
across 
2006 & 
2008 
Treatment 
including 
both Retired 
and 
Unemployed 
NN1 
 
-0.032 -0.12*** -0.032 -0.02 -0.085** 0.019 -1019.6** -212.065 1.956 -859.30* -324.591 477.962 
[0.035] [0.032] [0.039] [0.040] [0.039] [0.038] [501.612] [223.359] [185.336] [478.191] [236.536] [304.564] 
NN5 
 
-0.018 -0.08*** -0.05** -0.004 -0.018 -0.004 -95.325 -59.514 -186.014 -43.597 187.148 391.764 
[0.024] [0.023] [0.023] [0.028] [0.026] [0.026] [123.973] [147.509] [145.783] [143.412] [180.740] [274.870] 
Radius -0.020 -0.07*** -0.06*** 0.001 -0.023 0.01 -133.366 -173.239 -218.03* 17.686 20.018 349.39 
0.021 [0.022] [0.022] 0.024 [0.025] [0.024] 109.852 [183.196] [128.813] 134.611 [208.091] [285.644] 
              
 
Treatment 
including 
Unemployed 
NN1 
 
-0.055 -0.16*** -0.074 -0.045 -0.123** 0.053 -232.767 -365.97* 10.936 311.052 -86.22 230.856 
[0.045] [0.045] [0.046] [0.053] [0.063] [0.045] [186.776] [215.249] [132.397] [207.892] [185.560] [246.478] 
NN5 
 
-0.037 -0.10*** -0.08*** -0.001 -0.033 0.027 -142.247 -43.53 -165.394 193.506 295.78* 110.505 
[0.028] [0.028] [0.031] [0.033] [0.035] [0.034] [121.692] [115.657] [112.151] [128.789] [177.674] [230.110] 
Radius -0.046* -0.11*** -0.12*** -0.009 -0.039 0.051 -123.571 -168.99 -294.7*** 134.167 156.08 260.233 
[0.026] [0.028] [0.028] [0.031] [0.033] [0.032] [111.301] [116.727] [100.972] [121.376] [135.871] [228.023] 
              
 
Treatment 
including  
Retired 
NN1 
 
0.006 0.018 -0.056 0.045 -0.036 0.026 -632.172 129.129 -36.075 -585.273 -128.28 739.115 
[0.058] [0.051] [0.055] [0.052] [0.058] [0.058] [476.269] [288.921] [475.525] [613.049] [362.778] [680.088] 
NN5 
 
0.022 -0.041 0.043 0.013 -0.02 -0.109*** -162.047 -303.398 -69.817 69.527 9.152 572.478 
[0.037] [0.030] [0.034] [0.043] [0.033] [0.039] [217.074] [331.281] [322.621] [268.748] [393.729] [628.406] 
Radius 0.023 -0.044 0.013 0.034 -0.008 -0.057 -202.873 -176.508 -167.284 -127.736 47.119 552.243 
[0.039] [0.031] [0.036] [0.045] [0.034] [0.039] [243.004] [300.359] [360.570] [364.328] [363.824] [674.970] 
Note: Standard errors are reported in the bracket immediately under the estimates. Significance level can be read as * p≤0.05, ** p≤0.01, *** p≤0.001. Standard 
errors for nearest neighbor matching estimates are Abadie-Imbens standard errors while those for radius matching are obtained from 1000 bootstrapped sample.  
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Table 10. Doubly Robust Estimators for Unemployed Treatment Across all Comparison Years 
 
 Participation Difference in Participation Trip Expenditure Difference in Trip Expenditure 
 
Analysis Across Base Year 2006 and Treatment Year 2008 
 2004 
(Placebo) 
2008 
(Treatment) 
2004 & 2006 
(placebo) 
2006 & 2008 
(Base vs. 
treatment) 
2004 
(Placebo) 
2008 
(Treatment) 
2004 & 2006 
(placebo) 
2006 & 2008 
(Base vs. 
treatment) 
Employed in 2006 
but Retired or 
Unemployed in 2008 
-0.119 -0.638*** 0.018 -0.093*** -236.96** -277.953** -40.655 -96.134 
[0.176] [0.138] [0.034] [0.028] [118.531] [116.707] [139.877] [109.749] 
 
Analysis Across Base Year 2006 and Treatment Year 2010 
 2004 
(Placebo) 
2008 
(Treatment) 
2004 & 2006 
(placebo) 
2006 & 2008 
(Base vs. 
Treatment) 
2004 
(Placebo) 
2008 
(Treatment) 
2004 & 2006 
(placebo) 
2006 & 2008 
(Base vs. 
Treatment) 
Employed in 2006 
but Retired or 
Unemployed in 2010 
-0.452** -0.778*** -0.024 -0.092*** -33.06 -342.557*** 162.47 -123.50 
[0.226] [0.166] [0.037] [0.030] 126.47 [89.347] [162.382] [106.130] 
 
Analysis Across Base Year 2008 and Treatment Year 2010 
 
 
 2006 
(Placebo) 
2010 
(Treatment) 
2006 & 2008 
(placebo) 
2008 & 2010 
(Base vs. 
Treatment) 
2006 
(Placebo) 
2010 
(Treatment) 
2006 & 2008 
(placebo) 
2008 & 2010 
(Base vs. 
Treatment) 
Employed in 2008 
but Retired or 
Unemployed in 2010 
-0.509** -0.695*** 0.051 -0.078** -146.165 -352.134*** 46.444 -262.701 
[0.221] [0.156] [0.034] [0.032] [120.898] [82.439] [215.896] [161.423] 
Note: Standard errors are reported in the bracket immediately under the estimates. Significance level can be read as * p≤0.05, ** p≤0.01, *** p≤0.001. Standard 
errors for nearest neighbor matching estimates are Abadie-Imbens standard errors while those for radius matching are obtained from 1000 bootstrapped sample.  
Estimates from the placebo exercises under “differences in participation” and “differences in trip expenditure” heading will test if the parallel trend assumption 
is satisfied
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APPENDIX B. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 3 
 
Table A1: Balancing of Covariates, 2006 and 2008, Treatments are Unemployed and Retired Group 
Treatment Year is 2008 and Baseline Year is 2006 Mean Bias Median Bias 
Unmatched Matched Unmatched Matc
hed 
 
12.9 2.6 10.7 2 
 
12.9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.9 10.7 1.8 
 
12.9 1.2 10.7 1 
Unemployed&Retired, NN1
-20 -10 0 10 20 30
Standardized % bias across covariates
Unmatched
Matched
Unemployed&Retired, NN5
-20 -10 0 10 20 30
Standardized % bias across covariates
Unmatched
Matched
Unemployed&Retired, Radius with Caliper=0.5*SD of Propensity Score
-20 -10 0 10 20 30
Standardized % bias across covariates
Unmatched
Matched
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Table A2: Balancing of Covariates, 2006 and 2008, Treatments are Unemployed Group 
 
Treatment Year is 2008 and Baseline Year is 2006 Mean Bias Median Bias 
Unmatched Matched Unmatched Matched 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14.3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12.4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14.3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12.4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14.3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12.4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
Unemployed, NN1
-40 -20 0 20 40
Standardized % bias across covariates
Unmatched
Matched
Unemployed, NN5
-40 -20 0 20 40
Standardized % bias across covariates
Unmatched
Matched
Unemployed, Radius
-40 -20 0 20 40
Standardized % bias across covariates
Unmatched
Matched
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Table A3: Balancing of Covariates, 2006 and 2008, Treatments are Retired Group 
 
Treatment Year is 2008 and Baseline Year is 2006 Mean Bias Median Bias 
Unmatched Matched Unmatched Matched 
 
40.9 6.5 17.7 5.9 
 
40.9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2 17.7 1.8 
 
40.9 3.7 17.7 3.7 
 
 
 
-50 0 50 100 150 200
Standardized % bias across covariates
Unmatched
Matched
Retired, NN1
Retired, NN5
-50 0 50 100 150 200
Standardized % bias across covariates
Unmatched
Matched
Retired, Radius with Caliper=0.5*SD of Propensity Score
-50 0 50 100 150 200
Standardized % bias across covariates
Unmatched
Matched
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Table A4: Balancing of Covariates, 2006 and 2010, Treatments are Unemployed and Retired Group 
 
Treatment Year is 2010 and Baseline Year is 2006 Mean Bias Median Bias 
Unmatched Matched Unmatched Matched 
 
16.6 2.9 11.7 2.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16.6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11.7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16.6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11.7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1 
 
-20 0 20 40 60
Standardized % bias across covariates
Unmatched
Matched
Unemployed & Retired, NN1
Unemployed & Retired, NN5
-20 0 20 40 60
Standardized % bias across covariates
Unmatched
Matched
-20 0 20 40 60
Standardized % bias across covariates
Unmatched
Matched
Unemployed & Retired, Radius w Caliper=0.5*SD of Propensity Score
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Table A5: Balancing of Covariates, 2006 and 2010, Treatments are Unemployed Group 
 
Treatment Year is 2010 and Baseline Year is 2006 Mean Bias Median Bias 
Unmatched Matched Unmatched Matched 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13.5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11.2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13.5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11.2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13.5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11.2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.6 
unemployed, NN1
-40 -20 0 20 40
Standardized % bias across covariates
Unmatched
Matched
Unemployed, NN5
-40 -20 0 20 40
Standardized % bias across covariates
Unmatched
Matched
Unemployed, Radius w Caliper=0.5*SD of Propensity Score
-40 -20 0 20 40
Standardized % bias across covariates
Unmatched
Matched
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Table A6: Balancing of Covariates, 2006 and 2010, Treatments are Retired Group 
 
Treatment Year is 2010 and Baseline Year is 2006 Mean Bias Median Bias 
Unmatched Matched Unmatched Matched 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
42.3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
21.7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
42.3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
21.7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
42.3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
21.7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
-50 0 50 100 150 200
Standardized % bias across covariates
Unmatched
Matched
Retired, NN1
Retired, NN5
-50 0 50 100 150 200
Standardized % bias across covariates
Unmatched
Matched
Retired, Radius w Caliper=0.5*SD of Propensity Score
-50 0 50 100 150 200
Standardized % bias across covariates
Unmatched
Matched
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Table A7: Balancing of Covariates, 2008 and 2010, Treatments are Unemployed and Retired Group 
 
Treatment Year is 2010 and Baseline Year is 2008 Mean Bias Median Bias 
Unmatched Matched Unmatched Matched 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13.6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8.5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13.6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8.5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13.6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8.5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1 
 
 
Unemployed&Retired, NN1
-20 0 20 40
Standardized % bias across covariates
Unmatched
Matched
-20 0 20 40
Standardized % bias across covariates
Unmatched
Matched
Unemployed&Retired, NN5
Unemployed&Retired, Radius w Caliper=0.5*SD of Propensity Score
-20 0 20 40
Standardized % bias across covariates
Unmatched
Matched
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Table A8: Balancing of Covariates, 2008 and 2010, Treatments are Unemployed Group 
 
Treatment Year is 2010 and Baseline Year is 2008 Mean Bias Median Bias 
Unmatched Matched Unmatched Matched 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15.5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12.9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15.5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12.9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15.5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12.9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.3 
 
-40 -20 0 20 40
Standardized % bias across covariates
Unmatched
Matched
Unemployed, NN1
Unemployed, NN5
-40 -20 0 20 40
Standardized % bias across covariates
Unmatched
Matched
-40 -20 0 20 40
Standardized % bias across covariates
Unmatched
Matched
Unemployed, Radius w Caliper=0.5*SD of Propensity Score
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Table A9: Balancing of Covariates, 2008 and 2010, Treatments are Retired Group 
 
Treatment Year is 2010 and Baseline Year is 2008 Mean Bias Median Bias 
Unmatched Matched Unmatched Matched 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
47.2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
21.6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
47.2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
21.6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
47.2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
21.6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2 
 
 
Retired, NN1
-50 0 50 100 150 200
Standardized % bias across covariates
Unmatched
Matched
-50 0 50 100 150 200
Standardized % bias across covariates
Unmatched
Matched
Retired, NN5
Retired, Radius w Caliper=0.5*SD of Propensity Score
-50 0 50 100 150 200
Standardized % bias across covariates
Unmatched
Matched
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Table A10: Validity of Common Support Condition, Number of Matched and Unmatched Treatments. 
 
 Unemployed and Retired 
(group 1) 
Unemployed 
 (Group 2) 
Retired 
 (Group 3) 
 (a) Analysis on 2006 and 2008 
 Unmatched matched  Total Unmatched matched  Total Unmatched matched  Total 
Nearest Neighbor  
with replacement 
0 756 756 0 550 550 6 201 207 
Nearest 5 
Neighbors with 
replacement 
0 756 756 0 550 550 6 201 207 
Radius Matching  
( caliper =0.5*SD) 
0 756 756 0 550 550 6 201 207 
 (b) Analysis on 2006 and 2010 
 Unmatched matched  Total Unmatched matched  Total Unmatched matched  Total 
Nearest Neighbor  
with replacement 
2 457 459 1 803 804 1 348 349 
Nearest 5 
Neighbors with 
replacement 
2 457 459 1 803 804 1 348 349 
Radius Matching 
 ( caliper =0.5*SD) 
2 457 459 1 803 804 1 348 349 
 (c) Analysis on 2008 and 2010 
 Unmatched matched  Total Unmatched matched  Total Unmatched matched  Total 
Nearest Neighbor  
with replacement 
1 428 429 0 629 629 1 200 201 
Nearest 5 
Neighbors with 
replacement 
1 428 429 0 629 629 1 200 201 
Radius Matching 
( caliper =0.5*SD) 
1 428 429 0 629 629 1 200 201 
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CHAPTER 4. HOW LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH AFFECTS 
SCHOOLING INVESTMENT AND LIFETIME EARNINGS: EVIDENCE 
FROM CROSS-COUNTRY HOUSEHOLD SURVEYS 
 
1. Introduction 
Improvements in nutrition, education, transportation, sanitation and knowledge of diseases have 
had a dramatic effect on life expectancy worldwide.  Vallin and Meslé (2009) estimated that the 
various improvements in knowledge and technology increased potential life expectancy at birth 
by 0.33 years per year from 1885 to 1960 and by 0.2 years per year thereafter.  A woman born in 
2000 was expected to live 33 years longer than a woman born in 1885.40   This 63% increase in 
expected length of life was also accompanied by improved health and enhanced physical ability 
to work which should have profound effects on life-cycle investments of time in the acquisition 
of skills, the application of skills to the labor market, and the ability to consume leisure. 
Ben-Porath (1967) and Becker (1993) showed that increased length of life would have an 
unambiguous effect toward increased investment in human capital. Both formulations limited 
agents to choices of working versus acquiring additional human capital, ignoring the possibility 
that individuals would consume more leisure rather than spending more time working or 
learnings.  Heckman (1976) extended the model to allow both time and financial investments 
into human capital production and to allow agents to choose labor supply and the consumption of 
goods and leisure over the life cycle.  Still, his model predicts that increased life expectancy at 
birth would cause individuals to increase their lifetime human capital production.  
                                                 
40 Vallin and Meslé (2009) focused on women’s life expectancy to avoid the effects of war and the higher 
probability of violent or accidental deaths in their analysis of vital statistics.  Potential life expectancy is based on 
the highest country life expectancy in each of the years they evaluated between 1750 and 2000. 
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The link between health and human capital investment has been examined intensively in 
previous research and at different points in the life-cycle.  Shocks to fetal or infant health such as 
maternal malnutrition (Field et al. 2009; Maluccio et al. 2009; Almond and Majumder 2011); 
low birth-weight (Behrman and Rosenzweig 2004); excessive  or insufficient rainfall during the 
first year of childhood (Maccini and Yang 2009; Shah and Steinberg 2014); exposure to diseases 
(Almond 2006; Currie and Vogl 2013); or famine during early childhood (Almond and Currie 
2011; Gorgens et al. 2012) have all been shown to lower educational investments or returns.  
Exogenous shocks from exposure to environmental pollution or hazards (Chay and Greenstone 
2003; Foster et al. 2009; Jayachandran 2009; and Almond et al. 2009); or exposure to violence or 
civil war (Akresh et al. 2011; Camacho 2008; Blattman and Annan 2010; Leon 2012; and Yuksel 
2014) have also reduced educational attainment and labor market earnings.  
While the link between these shocks might be due to health outcomes or to related income 
shocks, other studies have been able to isolate the effects of health on human capital investments.  
Exploiting variation in the timing and intensity of hookworm and malaria eradication in the 
American South and across developing countries, Bleakley (2007, 2010a) and Lucas (2010) 
demonstrated improved education and earnings outcomes for populations with the earliest 
compared to later exposure to the public health intervention.  Miguel and Kremer (2004) found 
that children who received treatment for intestinal worms were absent 25% less than students in 
schools that were randomly assigned to receive the treatment 2-3 years later.  Follow-up surveys 
reveal that compared to the children in the control schools, children under treatment worked 13% 
more hours and earned 20-29% more (Karlan and Appel 2011).  Bhalotra and Venkataramani 
(2012) showed that the availability of antibiotics to combat pneumonia at the time of infancy 
increased education and earnings when the infants reached adulthood.   
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A few studies have examined the role of life expectancy on education.  Jayachandran and 
Lleras-Muney (2009) used improvements in maternal health to instrument for presumed 
endogenous life expectancy of their children, and found that an additional year of expected life 
increased schooling by 0.11 years.  Oster (2013) used information on when individuals learned 
that they had the fatal Huntington’s disease as the life cycle shock, and found that schooling 
increased by 0.17 years for every additional year of expected life. 
Studies that examine the effect of increased life expectancy on human capital investment 
have had more mixed results.  Acemoglu and Johnson (2006, 2007) found no effect of increasing 
life expectancy due to improved control of infectious disease on schooling.  They argued that 
because cohort size increases with improved length of life, returns to human capital may fall due 
to rising labor supply outpacing any growth in demand for skills.  Bloom, Canning and Fink 
(2014) found the Acemoglu and Johnson result reverses when controls for initial health are 
added.  Hazan (2009) argued that the Ben Porath model required an increase in lifetime labor 
supply for the gain in life expectancy to increase investment in human capital. He found that 
American men born between 1840 and 1970 actually reduced lifetime labor supply, from which 
he concluded that life expectancy has either a negligible or possibly even a negative effect on 
investments in education. His subsequent analysis (Hazan 2012) found no correlation between 
life expectancy at age 5 and schooling.41  However, other analyses of similar country-level data 
still retain the positive correlation between life expectancy and schooling (Cervellati and Sunde 
2013; Hansen 2013; and Cohen and Leker 2014). 
                                                 
41Following Soares (2005), Hazan included “post demographic transition countries” which are basically group of 
countries which exhibited life expectancy at birth above 50 in 1960. He preferred life expectancy at 5 or 10 instead 
of that at birth since the later displayed widespread variability due to high infant mortality. 
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This paper makes several improvements over the previous cross-country studies of life 
expectancy on human capital investments.  First, it is based on a much larger and broader set of 
111 developed and developing countries.  The analysis is conducted at the individual cohort level 
so that there is a one-to-one correspondence between year of birth in a country and the 
corresponding life expectancy at birth.  Exact measures of years of schooling by cohort were 
generated from household surveys for each country in place of the noisier approximations based 
on school enrollment data, extrapolated estimates for missing values, and ex post adjustments for 
mortality that were used in previous studies.  Estimates are reported separately for men and 
women and for urban and rural residents to establish the robustness of the findings.  Estimates of 
parental life expectancy at birth are incorporated into the analysis to examine evidence of the 
intergenerational transmission of human capital from parent to child.  Finally, we incorporate 
estimate of the impact of life expectancy on both lifetime years of schooling and lifetime 
earnings.  We find that an additional year of life expected at time of birth increases years of 
schooling by about 0.12 years and increases earnings by about 1%.  The implied Wald estimate 
of returns to schooling are 9.9% for men, 4.3% for women, 10.2% for urban residents and 2.9% 
for rural residents.  These cross-country results are very consistent with the findings based on 
individual data.   
The next section applies Heckman’s (1976) model of life-cycle earnings, learnings and 
consumption to the question of how increased life expectancy at birth will affect lifetime 
schooling and earnings. The next section is on how we utilize these implications to derive the 
reduced form specifications for our empirical exercises. Section four elaborates on the data 
sources while section five specifies the empirical model. Section six reports findings and 
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presents some robustness tests. The final section discusses, interprets the findings, and draws 
some concluding remarks.  
2. Theoretical Framework 
Heckman (1976) developed a life cycle model of earnings, learnings, and consumption by 
merging the theory of labor supply with that of human capital production. His model relaxes 
several assumptions of the Ben-Porath (1967) model that are important to our analysis, including 
that labor supply decisions are made endogenous, that budgets can be used to consume leisure 
and invest in human capital as well as to purchase market goods and services, and that initial 
endowments of assets and human capital will alter the entire trajectory of consumption, 
investment and labor supply. This study uses the Heckman’s framework to motivate the analysis 
of how life expectancy at birth will alter lifetime human capital investment and earnings. 
At each instant the individual is endowed with 1 unit of time, which s/he allocates among 
leisure 𝐿(𝑡), investment in human capital 𝐼(𝑡), and work (1 − 𝐿(𝑡) − 𝐼(𝑡)). Human capital H(t), 
augments individual time in the production of additional human capital, in income generation 
and in leisure consumption. Human capital is accumulated at the rate  
𝐻(𝑡)̇ = 𝐹[𝐼(𝑡)𝐻(𝑡), 𝐷(𝑡)] − 𝜎𝐻(𝑡).            (1) 
𝐻(0) = 𝐻0,              (2) 
where 𝐼(𝑡) is the time allocated to human capital production, and 𝐷(𝑡) is the input of market 
goods into human capital production in period t.  F is a concave production function. No human 
capital is produced unless time is allocated to it, i.e., 𝐼(𝑡) > 0. Human capital depreciates at the 
rate of σ in every period.42  
                                                 
42 Although human capital might exhibit differentiated rate of depreciation at older ages, we adopt Heckman’s 
assumption that 𝜎 is constant through the life. This will not change the implication of the model for our setting  
124 
 
 
 
Consumers’ income in period t comes from two sources: interest earnings from assets 
accumulated and wage earnings conditional on accumulated human capital. The market price for 
a unit of human capital is R.  Labor income in period t can at most be 𝑅𝐻(𝑡)if the individual 
devotes no time to human capital production or leisure. Income can be allocated to direct 
investment in education goods (𝐷(𝑡)), and consumption of durable and nondurable goods (𝑋(𝑡)) 
which are priced at P.  Given an endowment of initial assets 𝐴0 and the human capital 
endowment𝐻0, the individual will accumulate wealth 𝐴(𝑡) according to 
 𝐴(𝑡)̇ = 𝑟𝐴(𝑡) + 𝑅𝐻(𝑡)[1 − 𝐼(𝑡) − 𝐿(𝑡)] − 𝑃𝐷(𝑡) − 𝑃𝑋(𝑡),                (3) 
𝐴(0) = 𝐴0.           (4) 
In equation (3), r is the risk-free rate of return on accumulated assets. The individual 
instantaneous utility function takes the form  
𝑈[𝑋(𝑡), 𝐿(𝑡)𝐻(𝑡)],       
where utility is concave in its arguments 𝑋(𝑡) and 𝐿(𝑡)𝐻(𝑡). Note that 𝐿(𝑡) is leisure in natural 
units of time while 𝐻(𝑡)𝐿(𝑡) is the human capital augmented leisure. The individual seeks to 
maximize lifetime utility as 
∫ 𝑒−𝜌𝑡𝑈[𝑋(𝑡), 𝐿(𝑡)𝐻(𝑡)]𝑑𝑡
𝑇
0
.          (5) 
This is maximized subject to the constraints (1)-(4).43 The current value Hamiltonian of the 
above problem is  
                                                 
43 We ignore the bequest motive for simplicity. Bequests do not make much sense in a model without hierarchical 
families. 
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𝐽(𝑡): 𝑒−𝜌𝑡𝑈[𝑋(𝑡), 𝐿(𝑡)𝐻(𝑡)] + 𝜆(𝑡){ 𝑟𝐴(𝑡) + 𝑅𝐻(𝑡)[1 − 𝐼(𝑡) − 𝐿(𝑡)] − 𝑃𝐷(𝑡) − 𝑃𝑋(𝑡)} +
𝜇(𝑡){𝐹[𝐼(𝑡)𝐻(𝑡), 𝐷(𝑡)] − 𝜎𝐻(𝑡)},              
(6)44 
where 𝜆(𝑡) is the shadow value of an additional unit of wealth and µ(t) is the shadow value of an 
additional unit of human capital in period t. The first order conditions are 
𝐽(𝑡)𝑋(𝑡): 𝑈1(𝑡) = 𝜆(𝑡)𝑒
𝜌𝑡𝑃.          (7) 
𝐽(𝑡)𝐿(𝑡): 𝑈2(𝑡)𝐻(𝑡) = 𝜆(𝑡)𝑒
𝜌𝑡𝑅𝐻(𝑡).          (8) 
𝐽(𝑡)𝐼(𝑡): 𝜇(𝑡)𝐹1(𝑡)𝐻(𝑡) = 𝜆(𝑡)𝑅𝐻(𝑡).           
(9) 
𝐽(𝑡)𝐷(𝑡): 𝜇(𝑡)𝐹2(𝑡) = 𝜆(𝑡)𝑃.        (10) 
𝐽(𝑡)𝐴(𝑡): 𝜆(𝑡)̇ = −𝑟𝜆(𝑡).         (11) 
Equation (11) is a first order differential equation in 𝜆(𝑡). The solution for 𝜆(𝑡) is  
𝜆(𝑡) = 𝜆(0)𝑒−𝑟𝑡.                       (12) 
The last first order condition is  
𝐽(𝑡)𝐻(𝑡): 𝜇(𝑡)̇ = 𝜎𝜇(𝑡) − 𝑅𝜆(𝑡).                                                                                      (13) 
The terminal condition for human capital is 
𝜇(𝑇) = 0,                    (14) 
while the assumption of non-satiation 𝜆(𝑇) > 0 together with the “no Ponzi scheme” condition 
𝐴(𝑇) ≥ 0 implies that  the terminal condition for wealth is 
 𝜆(𝑇)𝐴(𝑇) = 0.        (15) 
                                                 
44 For simplification, we assume that there is no income tax in the model. Heckman assumed a tax rate of (1-α) so 
that household could keep only a fraction (α) of the income. 
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 In equation (12), 𝜆(0) is the shadow value or marginal utility of wealth at the beginning 
of life. Therefore, this is also the period 0 shadow value of lifetime earnings. Since resources are 
finite and an assumption of non-satiation holds, 𝜆(0) must be positive.  
 To simplify further analysis, we define the shadow value of human capital in terms of 
wealth, which is the ratio of the shadow value of human capital to that of assets: 𝑔(𝑡) =
𝜇(𝑡)
𝜆(𝑡)
. 
Utilizing this along with equation (14), the first order differential equation for 𝑔(𝑡) is  
𝑔(𝑡)̇ = (𝜎 + 𝑟)𝑔(𝑡) − 𝑅.    
Utilizing the terminal condition for shadow value of human capital, as stated in equation (14), we 
can derive the solution for 𝑔(𝑡): 
𝑔(𝑡) =
𝑅
(𝜎+𝑟)
[1 − 𝑒(𝜎+𝑟)(𝑡−𝑇)].          (16) 
Since two basic assumptions of the model are strict concavity and differentiability of the utility 
and production functions, we can invert equations (7), (8), and (12) to obtain the (𝜆(0)) constant 
demand function for consumption good 𝑋(𝑡) and effective leisure 𝐿(𝑡)𝐻(𝑡)  
𝑋(𝑡) = 𝑋[𝜆(0)𝑒(𝜌−𝑟)𝑡𝑃, 𝑅𝜆(0)𝑒(𝜌−𝑟)𝑡],                    (17)  
𝐻(𝑡)𝐿(𝑡) = 𝐻𝐿[𝜆(0)𝑒(𝜌−𝑟)𝑡𝑃, 𝑅𝜆(0)𝑒(𝜌−𝑟)𝑡].          (18) 
Similarly, the demand functions for the two human capital investment inputs can be obtained by 
inverting equations (9) and (10). 
𝐷(𝑡) = 𝐷 [
𝑃
𝑔(𝑡)
,
𝑅
𝑔(𝑡)
].                                  (19) 
𝐼(𝑡)𝐻(𝑡) = 𝐼𝐻 [
𝑃
𝑔(𝑡)
,
𝑅
𝑔(𝑡)
].              (20) 
Because 𝑔(𝑡) gets smaller as t→T, the price of purchased educational inputs and the opportunity 
cost of time devoted to human capital production increase as the individual ages.  As a result, 
time invested in human capital production, 𝐼(𝑡), decreases as an individual ages and approaches 
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zero at T. Before time T, human capital production takes place in every period to offset human 
capital depreciation.  
 The stock of human capital at any period t, H(t), is the depreciation-weighted 
accumulated investment in human capital till period t plus the depreciated initial stock. Human 
capital stock at period t is specified as following 
𝐻(𝑡) = ∫ 𝑒𝜎(𝜏−𝑡)𝐹[𝐼(𝜏)𝐻(𝜏), 𝐷(𝜏)]𝑑𝜏 + 𝐻(0)𝑒−𝜎𝑡
𝑡
0
.                    (21)  
So, the lifetime human capital stock is the accumulated human capital over a lifetime T 
𝐻(𝑇) = ∫ 𝑒𝜎(𝜏−𝑇)𝐹[𝐼(𝜏)𝐻(𝜏), 𝐷(𝜏)]𝑑𝜏 + 𝐻(0)𝑒−𝜎𝑇
𝑇
0
.                   (22) 
The value of human capital is equal to the earnings generated from selling this human 
capital in the market in each period, net of its explicit and implicit production cost. The shadow 
value of human capital in terms of wealth, g(t), can be used to convert human capital into wealth. 
The value of lifetime accumulated human capital stock evaluated at the initial period is  
𝑉 = 𝑔(0)𝐻(0) + ∫ 𝑒−𝑟𝑡{𝑔(𝑡)𝐹[𝐼(𝑡)𝐻(𝑡), 𝐷(𝑡)] − 𝑃𝐷(𝑡) − 𝑅𝐼𝐻(𝑡)}
𝑇
0
𝑑𝑡.       (23)  
The term inside the integral is the lifetime net earnings from human capital investment. 
2.1 Comparative dynamics from increase in life expectancy at birth T 
 This section derives the effect of changes in life expectancy, T, on human capital 
investment decisions, lifetime human capital production, and lifetime earnings from human 
capital investment. 
Proposition 1: The shadow value of human capital in terms of wealth, 𝑔(𝑡), increases when life     
expectancy, T, increases.45 This happens for all 𝑡 ∈ [0, 𝑇] as 
𝜕𝑔(𝑡)
𝜕𝑇
= 𝑅𝑒(𝜎+𝑟)(𝑡−𝑇) > 0.   
                                                 
45 All proofs to these propositions are presented in the appendix C. 
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As  𝑔(𝑡) increases, the effective cost of the inputs into human capital production fall, as 
expressed in equations (18-19), that leads us to proposition 2. 
Proposition 2: As life expectancy at birth, T, increases, purchases of educational-investment 
goods, D(t), and effective time investment, I(t)H(t) increase in every period of life t < T.  
Proposition 3: As life expectancy at birth, T, increases, the human capital stock H(t) 
accumulated by time t increases in every period 𝑡 ∈ [0, 𝑇] as does the total human capital H(T) 
accumulated over the lifetime.   This is a direct consequence of the increased use of D(t) and 
I(t)H(t) in every period t as governed by the production function 𝐹[𝐼(𝑡)𝐻(𝑡), 𝐷(𝑡)].46  
Proposition 4: As life expectancy at birth, T, increases, lifetime labor income increases. 
Proposition 5: As life expectancy at birth, T, increases marginal utility of lifetime wealth at the 
beginning of life, 𝜆(0), decreases. 
Proposition 6: As life expectancy at birth, T, increases, consumption of leisure in human capital 
adjusted efficiency units, 𝐻𝐿(𝑡), increases. However, measured hours of leisure, 𝐿(𝑡), may 
increase or decrease. 
The proof in appendix C shows that an increase in life expectancy at birth has two opposing 
effects on measured units of leisure.  Effective leisure becomes cheaper due to a fall in the marginal 
utility of wealth, but at the same time, the opportunity cost of hours spent in leisure increases due 
to rising human capital investments.  It is possible that lifetime leisure will rise or fall as T 
increases, contrary to the assertion made by Hazan (2009).   
 
                                                 
46 We are assuming that per unit value of human capital is not bid downward due to the outward shift of the supply 
of skilled workers.  As will demonstrate, the estimated impact of increased life expectancy on human capital 
investment is sufficiently small in magnitude that the positive effects of human capital on income have dominated 
the downward pressure from increased supply. 
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3. Reduced Form and Econometric Specification 
 
The model predicts that in every period of life, increased life expectancy at the start of life 
will increase accumulated human capital and will raise lifetime earnings.  Simultaneously 
solving the first-order conditions (7-15) results in reduced-form solutions of the lifetime 
sequences of expected paths of goods consumption, investments in human capital, leisure 
consumption, and the planned accumulations of assets and human capital in every period, 
conditional on available information on the exogenous variables at time 0. The exogenous 
variables include the rates of interest (r) and human capital depreciation (𝜎), the price of human 
capital inputs (P), the rental rate of human capital (R), the endowments of human capital and 
assets (𝐻0, 𝐴0), and life expectancy at birth (T). At the time of birth, the individual can set the 
optimal trajectory of the human capital stock at every point in the life cycle based on information 
available at that time Ω0 :  
𝐸[𝐻(𝑡)|Ω0] = 𝑓
𝐻(𝑟, 𝜎, 𝑃, 𝑅, 𝐻0, 𝐴0, 𝑇, 𝑔(𝑡)) ∀𝑡 ∈ [0, 𝑇].                              (24) 
The investment trajectory for time and goods inputs into human capital investment in each period 
is set by the expected paths of the shadow values of assets and human capital  
 𝑔(𝑡) = 𝑔(0)𝑒(𝜎+𝑟)𝑡 +
𝑅
(𝜎+𝑟)
[1 − 𝑒(𝜎+𝑟)𝑡] =
𝜇(0)
𝜆(0)
𝑒(𝜎+𝑟)𝑡 +
𝑅
(𝜎+𝑟)
[1 − 𝑒(𝜎+𝑟)𝑡].       (25) 
A change in 𝑇 increases the projected lifetime wealth at the beginning of life, which causes the 
marginal utility of wealth at birth, 𝜆(0),  to fall.  That increases 𝑔(0), the value of human capital 
relative to wealth at the start of life. The increase in 𝑔(0)increases all the subsequent values of 
𝑔(𝑡) by equation (25). 
 The planned sequence of 𝑔(𝑡) is based on information available at time 0.  Unanticipated 
shocks to the exogenous variables in equation (24) will cause the individual to re-optimize.  As a 
result, the sequence of 𝑔(𝑡) will evolve.  Critically, however, the new information will be 
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orthogonal to the information set Ω0.  As a result, changes to the sequence of 𝑔(𝑡) will be 
uncorrelated with Ω0.  For example, suppose at time t’ the individual finds out that life 
expectancy has changed from T to T’. The individual will re-optimize including new values of 
the 𝑔(𝑡) sequence from t’ through the end of life at T’. However, 𝐸[ℊ(𝑡)  −  𝑔(𝑡)|Ω0] = 0 ∀ 𝑡 >
𝑡′ where ℊ(𝑡) represents the re-optimized sequence of relative shadow values of human capital 
to assets.  That means that changes made to planned sequences of human capital investments, 
labor supply and lifetime consumption paths from the plans made at time 0 will be uncorrelated 
with the values of the exogenous variables at time 0 including the value of life expectancy at 
birth.47 
This has important implications for estimating lifetime human capital investments and 
earnings as a function of life expectancy at birth. Suppose that the planned human capital stock 
at time t conditional on initial information is 𝐻(𝑡|𝑇) and the updated plan after changes in 
information on life expectancy is ℋ(𝑡|𝑇′).  A survey will reveal information on actually 
completed human capital investments ℋ(𝑡), but 𝐸[ℋ(𝑡|𝑇′) − ℋ(𝑡)|Ω0] = 0 and so the 
projection of observed ℋ(𝑡) on T will yield the effect of life expectancy at birth on planned 
human capital investments at birth. On the other hand, 𝐸[(ℋ(𝑡|𝑇′) − 𝐻(𝑡)|Ω0, 𝑇
′] ≠ 0 and so a 
regression of ℋ(𝑡) on 𝑇′ will not generate the unbiased effect of life expectancy on planned 
human capital investments. In particular, if individual decisions made after birth due to new 
information on any of the exogenous variables result in changes in life expectancy, the observed 
human capital outcomes ℋ(𝑡) and the observed life expectancy 𝑇′will be jointly determined.  A 
                                                 
47 Some recent studies, for example Hazan (2012), have proposed that life expectancy at five instead of life 
expectancy at birth is more suitable to explain human capital investment decision due to selection problem with 
respect to who survives infancy or early childhood. In practice, by the time a child reaches age five, parents or 
government or both have made significant investment in the child, which makes life expectancy at age five higher 
compared to what it was at birth, and thus makes life expectancy at five an endogenous variable.  
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similar argument suggests that to derive the effect of life expectancy on lifetime earnings, one 
should also regress observed earnings on life expectancy at birth and not life expectancy at later 
ages.  
4. Data 
We require data with considerable variation in life expectancy at birth and information on 
lifetime human capital investment and earnings.  We exploit the World Bank’s International 
Income Distribution Database (I2D2) for that purpose.  I2D2 is a harmonized collection of 
household surveys conducted in 111 countries. A list of the countries and survey years is 
presented in table B1 in the appendix C. The database includes countries from all regions and 
income groups.  Of our 111 countries, 30 are developed countries, 11 from Asia and Pacific, 17 
from Central Asia and Eastern Europe, 23 from Latin America, 4 from the Middle East and 
North Africa, and 26 from Sub Saharan Africa and South Asia. 
From each survey, we keep only those individuals who have complete information on 
both education and wages. Since our interest lies in how life expectancy at birth affects human 
capital accumulation and earnings, we focus only on those individuals who are working.  We 
focus on the prime working age groups between 25 and 60 years who report positive incomes. 
Our focus on individuals over age 25 limits the probability that individuals are still in school. 48 
The upper age threshold of 60 years was selected to avoid selection issues related to retirements 
and rising mortality in some of the countries.  
Because life expectancy at birth sets the trajectory for lifetime human capital investment 
and earnings, we cannot aggregate across individuals with different life expectancies.  Therefore, 
we define each cohort in each country as the unit of observation.   Our earliest available survey is 
                                                 
48 Both Barro and Lee (2010), and Cohen and Soto (2007) assume that years of schooling are fixed by age 25. 
132 
 
 
 
in 1970 while the latest is in 2012.  To fit our age range of 25-60, that means we include 77 birth 
cohorts born from 1911 to 1987.  
There are multiple surveys for many of the countries, and so we have repeated observations 
for many cohorts.  However, completed schooling will be the same for the same cohort across 
surveys.  We opted to use the earliest available survey for each country to limit mortality bias in 
the estimated completed schooling and then the most recent survey to capture the completed 
schooling for the youngest cohorts in the country.  In total, we used 188 surveys across 111 
countries to create 4670 cohort observations covering almost 4 million individual observations. 
We further disaggregate the cohorts by gender, and if possible, by urban and rural residence.  For 
each birth cohort, we computed average years of schooling, average earnings, and incidence of 
marriage. To compare lifetime earnings across countries, we require a common unit of time.  
Across the 188 surveys, wages are measured per hour, day, week, month, quarter and year.  
However, the surveys are internally consistent, and so a survey-specific dummy variable will 
standardize time units.  The survey specific dummy variable also will standardize the currency 
units and so we do not have to rely on exchange rates.  The survey-specific dummy variable will 
also control for country-specific effects.  In effect, the source of identification will be variation in 
schooling and earnings across cohorts within surveys.   
Our data on life expectancy at birth by country were compiled from 1950 on from the United 
Nation’s Population database.49 For earlier birth cohorts, Gap Minder constructs a measure of 
life expectancy at birth for almost 200 countries back to 1900.  Figure 1 shows the pattern of life 
expectancy at birth by birth cohort starting in 1910. Worldwide life expectancy has risen from 38 
to 72 years over the 90-year period.  Over that same period, average years of schooling rose from 
                                                 
49 The UN maintains a rich database on various socio-economic indicators http://data.un.org/Default.aspx. 
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6.8 to 12.4 years.  As shown in Figure 2, these patterns are common across regions and income 
groups.  
As life expectancy increases, the fraction of the birth cohort that enters working age 
increases.  If workers of different ages are not perfect substitutes for one another, members of 
unusually large working-age cohorts will face depressed earnings (Welch, 1979). We use the 
number in the cohort relative to the total population as our measure of the relative cohort supply. 
Figure 3 shows the path of average wages across birth cohorts after netting out the survey fixed 
effect.50   Starting with the oldest cohorts, average earnings rise over birth cohorts until the mid-
1950s when the average earnings begin to decline.  The reversal is due to the declining age of the 
more recent birth cohorts, illustrating that we will need to control for position in the life cycle to 
remove the effects of age on lifetime earnings.  As we demonstrate in the next section, use of 
quadratic terms in age of the cohort or using cohort-specific fixed effects serve to correct for the 
age effect on earnings.   
5. Empirical Specification 
 The theory suggests that the reduced-form equation for completed schooling and earnings 
will depend on conditions known at the time of birth plus changes to those variables conditioned 
on information orthogonal to those variables known at birth. We specify these equations for 
completed years of schooling 𝑆𝑗𝑐𝑡 and log earnings ln(𝑌𝑗𝑐𝑡) for cohort j, country c, and survey 
year t by   
𝑆𝑗𝑐𝑡 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾𝐿𝐿𝐸𝑗𝑐 + 𝛾𝑅𝑅𝑈𝑅𝑗𝑐𝑡 + 𝛾𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑗𝑐𝑡 + 𝑎𝑗 + 𝜃𝑆𝑐𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗𝑐𝑡,           (26) 
                                                 
50 The survey fixed effect would take care of the problems we described above, and therefore, would give us an 
estimate of average wages net of fixed factors such as currency, time unit used for measurement of wages, country 
specific fixed effect and inflation. The wages are presented on a logarithmic scale. 
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ln(𝑌𝑗𝑐𝑡) = 𝑎0 + 𝛽𝐿 𝐿𝐸𝑗𝑐 + 𝛽𝑅𝑅𝑈𝑅𝑗𝑐𝑡 + 𝛽𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑗𝑐𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑝𝒁𝑗𝑐𝑡
𝐽
𝑝=1 + 𝑎𝑗 + 𝜃𝑌𝑐𝑡 + 𝜔𝑗𝑐𝑡.        (27) 
The focus on years of schooling is a matter of convenience in that we know that human 
capital investment will rise in every period t as life expectancy 𝐿𝐸𝑗𝑐  for cohort j rises, but 
schooling is the most readily observable and consistent measure of human capital investment 
across countries and time.  As it is also a form of human capital investment that is fixed at 
relatively young ages, we can assume that for birth cohorts aged 25 and over, their years of 
schooling are fixed for the rest of their lives. In equation (26) and (27), 𝑎𝑗 includes cohort-
specific effects that are known at birth and common across countries; 𝜃𝑆𝑐𝑡 and 𝜃𝑌𝑐𝑡 are survey- 
specific fixed effects that also incorporate country-specific effects that are common across 
cohorts within the country. 𝑀𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑗𝑐𝑡 and 𝑅𝑈𝑅𝑗𝑐𝑡 are respectively average proportion male and 
average proportion rural in cohort j, country c, and survey year t. The log earnings equation (27) 
shares many of the same features as (26).  Unique elements in Z include the cohort specific 
marriage incidence rate and size of the cohort within a country-survey year. Cohort-specific 
fixed effects 𝑎𝑗 will correct for position in the life cycle.  Alternatively, we can conserve on 
parameters and specify the lifetime log earnings function as  
ln(𝑌𝑗𝑐𝑡) = 𝑎0
′ + 𝛽𝐿
′ 𝐿𝐸𝑗𝑐 + 𝛽𝐴
′ 𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑗𝑐𝑡 + 𝛽𝐴𝐴
′ (𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑗𝑐𝑡)
2 + 𝛽𝑅
′ 𝑅𝑈𝑅𝑗𝑐𝑡 +  𝛽𝑀
′ 𝑀𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑗𝑐𝑡 +
                    ∑ 𝛽𝑝𝒁𝑗𝑐𝑡
𝐽
𝑝=1 + 𝜃𝑌𝑐𝑡
′ + 𝜔𝑗𝑐𝑡
′ ,              (28) 
where the quadratic terms in the age of the cohort control for position in the life cycle. We can 
compute the returns to schooling applying the Wald estimator: 
𝑑𝑙𝑛𝑌
𝑑𝑆
=
𝜕𝑙𝑛𝑌
𝜕𝐿𝐸
𝜕𝑆
𝜕𝐿𝐸
=
𝛽𝐿
𝛾𝐿
.  This estimate 
uses life expectancy at birth as an instrument for completed years of schooling by cohort. We can 
compare this estimate with the traditional estimate using the Mincerian earnings function 
specification  
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ln(𝑌𝑗𝑐𝑡) = 𝜑0 + 𝜑𝐴(𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑗𝑐𝑡) + 𝜑𝐴𝐴(𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑗𝑐𝑡)
2 + 𝜑𝑆(𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑗𝑐𝑡) + 𝜑𝑅𝑅𝑈𝑅𝑗𝑐𝑡  +
                   𝜑𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑗𝑐𝑡 + 𝜑𝑌𝑐𝑡 + 𝜗𝑗𝑐𝑡,                                                                              (29)        
which yields biased estimates of the returns to schooling due to presumed endogeneity of the 
schooling choice (Card, 1999).   
Observations are weighted to reflect the cell share of the total population in the country.  
We further weighted the data by the square root of the cell-size to correct for differences in 
measurement error variance between thin and thick cell samples.51  Finally, we cluster all errors 
at the country level to correct for likely correlated errors across cohorts within a country.  
6. Results 
6.1 Life expectancy at birth and education 
Table 1 reports the estimates obtained from regression specification (26). We start with the 
simplest bivariate specification relating life expectancy at birth and lifetime schooling.  All of the 
specifications include a survey fixed effect which controls for country specific fixed factors, 
cyclical factors related to the timing of the survey, and survey type:  household expenditure 
survey vs. labor force survey. We also control for common birth cohort-specific effects across 
countries.52 In specification IV, we include cohort dummies, where cohort is defined by the year 
of birth, to control time varying factors across countries. 53  
                                                 
51 Cell size is the total number of observations belonging to a specific cohort in a survey. We divide the cell size by 
how many times each cohort appears and use that to construct weight to be applied in the regression. In our sample, 
out of 111 countries, for 77 countries we add younger birth-year cohorts from the most recent survey.  
52 Cohorts born during the Great Depression or during World War II might experience common shocks to schooling 
availability. Similarly, there were several United Nations programs and activities to improve health and education 
across the countries implying that cohorts born after 1960s in the low income countries might have been exposed to 
similar global campaigns for education. 
53 Later, in the robustness section, we include cohort dummies defining cohorts by five-year birth range.  
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 The coefficient of life expectancy at birth, 𝛾𝐿  in equation (26), is always positive and 
statistically significant.   The effect ranges from 0.094 to 0.12 years of schooling per year of gain 
in life expectancy.  The specifications imply that individuals add one year of schooling for every 
8.5 years of gain in life expectancy, suggesting that the34 years of increased life expectancy 
between the 1910 and 1987 birth cohorts, as revealed in Figure 1, would have increased time in 
school by 3.98 years.  The coefficient of parental life expectancy in specification IV suggests 
that there is an intergenerational channel through which parental health affect education of their 
children. The effect of parental life expectancy is 22% of the own life expectancy effect.  
The effect of life expectancy gain at birth might have different effects on different groups. 
We investigate this by estimating equation (26) for four groups separately: (i) Male (ii) Female 
(iii) Urban, and (iv) Rural. Table 2 presents separate estimates of the life expectancy effect on 
schooling for each of these groups.  Across all specifications, we observe a larger effect of life 
expectancy gain at birth on women’s schooling compared to men.  There is little difference in the 
life expectancy effect on schooling between rural and urban residents.  For all four groups, the 
parental life expectancy does not seem to influence schooling decision for their children. 
6.2 Life expectancy at birth and earnings 
Table 3 reports estimates obtained from regression specification (27) and (28). Similar to the 
inverted u-shaped plot of log of wages across birth cohorts in figure three, the negative life 
expectancy coefficient obtained from a simple regression of log of wages against life expectancy 
at birth, as reported in the specification one in table three, implies the role of age factor in 
determining lifetime earnings. Once we control for lifecycle effects by including ages or cohort-
fixed effects, and other potential confounders, the coefficient of life expectancy at birth reveres 
sign-the effect of life expectancy at birth on log of wages turn out to be positive and statistically 
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significant. Increasing life expectancy at birth by one year increases lifetime earnings by roughly 
1%.  In all of the specifications, we observe that log of earnings increases with age at a 
decreasing rate.  Consistent with the findings in the literature, we find that married and urban 
people earn relatively more compared to their unmarried and rural counterparts. Larger cohort-
size lowers cohort earnings, consistent with presumption that unusually large cohorts receive 
depressed earnings.54  As with schooling, there is an intergenerational gain from parental life 
expectancy that is statistically significant in all of the specifications with cohort fixed effects. 
The parental life expectancy effect is 60-88% as large as the own life expectancy effect.   
In table 4, we report separate estimates by gender and region.  The returns to life expectancy 
are somewhat larger for men than women and for urban compared to rural residents. However, 
for male, the life expectancy coefficient turns out to be statistically significant only in 
specification III where we control for lifecycle position by birth-year fixed effect. For rural 
residents, life expectancy at birth fail to show statistical significance in any of the specifications.  
Parental life expectancy retains a small positive effect on the earnings of their children, but the 
effect is statistically significant for men, women and rural residents, and only in the specification 
with birth-year fixed effect. 
6.3 Return to schooling 
The Mincerian earnings function (29) generates a measure of the returns to education.  
This can be compared to the Wald estimator as laid out in the previous section.55 Estimates from 
the Mincerian earnings function are reported in table 5 while the comparisons of these estimates 
with those from Wald estimators are drawn in table 6. Additional schooling increases lifetime 
                                                 
54 Cohort-specific dummies would absorb this effect if one specific cohort experiences a surge in population across 
the world. 
55 The Wald estimator for 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑡𝑜 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 =
𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑡𝑜 𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 1 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝑖𝑛 𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑒 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑎𝑡 𝑏𝑖𝑟𝑡ℎ
𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑡𝑜 𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 1 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟  𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝑖𝑛 𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑒 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑎𝑡 𝑏𝑖𝑟𝑡ℎ
. 
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earnings irrespective of the specification used. For the pooled sample, the coefficient of school-
years show that one additional year of schooling increases lifetime-earnings by 11.8% in the 
simple specification I, which shrinks to 9.4% once we utilize a broad set of controls.56  The 
estimates on age terms, percentage male, percentage urban-rural, percentage married, and cohort-
size exhibit right sign pattern and statistical significance. The estimates of the earnings function 
by gender and urban-rural group do not show any notable variation across groups. Specification 
II reveals that one additional year of schooling increases lifetime earnings for male, female, 
urban and rural group by 10.6%, 7.3%, 9.5%, and 8.8% respectively.  Table 6 compares the 
return to education estimates obtained from specification II of the Mincerian earnings function 
with the Wald estimates.  
For the Pooled sample, the Wald estimate of returns to schooling is obtained by dividing 
the life expectancy coefficients from specification IV in table 3 by the life expectancy coefficient 
from specification IV in table 1. Similarly, for male, female, urban, and rural group we divide the 
group-specific life expectancy coefficient obtained from specification II in table 4 by the life 
expectancy coefficient from specification IV in table 2.  The standard errors for the Wald 
estimates are obtained by five hundred bootstrap replications with the corresponding sample. In 
the pooled sample, the Wald estimates are 16% lower compared to the Mincerian estimates 
(9.40% vs. 7.90%). The Wald estimate is slightly higher for urban residents (10.21% vs. 9.50%). 
In contrast, the Wald estimates are lower for males (9.90% vs. 10.60%), females (4.30% vs. 
7.30%) and rural residents (2.90% vs. 8.8%). For both Mincerian and Wald estimates, the return 
to schooling is always higher for males than females and higher for urban than rural residents.   
                                                 
56 In all specifications reported in table five, we have used survey fixed effects to facilitate comparison across 
countries and time periods. 
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6.4 Robustness  
We reexamined our findings with several differences in estimation methods and samples.  
We re-estimated the models (i) without weights, (ii) with a different sample consisting only of 
one survey per country, (iii) using an alternative definition of parents’ life expectancy57, (iv) 
including cohort fixed effect with an alternative definition of cohort58 (v) with a sample 
consisting only of young age groups, and (v) using a higher order age variable to wipe out all age 
effects while estimating the life expectancy effects on earnings.59  The robustness checks 
generate similar estimates of life expectancy effects on schooling and earnings. In most cases, 
the sign and statistical significance of the life expectancy coefficient is positive and statistically 
significant. The results for all robustness checks are briefly discussed and reported in the 
appendix C. 
The final check of robustness involves addition of some exogenous variables that vary by 
country and cohort at the time birth, and substitution of life expectancy at birth by life 
expectancy measures at higher ages. The theory predicts that the effect of life expectancy at birth 
is exogenous to any random shock realized in a later period in life. To demonstrate the validity of 
this, we incorporate average temperature and average precipitation that was observed for a birth-
cohort at the time of birth in its country of origin. Note that similar to life expectancy at birth, 
                                                 
57 Previously, parents’ life expectancy was constructed by taking a 25 year lag of life expectancy at birth. The 
youngest cohort in our survey was born in 1987. In the 1980s, in many regions, especially in Sub Saharan Africa and 
South Asia, mother’s age at first child birth was less than 20. For example, in Niger half of the women gave birth by 
age 18 (Source: http://www.unicef.org/pon95/fami0009.html). Alternative measure of parents life expectancy 
assumed a 15 years lagged value of own life expectancy. 
58 While constructing the five-year birth cohorts, we collapse all individuals aged 25-59 into different five year birth 
range except the first and last cohort. In total, we have defined 13 cohorts based on 5-year birth groups. Since the 
number of observations before 1930 is too thin, we group them into one cohort. Similarly all individuals, who were 
born during 1985-87, were collapsed to form the last cohort. 
59 In addition to those attempted for schooling, we try one additional robustness check for lifetime earnings. 
Following Card (1999), and Murphy and Welch (1990), we add higher order age terms to sponge out all age effects. 
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average temperatures and average precipitation also vary by birth-year and country. The results 
and discussion on this are presented in the appendix C. In total, the estimates reveal that the 
statistically significant positive association of life expectancy at birth with schooling and 
earnings is not altered after inclusion of these exogenous variables. 
Concerns related to high infant and child mortality rate led some recent papers to argue for 
appropriateness of use of life expectancy at birth. Hazan (2012) suggests that life expectancy 
beyond early childhood is more appropriate to capture its true effect on human capital investment 
decision since parents make schooling decision for their children at age five or later.60 However, 
by the time a child reaches age five or ten, the parents have made substantive investments in the 
child’s health based on new information on the child’s survival prospects.  That makes the life 
expectancy at ages 5 or 10 endogenous responses to child survival, making their use 
inappropriate as explanatory variables for other parental investments in their children.  However, 
results using life expectancy at higher ages, still have positive and significant effects on years of 
schooling and lifetime earnings, as reported in appendix C.  Note that this contrast to Hazan’s 
(2012) finding that life expectancy at higher ages do not exhibit any statistically significant 
association with schooling years in a cross-country panel. 
7. Extension 
We extend the analysis utilizing individual level observations instead of cohort level mean 
observations as reported above. Note that the theoretical model suggests that life expectancy at 
birth is exogenous in determining human capital investment and lifetime earnings, an individual 
level analysis will confirm if country-cohort specific unobservable is contaminating the cohort-
                                                 
60 The argument is based on the observation that cross-country life expectancy at birth exhibits more variation 
compared to life expectancy at five due to high infant and child mortality.  
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mean based empirical results. We estimate three equivalent specifications of equation 26, 28, and 
29 using individual level data.     
𝑆𝑖𝑐𝑡 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾𝐿𝐿𝐸𝑗𝑐 + 𝛾𝑅𝑅𝑈𝑅𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝛾𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝑎𝑗 + 𝜃𝑆𝑐𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑐𝑡,                                         (26 a) 
ln(𝑌𝑖𝑐𝑡) = 𝑎0
′ + 𝛽𝐿
′ 𝐿𝐸𝑗𝑐 + 𝛽𝐴
′ 𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝛽𝐴𝐴
′ (𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑐𝑡)
2 + 𝛽𝑅
′ 𝑅𝑈𝑅𝑖𝑐𝑡 +  𝛽𝑀
′ 𝑀𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑖𝑐𝑡 +
                    ∑ 𝛽𝑝𝒁𝑖𝑐𝑡
𝐽
𝑝=1 + 𝜃𝑌𝑐𝑡
′ + 𝜔𝑖𝑐𝑡,           (28 a) 
ln(𝑌𝑗𝑐𝑡) = 𝜑0 + 𝜑𝐴(𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑐𝑡) + 𝜑𝐴𝐴(𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑐𝑡)
2 + 𝜑𝑆(𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑡) + 𝜑𝑅𝑅𝑈𝑅𝑖𝑐𝑡  +
                   𝜑𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝜑𝑌𝑐𝑡 + 𝜗𝑖𝑐𝑡.                         (29 a) 
In our setting, we cannot observe individual life expectancy at birth; however, cohort life 
expectancy at birth, an average measure of individual life expectancies at birth across individuals 
within a cohort ( 𝐿𝐸𝑗𝑐 =
∑ 𝐿𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑐
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑁
 ), is exogenous to an individual’s completed years of schooling 
or lifetime earnings. Group mean is often used as an instrument to resolve endogeneity issue in 
individual level empirical analysis61. In the above specifications, 𝐿𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑐 = 𝐿𝐸𝑗𝑐 + 𝜇𝑖𝑗, which 
states that individual i’s life expectancy at birth in the country “c” deviates from cohort j’s mean 
life expectancy by 𝜇𝑖𝑗, which by construction orthogonal to mean. Since 𝜇𝑖𝑗 will be contained in 
the error term, the following conditions hold - 
 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜀𝑖𝑐𝑡, 𝐿𝐸𝑗𝑐) = 0, 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜔𝑖𝑐𝑡
′ , 𝐿𝐸𝑗𝑐) = 0, and 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜗𝑖𝑐𝑡, 𝐿𝐸𝑗𝑐) = 0.  
In contrast to cohort mean level analysis, to save time and space, here, we estimate one 
specification for each of the pooled sample, and male-female, rural-urban subsample62. As table 
7 reveals, the estimates conform to those obtained from the cohort-mean level analysis, life 
expectancy at birth exhibits a positive and statistically significant association both with 
                                                 
61 Royalty (2000) has used state tax rate as an instrument for marginal tax rate in explaining employees’ health 
insurance eligibility. Similarly, a series of studies following Ruhm (2000) exploited variation in state or county level 
unemployment rate while explaining individual health behavior during a recession. 
62 We choose specification IV from table 1 for schooling, and specification IV from table 3 for earnings 
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completed years of schooling and lifetime earnings. The life expectancy effects on schooling 
regression reveal similar pattern to those obtained from cohort-mean level analysis as reported in 
table 1 and 2. However, except for the urban sample, the life expectancy effects on earnings are 
always larger compared to similar estimates obtained from cohort-mean level analysis. In the 
pooled sample, one year gain in life expectancy at birth leads one to complete 0.115 years more 
completed years of schooling, and increases lifetime earnings by 1.3%. The largest effect on 
earnings is observed for the male sample-1.5% raise in lifetime earnings from each additional 
year of gain in life expectancy at birth.  
Following the procedure followed in table 7, table 8 reports the implied Wald estimate of 
return to schooling and draw a comparison with the estimates obtained for Mincerian return to 
schooling. The Mincerian return to education estimates lie around 10%. In contrast, the indirect 
least square estimates exhibit more variation across groups-for male the return to schooling is 
15% while that for the female is 7.8%. Except for the female sample, in all other cases Wald 
estimates of return to schooling outweighs corresponding Mincerian estimates. The Mincerian 
return to schooling for the pooled sample is 15.5% smaller compared to the Wald estimate.  
In contrast to the cohort-mean level analysis, the findings from individual empirical 
analysis consistently suggest that parent’s life expectancy exhibit a statistically significant 
positive influence both on human capital investment and lifetime earnings in the pooled sample 
as well as across male, urban and rural groups. Parents’ life expectancy effects on years in school 
stand around 19-26% of own life expectancy effect while for earnings the impacts are even 
larger- parents’ life expectancy effects are 38.5% to 54.5% of cohorts’ own life expectancy 
effect. There is strong evidence of intergenerational transfer to rising life expectancy at birth. 
Such high transmission across generations is not uncommon considering the recent findings by 
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Lindahl et al. (2015) that intergenerational persistence in human capital and lifetime earnings 
persists across several generations.  
7.1 Selection due to participation in the labor force 
Our analysis for lifetime earnings includes those who are in the labor force at the time of 
survey.  If life expectancy at birth affects an individuals’ labor force participation decision, our 
estimates will be subject to bias and the direction of bias is uncertain. Note that Hazan (2009) 
observed that gain in life expectancy at birth was associated with decrease in labor force 
participation for the US male born between 1840 and 1970. We investigate the labor force 
selection issue with the individual data in two ways: (i) first, including a birth-year specific 
correction measure for selection in each survey, which is constructed as the proportion of 
individuals participating in the labor force within the birth year cohort in a survey, (ii)  two-step 
Heckman selection correction for an individual’s labor force participation status. The selection 
equation includes household size (number of household members) and interviewee’s relationship 
with the household head to fulfill the exclusion criterion.63  We examine the selection issue for 
each of the pool, male, female, urban rural sample separately. 
The results are reported in table 9 and 10. After controlling for the proportion of the birth-
year cohort in the labor force, neither for the pooled sample nor for any of the subsample, does 
the effects of gain in life expectancy at birth on lifetime earnings show a different pattern from 
that obtained without addressing the selection issue as reported in table 8.  However, estimates 
obtained following Heckman’s two-step procedure, as reported in table 10, where we utilize 
                                                 
63 In the first stage we estimate a fixed effect logit model of labor force participation decision including age, gender, 
urban/rural, marital status, life expectancy at birth, parents’ life expectancy, household size, relationship with head, 
and survey/country fixed effects. Based on the parameters extracted from the logit model, we calculate linear 
predicted probability, which is then converted into normal densities to construct the inverse mills ratio and to use in 
the second stage for selection correction.  
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information on individual labor force status, the coefficients of life expectancy at birth in the 
second stage earnings estimation are positive, statistically significant, and except for the female 
group, are larger in magnitude compared to those obtained without any selection correction.64 
The life expectancy effects on lifetime earnings for the pool, male, and rural subsample are 
respectively 17%, 20%, and 15% larger in magnitude compared to those obtained from the 
corresponding sample without correcting for selection. For urban population, the selection 
correction does not alter the life expectancy effects on lifetime earnings. Household size and 
relationship with head, the identification variables in the selection equation, always turn out to be 
statistically significant predictor of one’s labor force participation decision.   
The life expectancy coefficient in selection equation is positive and statistically significant 
except for the rural sample though smaller in magnitude. Since we control for the life cycle 
position in the selection specification, this positive association suggests that gain in life 
expectancy at birth influences labor force participation decision marginally at any stage of the 
lifecycle. In the earnings specification, the negative and statistically significant inverse mills 
ratios suggest possibly a negative selection-individuals who we observe with wage information 
are with lower wages compared to the counterfactuals. But this does not seem consistent for the 
female group. After controlling for selection, the life expectancy coefficients for female has 
shrunk by 17%. Possibly, we female population with complete wage information are drawn from 
a relatively high income group. Overall, the effects of gain in life expectancy at birth on lifetime 
earnings without correcting for selection terms from the cohort-based analysis are conservative. 
                                                 
64 Replicating the analysis in table 10 on the same sample but without including the selection correction term 
produces life expectancy coefficients of 0.13, 0.15, 0.12, 0.12 and 0.10 for the pooled, male, female, rural, and urban 
sample.  
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8. Interpretation and Conclusion 
We find that gain in life expectancy at birth increases investment in human capital and 
lifetime earnings. An individual spent 0.12 years in school out of each additional year of gain in 
life expectancy at birth.  This is comparable to the estimates of 0.11 years in Sri Lanka 
(Jayachandran and Lleras-Muney 2009), and 0.17 years in a cross-country study (Hansen 2013). 
Global average life expectancy at birth increased 29.74 years between 1922 and 1987 birth 
cohorts. That implies a 3.56 years of increase in terms of completed schooling.  In our sample, 
actual years of schooling increased by 4.76 years for the same cohorts. Our estimates suggest 
that increased life expectancy at birth explains 75% of the increase in average schooling 
worldwide. To put it into the United States context, life expectancy at birth rose 28 years from 
the 1880 to the 1980 birth cohorts. Actual years of schooling increased 6.5 years. The implied 
increase in schooling by our model is 3.36 years. Therefore, increased life expectancy at birth 
explains 51.6% of the increased years of schooling in the United States over the 100-year period.  
Each additional year of life expectancy at birth leads to a 1% gain in lifetime earnings. 
Global per capita GDP has increased by 380% between 1900 and 2000. Our analysis implies that 
the gain in life expectancy alone could explain approximately one-third of this gain in per capita 
GDP. Utilizing the estimates obtained from the simple regression specification of life expectancy 
effects on earnings (specification II in table 3), we conduct a simulation exercise to observe how 
lifetime earnings of urban-male respond to improvement in life expectancy at birth across birth 
cohorts. Figure 4 suggests that due to gain in life expectancy at birth, lifetime earnings of cohorts 
born in 1987 increased by 26% to 28% compared to that of the cohort born in1922.  
The estimates of return to education from Wald estimator and Mincerian earnings 
function are consistent.  However, both of the cohort-mean based analysis and individual 
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observation based analysis reveal that the Wald estimate of male returns to schooling exceeds 
female returns to schooling. Similar evidence for rural-urban returns is not consistent across 
cohort-mean and individual level analysis. Selection due to participation in the labor force is not 
driving the life expectancy effects on earnings upward, the cohort mean level estimate of 1% 
return of life expectancy gain to lifetime earnings is rather conservative. Finally, a series of 
robustness checks give confidence in reinforcing the role of health on human capital 
accumulation and wellbeing. 
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Figure 1: Life Expectancy at Birth across Cohorts, World Average 
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Figure 2: Life Expectancy and Schooling by Birth Cohort across Regions 
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Note: The birth-year specific wages are the coefficients of Birth-Year dummies in the regression of log (wages) on 
birth-year dummies and survey dummies, where the survey dummies are taking care of across survey differences in 
exchange rates, inflation, unit of wages, differences in survey instruments.  
 
Figure 3: Log(wage) by 1905-1987 Birth-year Cohorts, World Averages 
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Note:  We assume 1922 as the base year. We plot the implied present value of lifetime earnings (adjusted for the 
base year) from the specification II in table 3 against the Birth Year. The lifetime earnings estimates are assumed for 
male residing in urban areas. The life expectancy at birth numbers are the maximum life expectancy enjoyed by a 
cohort across the countries, which is to capture what an average person would expect to enjoy staying on the frontier 
of health technology at the time of birth. While calculating the net present value of log of lifetime earnings, we try 
two different discount rates 2% and 5%.  The period in the figure ranges from 1922 to 1987 as prior to 1922, the 
information on urban/rural residence is missing. 
Figure 4: World Average Life Expectancy at Birth and Implied Lifetime Earnings Index 
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Table 1: Life Expectancy at Birth and Education 
 
 I II III IV 
Life Expectancy at Birth 
 
0.120*** 
[0.015] 
0.097*** 
[0.014] 
0.094*** 
[0.008] 
0.117*** 
[0.026] 
% Urban 
 
 6.009*** 
[1.687] 
6.043*** 
[1.748] 
6.737*** 
[1.057] 
% Male 
 
 -1.212 
[1.047] 
-1.342 
[0.922] 
-0.858* 
[0.516] 
Parents Life 
Expectancy 
  0.004 
[0.019] 
0.026* 
[0.014] 
Birth Year FE    YES 
Survey FE     
Constant 3.476*** 
[0.916] 
1.574 
[2.298] 
1.625 
[2.455] 
-1.748 
[2.256] 
N 4670 4185 3861 3861 
Adjusted  R-square 0.987 0.985 0.985 0.987 
Note: Standard errors in brackets. Significance level can be read as * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** 
p<0.001. 
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Table 2: Heterogeneity in Effects of Life Expectancy at Birth on Education 
 
Panel a 
  
MALE 
 
 
FEMALE 
 
 I II III IV I II III IV 
Life Expectancy at Birth 0.098*** 
[0.015] 
0.082*** 
[0.013] 
0.084*** 
[0.009] 
0.107*** 
[0.028] 
0.157*** 
[0.018] 
0.141*** 
[0.018] 
0.135*** 
[0.014] 
0.157*** 
[0.032] 
% Urban  5.679*** 5.766*** 5.958***  4.249*** 4.351*** 4.737*** 
  [1.860] [1.911] [1.155]  [0.845] [0.927] [0.645] 
% Male         
Parents Life Expectancy   -0.005 
[0.022] 
0.02 
[0.017] 
  0.007 
[0.018] 
0.019 
[0.015] 
Birth Year FE    YES    YES 
Constant 4.420*** 
[0.905] 
1.801 
[1.713] 
1.888 
[1.949] 
-1.172 
[2.288] 
1.622 
[1.148] 
-0.419 
[1.491] 
-0.52 
[1.755] 
-3.001 
[2.623]  
N 4690 4204 3878 3878 4622 4149 3822 3822 
Adjusted  R-square 0.984 0.98 0.98 0.983 0.983 0.981 0.982 0.982 
Panel b 
  
URBAN 
 
RURAL 
 
Life Expectancy at Birth 0.112*** 
[0.018] 
0.103*** 
[0.018] 
0.097*** 
[0.011] 
0.108*** 
[0.028] 
0.129*** 
[0.017] 
0.119*** 
[0.011] 
0.114*** 
[0.010] 
0.118*** 
[0.029] 
% Urban         
% Male  -0.25 
[0.807] 
-0.291 
[0.707] 
-0.106 
[0.441] 
 -0.56 
[0.548] 
-0.68 
[0.576] 
-0.448 
[0.467] 
Parents Life Expectancy   0.007 
[0.016] 
0.02 
[0.013] 
  0.01 
[0.019] 
0.012 
[0.018] 
Birth Year FE    YES    YES 
Constant 4.539*** 
[1.104] 
5.461*** 
[1.433] 
5.492*** 
[1.513] 
3.861* 
[2.167] 
2.195** 
[0.996] 
2.567*** 
[0.884] 
2.444** 
[1.202] 
1.785 
[2.510] 
N 4684 4200 3874 3874 4446 3959 3657 3657 
Adjusted  R-square 0.982 0.963 0.963 0.965 0.992 0.987 0.988 0.988 
 
Note: Standard errors in brackets. Significance level can be read as * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
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Table 3: Effect of Life Expectancy at Birth on Earnings 
  I II III IV  V VI 
Life Expectancy at 
Birth 
  
-0.017*** 
[0.005] 
0.010* 
[0.006] 
0.011* 
[0.006] 
0.009* 
[0.005] 
 0.013** 
[0.005] 
0.009** 
[0.004] 
Age 
  
 0.091*** 
[0.015] 
0.094*** 
[0.015] 
0.077*** 
[0.013] 
   
Age square*(1/100) 
  
 -0.10*** 
[0.000] 
-0.10*** 
[0.000] 
-0.10*** 
[0.000] 
   
% Urban 
  
 1.303*** 
[0.421] 
1.396*** 
[0.423] 
1.112*** 
[0.196] 
 1.348*** 
[0.323] 
1.087*** 
[0.186] 
% Male 
  
 0.409*** 
[0.111] 
0.412*** 
[0.116] 
0.206* 
[0.118] 
 0.154 
[0.130] 
-0.059 
[0.145] 
Parents Life 
Expectancy 
  
  0.004 
[0.003] 
0.003 
[0.003] 
 0.008** 
[0.003] 
0.008** 
[0.003] 
% Married 
  
   0.471*** 
[0.153] 
  0.610*** 
[0.124] 
Cohort Size 
  
   -8.577*** 
[1.534] 
  -7.733*** 
[1.544] 
Birth Year FE      YES YES 
Constant 
  
8.490*** 
[0.331] 
3.738*** 
[0.746] 
3.341*** 
[0.819] 
4.206*** 
[0.671] 
 5.278*** 
[0.481] 
5.637*** 
[0.415] 
N 4670 4185 3861 3861  3861 3861 
Adjusted  R-square 0.996 0.998 0.998 0.998  0.998 0.998 
Note: Standard errors in brackets. Significance level can be read as * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
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Table 4: Heterogeneity in Effect of Life Expectancy at Birth on Earnings 
 
 MALE FEMALE 
  I II III I II III 
Age 
  
0.103*** 
[0.018] 
0.084*** 
[0.018] 
 0.069*** 
[0.011] 
0.054*** 
[0.007] 
 
Age square*(1/100) -0.10*** -0.10***  -0.10*** -0.10***  
  [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000] [0.000]  
% Urban 1.252*** 0.947*** 0.892*** 0.907*** 0.933*** 0.949*** 
  [0.475] [0.201] [0.154] [0.121] [0.130] [0.151] 
% Male       
Life Expectancy at Birth 0.011 0.010 0.012** 0.009** 0.007** 0.009*** 
  [0.008] [0.007] [0.006] [0.004] [0.003] [0.003] 
Parents Life Expectancy  0.002 0.008*  0.001 0.004* 
   [0.004] [0.004]  [0.003] [0.002] 
% Married  0.472** 0.578***  0.429*** 0.434*** 
   [0.180] [0.144]  [0.125] [0.074] 
Cohort Size  -12.837*** -12.065***  -9.243 -10.247 
   [0.643] [1.059]  [7.188] [7.816] 
Birth Year FE   YES   YES 
Constant 3.796*** 4.350*** 5.671*** 4.596*** 4.905*** 5.708*** 
  [0.893] [0.980] [0.562] [0.370] [0.334] [0.324] 
N 4204 3878 3878 4149 3822 3822 
adj. R-square 0.997 0.998 0.998 0.997 0.998 0.998 
 URBAN RURAL 
  I II III I II III 
Age 
  
0.096*** 
[0.012] 
0.083*** 
[0.010] 
 0.069*** 
[0.013] 
0.054*** 
[0.015] 
 
Age square*(1/100) 
  
-0.10*** 
[0.000] 
-0.10*** 
[0.000] 
 -0.10*** 
[0.000] 
-0.10*** 
[0.000] 
 
% Urban       
% Male 0.495*** 0.377*** 0.103 0.193 0.124 0.074 
  [0.091] [0.074] [0.091] [0.140] [0.133] [0.147] 
Life Expectancy at Birth 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.002 0.003 0.007 
  [0.004] [0.003] [0.003] [0.008] [0.009] [0.007] 
Parents Life Expectancy  0.002 0.005  0.007 0.011** 
   [0.002] [0.003]  [0.006] [0.005] 
% Married  0.294*** 0.501***  0.534** 0.592*** 
   [0.089] [0.095]  [0.237] [0.124] 
Cohort Size  -7.169* -5.264  -7.316*** -6.624*** 
   [4.065] [3.542]  [1.637] [2.369] 
Constant 4.337*** 4.653*** 6.396*** 5.706*** 5.380*** 5.988*** 
  [0.543] [0.473] [0.336] [0.900] [1.086] [0.642] 
N 4200 3874 3874 3959 3657 3657 
adj. R-square 0.998 0.999 0.998 0.996 0.996 0.996 
 
Note:  Standard errors in brackets. Significance level can be read as * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.00
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Table 5: Mincerian Earnings Functions and Return to Schooling 
 
  POOL Male Female URBAN  RURAL 
  I II I II I II I II I II 
Age 
  
0.081*** 
[0.007] 
0.072*** 
[0.006] 
0.088*** 
[0.008] 
0.077*** 
[0.008] 
0.069*** 
[0.005] 
0.054*** 
[0.005] 
0.087*** 
[0.007] 
0.081*** 
[0.005] 
0.073*** 
[0.009] 
0.049*** 
[0.009] 
Age-square 
*(1/100) 
  
-0.10*** 
[0.000] 
-0.10*** 
[0.000] 
-0.10*** 
[0.000] 
-0.10*** 
[0.000] 
-0.10*** 
[0.000] 
-0.10*** 
[0.000] 
-0. 10*** 
[0.000] 
-0.10*** 
[0.000] 
-0.10*** 
[0.000] 
-0.000*** 
[0.000] 
Years of 
Schooling 
  
0.121*** 
[0.025] 
0.094*** 
[0.013] 
0.137*** 
[0.028] 
0.106*** 
[0.020] 
0.093*** 
[0.012] 
0.073*** 
[0.008] 
0.102*** 
[0.018] 
0.095*** 
[0.010] 
0.096*** 
[0.022] 
0.088*** 
[0.024] 
%Urban 
  
0.528*** 
[0.172] 
 0.406** 
[0.171] 
 
 
0.604*** 
[0.093] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
%Male 
  
0.363*** 
[0.116] 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.392*** 
[0.099] 
 
 
0.244** 
[0.108] 
% Married 
  
0.329*** 
[0.110] 
 0.308*** 
[0.097] 
 
 
0.341*** 
[0.127] 
 
 
0.172* 
[0.103] 
 
 
0.406** 
[0.182] 
Cohort Size 
  
-5.78*** 
[1.208] 
 -7.35*** 
[1.141] 
 
 
-6.91 
[6.369] 
 
 
-4.073* 
[2.291] 
 
 
-4.967*** 
[1.486] 
Constant 
  
4.291*** 
[0.337] 
4.243*** 
[0.307] 
4.135*** 
[0.373] 
4.416*** 
[0.335] 
4.665*** 
[0.211] 
4.748*** 
[0.126] 
4.302*** 
[0.343] 
4.352*** 
[0.230] 
4.746*** 
[0.348] 
5.110*** 
[0.386] 
Survey FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 4670 4185 4690 4204 4622 4149 4687 4201 4446 3959 
Adjusted  R-
square 
0.998 0.998 0.998 0.998 0.997 0.998 0.998 0.999 0.996 0.996 
Note: Standard errors in brackets. Significance level can be read as *p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001.  
1
5
9
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Table 6: Comparison of Returns to Schooling from Wald estimator and Mincerian functions 
 
 POOL MALE FEMALE URBAN RURAL 
Mincerian Earnings 
Function 
[std. error] 
9.40%*** 
[0.013] 
10.60%*** 
[0.020] 
7.30%*** 
[0.008] 
9.50%*** 
[0.010] 
8.80%*** 
[0.024] 
Indirect Least Square 
Estimates 
[std. error] 
7.90%*** 
[0.018] 
9.90%*** 
[0.024] 
4.30%*** 
[0.011] 
10.21%*** 
[0.017] 
2.90% 
[0.026] 
 
Note: The Mincerian return to schooling estimates are taken from specification II for each group in table 5 while the 
Indirect Least Square estimates for pooled sample is derived by dividing the coefficients of life expectancy at birth 
from  specification VII in table 3 by  the coefficient of life expectancy at birth in specification IV in table 1. 
Similarly, for each gender and Rural-Urban group, the ILS estimates are obtained by dividing the life expectancy 
coefficients from specification II in table 4 by life expectancy coefficients from specification II in table 2. Standard 
errors for indirect least square estimates are obtained by 500 bootstrap replications.
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Table 7: Life Expectancy at Birth Effects on Schooling and Earning, Individual Level analysis 
 
  POOL MALE FEMALE RURAL URBAN 
  Schooling Earning Schooling Earning Schooling Earning Schooling Earning Schooling Earning 
Urban 
  
-1.621*** 
[0.087] 
-0.424*** 
[0.017] 
-1.812*** 
[0.087] 
  
  
-1.253*** 
[0.074] 
  
  
  
  
-0.483*** 
[0.016] 
  
  
-0.396*** 
[0.017] 
Male/Female 
  
0.247*** 
[0.032] 
-0.366*** 
[0.010] 
  
  
-0.358*** 
[0.012] 
  
  
-0.355*** 
[0.008] 
0.0932* 
[0.041] 
  
  
0.287*** 
[0.031] 
  
  
Life Expectancy 
at Birth 
0.115*** 
[0.008] 
0.013*** 
[0.001] 
0.103*** 
[0.008] 
0.015*** 
[0.002] 
0.150*** 
[0.011] 
0.012*** 
[0.002] 
0.120*** 
[0.009] 
0.012*** 
[0.002] 
0.0996*** 
[0.007] 
0.011*** 
[0.001] 
Parents Life 
Expectancy 
0.0219*** 
[0.006] 
0.005*** 
[0.001] 
0.0270*** 
[0.007] 
0.008*** 
[0.002] 
0.008 
[0.006] 
0.002 
[0.001] 
0.0233** 
[0.007] 
0.006*** 
[0.002] 
0.0233*** 
[0.006] 
0.006*** 
[0.001] 
Age 
  
  
  
0.077*** 
[0.004] 
  
  
0.087*** 
[0.005] 
  
  
0.060*** 
[0.005] 
  
  
0.064*** 
[0.003] 
  
  
0.081*** 
[0.005] 
Age 
square*(1/100) 
  
  
  
-0.10*** 
[0.000] 
  
  
-0.10*** 
[0.000] 
  
  
-0.10*** 
[0.000] 
  
  
-0.10*** 
[0.000] 
  
  
-0.10*** 
[0.000] 
Marital Status 
  
  
  
-0.107*** 
[0.008] 
  
  
-0.245*** 
[0.008] 
  
  
0.024 
[0.015] 
  
  
-0.100*** 
[0.008] 
  
  
-0.113*** 
[0.009] 
Cohort Size 
  
  
  
-2.483*** 
[0.286] 
  
  
-2.666*** 
[0.357] 
  
  
-1.270*** 
[0.375] 
  
  
-1.771*** 
[0.335] 
  
  
-2.497*** 
[0.279] 
Constant 
  
3.315*** 
[0.645] 
4.925*** 
[0.217] 
3.749*** 
[0.640] 
4.474*** 
[0.279] 
2.112* 
[0.835] 
4.979*** 
[0.245] 
1.297 
[0.796] 
5.062*** 
[0.218] 
4.242*** 
[0.569] 
4.838*** 
[0.225] 
Birth-Year FE YES   YES   YES   YES   YES   
Survey Fixed 
Effect 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 2725213 2543741 1589055 1473199 1136158 1070542 872016 832947 1853197 1710794 
adj. R-square 0.444 0.898 0.442 0.916 0.451 0.869 0.589 0.888 0.340 0.904 
F 36.730 1371.40 39.200 1040.50 49.770 350.70 39.120 292.50 30.190 468.70 
Note: Standard errors in brackets. Significance level can be read as *p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
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Table 8: Return to Schooling from Mincerian Earnings Functions and Indirect Least Square Estimates, Individual Level analysis. 
 
 POOL MALE FEMALE RURAL URBAN 
  Mincerian 
Estimate 
Indirect 
Least 
Square 
Mincerian 
Estimate 
Indirect 
Least 
Square 
Mincerian 
Estimate 
Indirect 
Least 
Square 
Mincerian 
Estimate 
Indirect 
Least 
Square 
Mincerian 
Estimate 
Indirect 
Least 
Square 
Years of 
Schooling  
  
0.097*** 
[0.001] 
0.112 0.089*** 
[0.001] 
0.150 
 
0.107*** 
[0.001] 
0.078 0.086*** 
[0.001] 
0.102 0.100*** 
[0.001] 
0.105 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Age 
  
0.062*** 
[0.003] 
0.068*** 
[0.004] 
0.052*** 
[0.004] 
0.052*** 
[0.003] 
0.066*** 
[0.004] 
Age 
square*(1/100) 
-0.10*** 
[0.000] 
-0.10*** 
 [0.000] 
-0.10*** 
 [0.000] 
-0.10*** 
 [0.000] 
-0.10*** 
 [0.000] 
URBAN 
  
-0.222*** 
[0.004] 
-0.210*** 
[0.006] 
-0.231*** 
[0.004] 
  
MALE/FEMALE 
  
-0.450*** 
[0.014] 
  -0.493*** 
[0.016] 
-0.427*** 
[0.015] 
Marital Status 
  
  
-0.061*** 
[0.006] 
-0.204*** 
[0.006] 
0.073*** 
[0.012] 
-0.067*** 
[0.007] 
-0.062*** 
[0.007] 
Cohort Size 
  
  
-0.326 
[0.203] 
-0.417 
[0.260] 
0.083 
[0.294] 
-0.331 
[0.274] 
-0.348* 
[0.197] 
Constant 
  
5.102*** 
[0.075] 
5.164*** 
[0.096] 
4.573*** 
[0.093] 
5.444*** 
[0.059] 
4.865*** 
[0.084] 
Survey Fixed 
Effect 
YES YES YES YES YES 
N 2572536 1491901 1080635 842749 1729787 
adj. R-square 0.912 0.928 0.888 0.901 0.919 
F 3299.304 2002.804 3300.83 1117.629 2029.129 
Note: Standard errors in brackets. Significance level can be read as *p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Indirect least square estimates for pool, male-female, and 
urban-rural groups are obtained by dividing the coefficients of life expectancy at birth from  earning specification by  the coefficient of life expectancy at birth 
from schooling  specification  in table 7.  
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Table 9: Life Expectancy at Birth Effects on Lifetime Earnings with Correction for Selection including Cohort Size in Labor Force 
 
 POOL MALE FEMALE RURAL URBAN 
Life Expectancy at Birth 0.013*** 
[0.001] 
0.015*** 
[0.002] 
0.012*** 
[0.001] 
0.013*** 
[0.001] 
0.011*** 
[0.001] 
age 0.077*** 
[0.005] 
0.091*** 
[0.006] 
0.061*** 
[0.007] 
0.062*** 
[0.005] 
0.083*** 
[0.006] 
Age square*(1/100) -0.10*** 
[0.000] 
-0.10*** 
[0.000] 
-0.10*** 
[0.000] 
-0.10*** 
[0.000] 
-0.10*** 
[0.000] 
Rural -0.371*** 
[0.010] 
-0.363*** 
[0.012] 
-0.362*** 
[0.008] 
  
Male 0.425*** 
[0.016] 
  0.485*** 
[0.015] 
0.396*** 
[0.017] 
Marital Status -0.109*** 
[0.009] 
-0.248*** 
[0.008] 
0.022 
[0.015] 
-0.103*** 
[0.009] 
-0.116*** 
[0.010] 
Cohort Size -2.05 
[1.489] 
0.22 
[1.697] 
-1.641 
[1.990] 
-3.361* 
[1.944] 
-0.671 
[1.400] 
Parents Life Expectancy 0.005*** 
[0.001] 
0.008*** 
[0.002] 
0.002 
[0.001] 
0.006*** 
[0.002] 
0.006*** 
[0.001] 
Correction term for selection  
(Proportion of the Birth-year 
cohort in Labor Force) 
-0.743 
[2.000] 
-4.248* 
[2.324] 
0.204 
[2.600] 
2.243 
[2.664] 
-2.622 
[1.851] 
Constant 4.498*** 
[0.214] 
4.459*** 
[0.273] 
4.986*** 
[0.258] 
4.606*** 
[0.221] 
4.428*** 
[0.220] 
N 2585968 1498455 1087513 849833 1736135 
Adjusted  R square 0.896 0.915 0.868 0.886 0.903 
Note: Standard errors in brackets. Significance level can be read as *p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
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Table 10:  Life Expectancy at Birth Effects on Lifetime Earnings with Correction for selection due to participation in Labor Force 
 
 POOL MALE FEMALE RURAL URBAN 
  Selection 
Equation 
Earnings 
Equation 
Selection 
Equation 
Earnings 
Equation 
Selection 
Equation 
Earnings 
Equation 
Selection 
Equation 
Earnings 
Equation 
Selection 
Equation 
Earnings 
Equation 
Household Size 
  
-0.039*** 
[0.001] 
 -0.011*** 
[0.001] 
 -0.075*** 
[0.001] 
 -0.022*** 
[0.001] 
 -0.055*** 
[0.001] 
 
Respondent is 
Household Head  
0.784*** 
[0.003] 
 0.785*** 
[0.007] 
 0.396*** 
[0.005] 
 0.730*** 
[0.006] 
 0.801*** 
[0.004] 
 
Life Expectancy at 
Birth 
0.002*** 
[0.000] 
0.015*** 
[0.001] 
0.002*** 
[0.001] 
0.018*** 
[0.002] 
0.006*** 
[0.000] 
0.010*** 
[0.002] 
-0.006*** 
[0.001] 
0.014*** 
[0.002] 
0.015*** 
[0.001] 
0.010*** 
[0.001] 
Age  
  
0.202*** 
[0.001] 
0.040*** 
[0.004] 
0.206*** 
[0.002] 
0.037*** 
[0.005] 
0.210*** 
[0.001] 
-0.038*** 
[0.007] 
0.198*** 
[0.002] 
0.042*** 
[0.004] 
0.206*** 
[0.002] 
0.038*** 
[0.005] 
Age square 
  
-0.003*** 
[0.000] 
-0.000*** 
[0.000] 
-0.003*** 
[0.000] 
-0.000* 
[0.000] 
-0.003*** 
[0.000] 
0.001*** 
[0.000] 
-0.003*** 
[0.000] 
-0.000*** 
[0.000] 
-0.003*** 
[0.000] 
-0.000*** 
[0.000] 
Rural 
 
0.107*** 
[0.003] 
-0.382*** 
[0.009] 
-0.062*** 
[0.006] 
-0.351*** 
[0.012] 
0.177*** 
[0.003] 
-0.428*** 
[0.006] 
    
    
Male 
  
1.688*** 
[0.003] 
0.090*** 
[0.019] 
    1.844*** 
[0.006] 
0.248*** 
[0.018] 
1.629*** 
[0.004] 
0.039* 
[0.020] 
Marital status, if 
single 
0.127*** 
[0.005] 
-0.174*** 
[0.008] 
-0.672*** 
[0.011] 
-0.097*** 
[0.008] 
0.520*** 
[0.007] 
-0.303*** 
[0.021] 
-0.01 
[0.009] 
-0.125*** 
[0.008] 
0.183*** 
[0.007] 
-0.201*** 
[0.010] 
Cohort Size 
  
 -2.226*** 
[0.317] 
 -2.436*** 
[0.389] 
 -0.65 
[0.424] 
 -1.725*** 
[0.343] 
 -2.043*** 
[0.327] 
Parents Life 
Expectancy 
0.008*** 
[0.000] 
0.004*** 
[0.002] 
-0.002*** 
[0.001] 
0.008*** 
[0.002] 
0.012*** 
[0.000] 
-0.002* 
[0.001] 
0.012*** 
[0.001] 
0.005** 
[0.002] 
-0.001*** 
[0.000] 
0.007*** 
[0.002] 
Inverse Mills Ratio  -0.867*** 
[0.050] 
 -1.566*** 
[0.115] 
 -1.602*** 
[0.097] 
 -0.537*** 
[0.046] 
 -0.986*** 
[0.056] 
Constant  
  
-3.395*** 
[0.038] 
5.519*** 
[0.224] 
-0.558*** 
[0.084] 
5.219*** 
[0.275] 
-4.105*** 
[0.045] 
7.990*** 
[0.306] 
-3.130*** 
[0.058] 
5.161*** 
[0.229] 
-3.700*** 
[0.050] 
5.673*** 
[0.234] 
Number of Obs. 4453457 2478294 2149295 1434525 2304162 1043769 1831123 822189 2622334 1656105 
Adjusted. R square  0.90  0.92  0.87  0.89  0.91 
F-stat  1301.789  916.29  724.047  220.543  330.477 
Note: Standard errors in brackets. Significance level can be read as *p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. From the selection equation, we calculate the linear 
predicted probabilities probability, and then convert these into normal densities to calculate inverse mills ratio.  The group-specific inverse-mills ratios are used 
in the earnings specifications, which is estimated only on those who are in the labor force, to correct for the selection. 
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APPENDIX C. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 4 
 
Proofs of Propositions Presented in section Three 
Proposition 1: shadow value of human capital in terms of wealth, 𝑔(𝑡), increases when life     
expectancy, T, increases. 
Proof: differentiation of equation (15) w.r.t. T yields 
𝑑𝑔(𝑡)
𝑑𝑇
=
𝑑
𝑑𝑇
(
𝑅
(𝜎+𝑟)
[1 − 𝑒(𝜎+𝑟)(𝑡−𝑇)])  
          =
𝑅
(𝜎+𝑟)
[−(𝜎 + 𝑟)(−𝑒(𝜎+𝑟)(𝑡−𝑇))]  
         =𝑅[(𝑒(𝜎+𝑟)(𝑡−𝑇))].   
Since market rental rate of human capital  𝑅 > 0, 
𝑑𝑔(𝑡)
𝑑𝑇
= 𝑅[(𝑒(𝜎+𝑟)(𝑡−𝑇))] > 0.    
Proposition 2: If life expectancy at birth, T, increases, purchases of educational-investment 
goods, D(t), and effective time investment, I(t)H(t) would increase in every period of life.  
Proof: from equation (19)-(20), we see that price of D(t) is 
𝑃
𝑔(𝑡)
, and price of I(t)H(t) is 
𝑃
𝑔(𝑡)
. P and 
R are assumed to be constant over lifetime. Therefore, 𝑔(𝑡)  determines the movement of prices 
in the demand functions for investment goods.  Proposition 1 shows that
𝑑𝑔(𝑡)
𝑑𝑇
> 0. So, in 
response to a rise in T, prices of both D(t) and I(t)H(t) would decrease as well. Since both of 
these inputs are assumed normal, own price decrease would increase purchase of both inputs 
∀ 𝑡 ∈ [0, 𝑇] i.e., 
𝑑𝐷(𝑡)
𝑑𝑇
> 0 and 
𝑑𝐼(𝑡)𝐻(𝑡)
𝑑𝑇
> 0. We explicitly show the case for 𝐷(𝑡). 
𝐷(𝑡) = 𝐷 [
𝑃
𝑔(𝑡)
,
𝑅
𝑔(𝑡)
] ∀ 𝑡 ∈ [0, 𝑇] 
𝑑𝐷(𝑡)
𝑑𝑇
= −
𝑃
[𝑔(𝑡)]2
∗ 𝐷1 ∗
𝑑𝑔(𝑡)
𝑑𝑇
−
𝑅
[𝑔(𝑡)]2
∗ 𝐷2 ∗
𝑑𝑔(𝑡)
𝑑𝑇
 
𝑑𝐷(𝑡)
𝑑𝑇
= − [
𝑃
𝑔(𝑡)
∗ 𝐷1 +
𝑅
𝑔(𝑡)
∗ 𝐷2] ∗
𝑑𝑔(𝑡)
𝑑𝑇
𝑔(𝑡)
. 
Strong concavity and twice differentiability of production function implies that 
𝑃
𝑔(𝑡)
∗ 𝐷1 +
𝑅
𝑔(𝑡)
∗ 𝐷2 < 0, and from proposition 1, 
𝑑𝑔(𝑡)
𝑑𝑇
> 0. These together imply that 
𝑑𝐷(𝑡)
𝑑𝑇
> 0. 
Proposition 3: If life expectancy, T, increases, total human capital stock accumulated over 
lifetime increases as well. 
Proof: From equation 21, human capital stock at any time t is 
𝐻(𝑡) = ∫ 𝑒𝜎(𝜏−𝑡)𝐹[𝐼(𝜏)𝐻(𝜏), 𝐷(𝜏)]𝑑𝜏 + 𝐻(0)𝑒−𝜎𝑡
𝑡
0
.  
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𝑑
𝑑𝑇
[𝐻(𝑡)] =
𝑑
𝑑𝑇
[∫ 𝑒𝜎(𝜏−𝑡)𝐹[𝐼(𝜏)𝐻(𝜏), 𝐷(𝜏)]𝑑𝜏 + 𝐻(0)𝑒−𝜎𝑡
𝑡
0
] 
    =∫ 𝑒𝜎(𝜏−𝑡)
𝑑
𝑑𝑇
{𝐹[𝐼(𝜏)𝐻(𝜏), 𝐷(𝜏)]}𝑑𝜏 +
𝑑
𝑑𝑇
(𝐻(0)𝑒−𝜎𝑡)
𝑡
0
 
     =∫ 𝑒𝜎(𝜏−𝑡) {𝐹1
𝛿𝐼(𝜏)𝐻(𝜏)
𝛿𝑇
+ 𝐹2
𝛿𝐷(𝜏)
𝛿𝑇
} 𝑑𝜏
𝑡
0
. 
Proposition 2 demonstrates that 
𝑑𝐷(𝑡)
𝑑𝑇
> 0, and 
𝑑𝐼(𝑡)𝐻(𝑡)
𝑑𝑇
> 0. Again, 𝐹[𝐼(𝜏)𝐻(𝜏), 𝐷(𝜏)] is 
increasing in both of its argument if  𝐼(𝜏) > 0. So, the term in braces inside the integral is 
positive, i.e., {𝐹1
𝛿𝐼(𝜏)𝐻(𝜏)
𝛿𝑇
+ 𝐹2
𝛿𝐷(𝜏)
𝛿𝑇
} > 0. These together imply that 
𝑑
𝑑𝑇
[𝐻(𝑡)] > 0.  
Since in response to a rise in life expectancy at birth, human capital increases ∀ 𝑡 ∈
[0, 𝑇], lifetime human capital stock, 𝐻(𝑇) = ∫ [𝑒𝜎(𝜏−𝑡)𝐹[𝐼(𝜏)𝐻(𝜏), 𝐷(𝜏)]𝑑𝜏 + 𝐻(0)𝑒−𝜎𝑇]𝑑𝑡
𝑇
0
, 
will increase as well. Further, since lifetime accumulation of human capital increases, the value 
of the stock would change as well in response to a rise in life expectancy. Proposition 4 below 
explains this. 
Proposition 4: If life expectancy T increases, lifetime labor income increases. 
Proof: the present value of lifetime labor earnings, as stated in equation 23, is 
𝑉 = 𝑔(0)𝐻(0) + ∫ 𝑒−𝑟𝑡{𝑔(𝑡)𝐹[𝐼(𝑡)𝐻(𝑡), 𝐷(𝑡)] − 𝑃𝐷(𝑡) − 𝑅𝐼𝐻(𝑡)}
𝑇
0
𝑑𝑡, 
where the term inside the integral is the time 0 present value of net profits from human capital 
accumulation as of time t. Differentiating w.r.t T yields    
𝑑𝑉
𝑑𝑇
= 𝐻(0)
𝑑
𝑑𝑇
[
𝑅
(𝜎+𝑟)
[1 − 𝑒(𝜎+𝑟)(−𝑇)]] +
𝑑
𝑑𝑇
[∫ 𝑒−𝑟𝑡{𝑔(𝑡)𝐹[𝐼(𝑡)𝐻(𝑡), 𝐷(𝑡)] − 𝑃𝐷(𝑡) −
𝑇
0
𝑅𝐼𝐻(𝑡)} 𝑑𝑡]. 
Applying the Leibniz Rule on the above yields  
𝑑𝑉
𝑑𝑇
= 𝐻(0) [𝑅[𝑒(𝜎+𝑟)(−𝑇)]] + [∫ 𝑒−𝑟𝑡
𝑑
𝑑𝑇
{𝑔(𝑡)𝐹[𝐼(𝑡)𝐻(𝑡), 𝐷(𝑡)] − 𝑃𝐷(𝑡) − 𝑅𝐼𝐻(𝑡)}
𝑇
0
𝑑𝑡] +
𝑒−𝑟𝑇[𝑔(𝑇)𝐹[𝐼(𝑇)𝐻(𝑇), 𝐷(𝑇)] − 𝑃𝐷(𝑇) − 𝑅𝐼𝐻(𝑇)], 
𝑑𝑉
𝑑𝑇
= 𝐻(0) [𝑅[𝑒(𝜎+𝑟)(−𝑇)]] + [∫ 𝑒−𝑟𝑡 {[𝑔(𝑡)𝐹1
𝛿𝐼(𝜏)𝐻(𝜏)
𝛿𝑇
+ 𝑔(𝑡)𝐹2
𝛿𝐷(𝜏)
𝛿𝑇
] +
𝑇
0
𝐹[𝐼(𝑡)𝐻(𝑡), 𝐷(𝑡)]
𝑑𝑔(𝑡)
𝑑𝑇
− 𝑃
𝑑𝐷(𝑡)
𝑑𝑇
− 𝑅
𝑑𝐻(𝑡)
𝑑𝑇
} 𝑑𝑡]+𝑒−𝑟𝑇[𝑔(𝑇)𝐹[𝐼(𝑇)𝐻(𝑇), 𝐷(𝑇)] − 𝑃𝐷(𝑇) −
𝑅𝐼𝐻(𝑇)]. 
From the first order conditions (9), we substitute 𝑔(𝑡)𝐹1 = 𝑅, and from (10), 𝑔(𝑡)𝐹2 = 𝑃 into 
the above equation to yield 
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𝑑𝑉
𝑑𝑇
= 𝐻(0) [𝑅[𝑒(𝜎+𝑟)(−𝑇)]] + [∫ 𝑒−𝑟𝑡 {𝑅
𝛿𝐼(𝜏)𝐻(𝜏)
𝛿𝑇
+ 𝑃
𝛿𝐷(𝜏)
𝛿𝑇
+ 𝐹[𝐼(𝑡)𝐻(𝑡), 𝐷(𝑡)]
𝑑𝑔(𝑡)
𝑑𝑇
−
𝑇
0
𝑃
𝛿𝐷(𝜏)
𝛿𝑇
− 𝑅
𝛿𝐼(𝜏)𝐻(𝜏)
𝛿𝑇
} 𝑑𝑡]+𝑒−𝑟𝑇[𝑔(𝑇)𝐹[𝐼(𝑇)𝐻(𝑇), 𝐷(𝑇)] − 𝑃𝐷(𝑇) − 𝑅𝐼𝐻(𝑇)], 
𝑑𝑉
𝑑𝑇
= 𝐻(0) [𝑅[𝑒(𝜎+𝑟)(−𝑇)]] +
[∫ 𝑒−𝑟𝑡 {𝐹[𝐼(𝑡)𝐻(𝑡), 𝐷(𝑡)]
𝑑𝑔(𝑡)
𝑑𝑇
}
𝑇
0
𝑑𝑡]+𝑒−𝑟𝑇[𝑔(𝑇)𝐹[𝐼(𝑇)𝐻(𝑇), 𝐷(𝑇)] − 𝑃𝐷(𝑇) − 𝑅𝐼𝐻(𝑇)]. 
 In the RHS of the above equation, clearly the first term 𝐻(0) [𝑅[𝑒(𝜎+𝑟)(−𝑇)]] > 0. Since 
𝑑𝑔(𝑡)
𝑑𝑇
> 0 from proposition 1, the middle term [∫ 𝑒−𝑟𝑡 {𝐹[𝐼(𝑡)𝐻(𝑡), 𝐷(𝑡)]
𝑑𝑔(𝑡)
𝑑𝑇
}
𝑇
0
𝑑𝑡]>0. Finally, 
the last term  𝑒−𝑟𝑇[𝑔(𝑇)𝐹[𝐼(𝑇)𝐻(𝑇), 𝐷(𝑇)] − 𝑃𝐷(𝑇) − 𝑅𝐼𝐻(𝑇)] is the present value of net profit 
from human capital investment in the last period T. Although, Heckman assumes that human 
capital investment might be taken even at a financial loss because of nonmarket benefit of 
education, in the current setting, condition 14 states that shadow value of human capital is 0 in the 
last period T. It implies that an individual at her last stage of life would not invest in human capital 
since she will not survive in periods after T to reap the benefits of the investment.  Accordingly, 
in the last period T, 𝐷(𝑇) = 0, and, therefore, the last term is 0. It suggests that lifetime labor 
income from human capital investment is positive, i.e., 
𝑑𝑉
𝑑𝑇
> 0. 
Proposition 5: If T increases, marginal utility of lifetime wealth, 𝜆(0), decreases. 
Proof: Since 𝜆(0) is the marginal utility of wealth or shadow value of lifetime wealth as of 
period 0, and utility function follows concavity, it would decrease if lifetime wealth increases. 
Throughout the lifetime, wealth comes from two sources-labor income from exploiting human 
capital in the labor market and initial asset. Proposition 4 shows that lifetime labor income 
increases in response to gain in T. However, T does not affect initial endowment of assets 𝐴(0). 
These together imply that an increase in T would increase lifetime wealth, which, in turn, 
suggests that 𝜆(0) falls when life expectancy at birth increases. 
Proposition 6: If life expectancy T increases, consumption of leisure in human capital adjusted 
efficiency units, i.e., effective leisure 𝐻𝐿(𝑡) increases. However, measured hours of leisure,𝐿(𝑡), 
responds in an ambiguous manner. 
Proof: Since leisure is by assumption a normal good and an increase in life expectancy at birth 
(T) increases lifetime income, value of leisure should increase∀ 𝑡 ∈ [0, 𝑇] . From equation 17, 
𝐻(𝑡)𝐿(𝑡) = 𝐻𝐿[𝜆(0)𝑒(𝜌−𝑟)𝑡𝑃, 𝑅𝜆(0)𝑒(𝜌−𝑟)𝑡].  
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Since proposition 5 shows that 
𝑑𝜆(0)
𝑑𝑇
< 0, when T increases effective leisure becomes cheaper 
through reduced value for 𝜆(0). It implies that in response to gain in T, for an individual value of 
leisure increases at all ages. However, the direction of change in consumption of leisure in 
natural units of time, 𝐿(𝑡), is not quite clear. For exposition, note that effective leisure can be 
expressed as  
 𝐼𝑛𝐿(𝑡) = 𝐼𝑛𝐻𝐿(𝑡) − 𝐼𝑛𝐻(𝑡) 
𝑑
𝑑𝑇
[𝐼𝑛𝐿(𝑡)] =
𝑑
𝑑𝑇
[𝐼𝑛𝐻𝐿(𝑡)] −
𝑑
𝑑𝑇
[𝐼𝑛𝐻(𝑡)], 
=
𝑑[𝐼𝑛𝐻𝐿(𝑡)]
𝑑𝜆(0)
∗
𝑑𝜆(0)
𝑑𝑇
−
𝑑[𝐼𝑛𝐻(𝑡)]
𝑑𝑇
.  
Since leisure is a normal good, 
𝑑[𝐼𝑛𝐻𝐿(𝑡)]
𝑑𝜆(0)
∗
𝑑𝜆(0)
𝑑𝑇
> 0, and in proposition 3, we have already shown 
that the second term 
𝑑[𝐼𝑛𝐻(𝑡)]
𝑑𝑇
> 0. Therefore, we cannot sign 
𝑑
𝑑𝑇
[𝐼𝑛𝐿(𝑡)]. If  
𝑑[𝐼𝑛𝐻𝐿(𝑡)]
𝑑𝜆(0)
∗
𝑑𝜆(0)
𝑑𝑇
>
𝑑[𝐼𝑛𝐻(𝑡)]
𝑑𝑇
 , 𝐿(𝑡) increases in response to a rise in T and vice versa. 
 
 
Table B1: List of Countries and Years of Surveys  
Country Survey Year Country Survey Year 
Afghanistan 2007 Latvia 2004, 2012 
Albania 2003 Moldavia 2002, 2005 
Argentina 2012 Maldives 1998, 2004 
Austria 2004, 2012 Mexico 1989, 2012 
Azerbaijan 1995 Macedonia 2003, 2005 
Belgium 2004, 2011 Malta 2009, 2012 
Burkina Faso 1994, 2009 Mongolia 2002, 2011 
Bulgaria 2003, 2012 Mozambique 2002 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 2001, 2004 Mauritius 1999, 2012 
Belarus 1998 Malawi 2004, 2010 
Belize 1993, 1999 Namibia 1993 
Bolivia 1992, 2012 Niger 1995, 2011 
Brazil 1981, 2012 Nigeria 1993 
Canada 1981, 2001 Nicaragua 1993, 2009 
Switzerland 2011 Holland 2005, 2012 
Chile 1987, 2011 Norway 2004, 2012 
China 2002 Pakistan 2010 
Cameroon 2001 Panama 1989, 2012 
Colombia 2001, 2012 Peru 1997, 2012 
Costa Rica 1989, 2009 Philippines 2003, 2011 
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Table B1 continued. 
Country Survey Year Country Survey Year 
Cyprus 2005, 2012 Poland 2005, 2012 
Czech Republic 2005, 2012 Puerto Rica 1970, 2005 
Germany 2005, 2012 Portugal 2004, 2012 
Denmark 2004, 2012 Paraguay 1990, 2011 
Dominican Republic 1996, 2011 Romania 1994, 2012 
Ecuador 1994, 2012 Russia 1994, 2009 
Spain 2004, 2012 Senegal 2011 
Estonia 2004, 2012 Solomon Islands 2005 
Ethiopia 2005 Sierra Leone 2003, 2011 
Finland 2004, 2012 El Salvador 1991, 2009 
France 2004, 2012 Serbia 2008 
Micronesia, Fed. States. 2000 Sao Tome and 
Principe 
2000, 2010 
Gabon 2005 Surinam 1999 
United Kingdom 2005, 2012 Slovakia 2003, 2012 
Greece 2004, 2012 Slovenia 2005, 2012 
Guatemala 2000, 2011 Sweden 2004, 2012 
Guyana 1992 Swaziland 2000 
Honduras 1991, 2011 Chad 2003 
Croatia 2004, 2012 Togo 2006 
Haiti 2001 Thailand 1990, 2009 
Hungary 2004, 2012 Tajikistan 2003 
Indonesia 1998, 2010 Turkmenistan 1998 
India 1983, 2007 East Timor 2001, 2007 
Ireland 2004, 2009 Tunisia 2001 
Iceland 2004, 2012 Turkey 2002 
Italy 2004, 2012 Tanzania 2000 
Jamaica 1990, 2002 Uganda 1992 
Jordan 2002, 2010 Ukraine 2000, 2005 
Kenya 2005 Uruguay 1989, 2012 
Kyrgyzstan 1997 USA 1990, 2010 
Cambodia 1997, 2008 Venezuela 1989, 2006 
Lao PDR 1997, 2008 Vietnam 2002, 2010 
Lebanon 2011 West Bank and Gaza 1998, 2008 
Sri Lanka 1993, 2009 Zaire 2005 
Lithuania 2005, 2012 Zambia 1998, 2010 
Luxembourg 2004, 2012     
Total 188 surveys from 111countries spanning the years 1970-2012. 
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Robustness 
Table C1 reports the first set of robustness results for schooling. In general, estimates of 
life expectancy effect on schooling from all of the specifications for robustness show similar 
pattern as we observed before: the coefficients of life expectancy at birth always turn out to be 
positive and statistically significant at less than one percent level. The estimates lie in the range 
of 0.04-0.111. Life expectancy effect on schooling is smaller in magnitude both in the un-
weighted case, and when a young group sample is used. The estimates are similar in magnitude 
when we use only one survey per country (the latest possible survey), or we replace parents’ life 
expectancy by a 15-year lagged value of life expectancy at birth.  Similar to previously reported 
estimates, if life expectancy at birth increases by one year, the birth-year cohort will spend 0.1 
years more time in school.  
For lifetime earnings, table C2 reports that the positive and statistically significant 
relationship between life expectancy at birth and earnings is robust across sample consisting only 
young-age group, controls through higher order age terms, alternative definition of parents’ life 
expectancy, and alternative assumption on cohort fixed effect. In contrast to that for schooling, 
we fail to notice any statistical significance for un-weighted regression and sample consisting 
only one survey per country. Incorporating higher order age terms in our specification, we obtain 
a 0.8% increase in income from an additional year of gain in life expectancy at birth, which is 
similar to what we observe in our main specification (specification IV in table 3). Including 
cohort fixed effect by defining cohort at five-year birth range shrinks life expectancy effect on 
lifetime earnings, as reported in column IV. Parents’ life expectancy if constructed by taking a 
15-year lag does not affect the life expectancy effect on earnings. Next, we restrict our sample on 
young working group by including only those who are in age group 25-45. The coefficient of life 
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expectancy at birth now shrinks further in magnitude (1.6% per year of added life expectancy) 
and still remain statistically significant. Although we do not report in table C2, the coefficient of 
life expectancy at birth turns out to be positive and statistically significant if we alternatively 
define the young working group to be those in the age ranges of 25-50 or 25-40.  
Life Expectancy at birth or something else? 
The literature finds that weather shocks impact well-being through multifaceted channels 
including reduced labor productivity, agricultural output shock, mortality due to disease 
outbreak, and political instability instigating civil war (Dell et al. 2014; Maccini and Yang 2009). 
As a control for other factors prevailing at the time of birth, we incorporate country-cohort 
specific average temperature and average precipitation. The weather attributes that prevailed at 
the time of birth appear to be exogenous. This robustness check will give us an indication of 
whether the positive and statistically significant positive association of life expectancy at birth 
with schooling and lifetime earnings is truly an exogenous impact of life expectancy at birth, or 
it is actually due to any cohort and country specific omitted or unobserved factors which 
influence both health and human capital.65 
The time series on country averages on yearly temperature and precipitation is compiled 
from CRY-CY dataset, produced and maintained by Climate Research Unit at the University of 
East Anglia, UK. 66 The CRU CY dataset maintains information on monthly, seasonal or annual 
                                                 
65 For illustration, while one was in the womb, if there was a severe flood in his/her locality, which caused  food 
scarcity and high infant mortality in that area, then any life expectancy effects we observe in our model would 
actually be the true effect of weather shocks. 
66 The underlying dataset behind the construction of CRU-CY dataset is CRU TS dataset. The construction is 
described as “The original data (CRU TS 3.21) took the form of a value for each month and each box on a 0.5 
degree latitude/longitude grid. CRU assigned each box to a single country. For each country CRU calculated the 
weighted mean of the values from its constituent grid boxes for each month in turn. Each grid box was weighted by 
surface area, using the cosine of the latitude. The seasonal and annual values are the means of their constituent 
months. The CRU TS dataset prioritizes completeness, and has no missing data over land. Where observations are 
unavailable, the 1961-90 monthly climatic mean is used as a substitute. In data sparse regions of the world, this can 
lead to repeated values, and this can show up in derived products such as CRU CY.” 
172 
 
 
 
spatial averages on ten climate variables including temperature and precipitation.  We utilize 
annual averages of these two variables- temperature and precipitation. The first two columns in 
table C3 report the results from the earnings specifications with weather variables while the last 
two columns report those for years in school.  
The estimates show that the inclusion of birth-year-and-country specific weather 
variables do not alter the impact of life expectancy at birth on either schooling or lifetime 
earnings compared to what we observed above. Controlling for any possible weather shock at the 
time of birth, we observe that one additional year gain in life expectancy increases investment in 
schooling by 0.11 year and lifetime earnings by 0.8%.  We do not observe any such independent 
effects of temperature and precipitation on either schooling or earnings in our complete 
specification. However, specifications excluding life expectancy variables in column II and IV 
reveal that any possible temperature shock at the time of birth is associated with lifetime 
earnings but not schooling, while high precipitation at the time of birth lead one to spend more 
time in school. 
Life expectancy at higher ages 
Some recent papers question the appropriateness of use of life expectancy at birth 
emphasizing on concerns related to high infant and child mortality rate. We check the strength of 
our findings to life expectancy at ages beyond infancy by incorporating life expectancy at age 
five and ten in place of that at birth in our empirical analysis. However, since life expectancy at 
age 5 and 10 are not available before 1950 for most of the countries in our sample, we use a 
truncated sample of what we have used so far.  Data on life expectancy at age 5 and 10 is 
available from world population prospects (2012) published by Population division, Department 
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of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations. 67 Note that this data is available at 5-year 
range, for example, those who were born between 1950 and 1955 in Brazil share the same life 
expectancy at five or ten.  So, in this empirical exercise life expectancy at age five or ten varies 
by five-year-cohort within a country, whereas previously it varied by birth-year. Other variables 
would remain the same, and will vary birth-year. To consistently assign life expectancy measures 
at higher ages, for a birth-year cohort we assign a five year forwarded value as measures of life 
expectancy at five, and ten-year forwarded value as measure of life expectancy at ten. 
The columns I-III in table C4 reports the results for schooling while columns IV-VI for 
lifetime earnings. To facilitate a comparison of the coefficients of life expectancy at birth with 
life expectancy at five and ten, we estimate one specifications with life expectancy at birth. The 
impact of life expectancy at age five or ten on time spent in school is similar to what we observe 
for life expectancy at birth. An additional year of life expectancy at birth increases school-years 
by 0.11 year while an additional year of gain in life expectancy at age five and ten increases 
years in school respectively by 0.115 and 0.10 year. Overall we observe estimates in similar 
magnitude compared to our estimates in table 1 and 2. Similarly, the impact of life expectancy at 
higher ages, at five and ten, on lifetime earnings is positive and statistically significant in this 
truncated sample. An additional year of life expectancy gain at age five or ten increases lifetime 
earnings by 1.1% and 1.3%, which is close to the 0.9% effect that we have observed for life 
expectancy at birth.  
                                                 
67 Various region, gender and age specific life expectancy data is available at http://esa.un.org/wpp/Excel-
Data/mortality.htm (last accessed on November 13th, 2014) 
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Table C5 reports the results from a replication of table C4 with individual level data.68 In this 
table, both for schooling and earnings, as we move from life expectancy at birth to higher ages, 
the coefficient of life expectancy at birth increases in magnitude. An additional year of gain in 
life expectancy at age 10 increase school years by 0.129 years, which is 16% larger compared to 
the effect of life expectancy at birth. For earnings, the life expectancy at age 10 exhibits a 61% 
larger effect compared to similar effect from life expectancy at birth. One interesting finding 
from this robustness exercise is that parents’ life expectancy turnout to be positive and 
statistically significant in almost all of the specifications with life expectancy at higher ages for 
both of schooling and earnings. It implies that parents with higher life expectancy were 
expectedly healthier and possibly more educated and rich that is transmitted to their children 
either through better health or more investment into children. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
68To facilitate a comparison of the coefficients of life expectancy at birth with life expectancy at five and ten, we 
also replicate table C5 exclusively for the sample for which life expectancy at age of five and ten are available. The 
estimates from the balanced and unbalanced samples are close. 
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Table C1: Life Expectancy at Birth and Schooling- Robustness Check with Different Weighting, 
Surveys and Sample Groups 
  I II III IV V 
 No 
Weight 
Single 
Survey(Oldest) 
Alternative 
Definition of 
Parents Life 
Expectancy 
Alternative 
Definition 
of Cohort 
Fixed Effect 
Sample 
Consisting only 
Young Group 
(Age 25 to 50) 
% Urban 
  
3.811*** 
[0.654] 
6.028*** 
[1.415] 
6.477*** 
[1.234] 
6.715*** 
[1.220] 
6.237*** 
[1.464] 
% Male 
  
0.991* 
[0.526] 
-1.336** 
[0.643] 
-0.896* 
[0.476] 
-0.932* 
[0.495] 
-0.182 
[0.483] 
Life Expectancy at 
Birth 
  
0.039** 
[0.017] 
0.104*** 
[0.023] 
0.107*** 
[0.021] 
0.112*** 
[0.023] 
0.111*** 
[0.023] 
Parents Life 
Expectancy (lag of 25 
years) 
-0.008 
[0.010] 
-0.008 
[0.009] 
 0.023** 
[0.011] 
0.031*** 
[0.010] 
Parents Life 
Expectancy (lag of 15 
years) 
  0.026*** 
[0.010] 
   
  
Cohort FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant  4.896*** 
[1.111] 
1.566 
[1.841] 
-1.064 
[1.617] 
-1.198 
[1.736] 
-1.681 
[1.777] 
N 3861 3022 3977 3861 3090 
Adjusted R-square 0.945 0.986 0.987 0.987 0.988 
Note: Standard errors in brackets. Significance level can be read as * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** 
p<0.001. Young Age group specific analysis is robust to age group 25-45 and 25-40. In column 
IV, instead of birth-year level, cohort fixed effect is defined at five year birth range.  
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Table C2: Life Expectancy at Birth and Earnings: Robustness Check with Different Weighting, Specification and Survey Selection 
 
  I II III IV V VI 
 No Weight Single 
Survey(Oldest) 
Higher Order 
Age Variable 
Alternative 
Definition of 
Cohort Fixed 
Effect 
Alternative 
Definition of 
Parents Life 
Expectancy 
Sample 
Consisting only 
Young Group 
(Age 25 to 45) 
Age 0.068*** 
[0.007] 
0.072*** 
[0.012] 
-0.094 
[0.168] 
 0.079*** 
[0.014] 
0.089*** 
[0.009] 
Age Square 
 
-0.001*** 
[0.000] 
-0.001*** 
[0.000] 
0.006 
[0.006] 
 -0.001*** 
[0.000] 
-0.001*** 
[0.000] 
% Urban 0.883*** 
[0.101] 
1.006*** 
[0.206] 
1.109*** 
[0.193] 
1.043*** 
[0.221] 
1.118*** 
[0.203] 
0.953*** 
[0.166] 
% Male 0.480** 
[0.186] 
-0.007 
[0.145] 
0.210* 
[0.121] 
-0.11 
[0.155] 
0.210* 
[0.111] 
0.363** 
[0.140] 
Life Expectancy at Birth 0.004 
[0.003] 
0.005 
[0.005] 
0.008* 
[0.005] 
0.005* 
[0.003] 
0.008* 
[0.004] 
0.016*** 
[0.006] 
Parents Life Expectancy 
(lag of 25 years) 
0.00 
[0.003] 
-0.001 
[0.003] 
0.003 
[0.003] 
0.004 
[0.003 
 0.008** 
[0.004] 
Parents Life Expectancy 
(lag of 15 years) 
   
 
 0.005 
[0.004] 
 
% Married 0.249*** 
[0.063] 
0.491*** 
[0.169] 
0.491*** 
[0.179] 
0.779*** 
[0.200] 
 
0.446*** 
[0.152] 
0.305** 
[0.138] 
Cohort Size -5.843*** 
[2.105] 
-10.320*** 
[1.624] 
-8.636*** 
[1.513] 
-7.792*** 
[1.785] 
-8.684*** 
[1.352] 
-7.948*** 
[1.619] 
Age Cube   0 
[0.000] 
   
Age^4   -0.094 
[0.168] 
   
Constant 4.943*** 
[0.477] 
5.184*** 
[0.565] 
5.881*** 
[1.747] 
6.072*** 
[0.316] 
4.087*** 
[0.700] 
3.241*** 
[0.712] 
Cohort FE    YES   
Survey FE YES YES YES  YES YES 
Number of Observations  3861 3022 3861 3861 3977 2638 
Adjusted R square 0.995 0.998 0.998 0.998 0.998 0.999 
Note: Standard errors in brackets. Significance level can be read as * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.Specification VI is robust to age group 25-40 and 25-50. In 
column IV, position in the life cycle is controlled by including cohort fixed effect while defining cohort at 5-year birth range.  
1
7
6
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Table C3: Life Expectancy at Birth, Earnings and Years in School: Robustness Check including 
Temperature and Precipitation 
 Log Wage Years in School 
 I                            II III                           IV 
Age 0.077*** 
[0.013] 
0.071*** 
[0.011] 
 
 
 Age Square*100 -0.10*** 
[0.000] 
-0.10*** 
[0.000] 
% Urban 1.107*** 
[0.198] 
1.082*** 
[0.207] 
6.772*** 
[1.233] 
6.737*** 
[1.355] 
% Male 0.212* 
[0.122] 
0.035 
[0.166] 
-0.981** 
[0.506] 
-3.303*** 
[1.223] 
Life Expectancy at 
Birth 
0.008* 
[0.005] 
 0.112*** 
[0.023] 
 
 
Average Precipitation 
at the time of Birth 
-0.007 
[0.005] 
-0.01 
[0.006] 
0.028 
[0.036] 
0.071*** 
[0.023] 
Average Temperature 
at the time of Birth 
0.004 
[0.004] 
0.007** 
[0.003] 
-0.003 
[0.010] 
0.006 
[0.012] 
Parent’s Life 
expectancy 
0.003 
[0.003] 
0.002 
[0.003] 
0.024** 
[0.011] 
0.013 
[0.012] 
% Married 0.477*** 
[0.156] 
0.549*** 
[0.164] 
 
 
 Cohort Size -8.680*** 
[1.494] 
-8.503*** 
[1.616] 
Constant 4.256*** 
[0.623] 
5.133*** 
[0.314] 
-1.624 
[1.605] 
6.885*** 
[1.412] 
Cohort FE YES YES YES YES 
Survey FE YES YES YES YES 
N 3751 3751 3751 3751 
Adjusted R-square 0.998 0.998 0.987 0.982 
Note: Standard errors in brackets. Significance level can be read as * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
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Table C4: Life Expectancy, Earnings and Education: Robustness Check with Life Expectancy at Higher 
Ages. 
 Years in School Log of Earnings 
  I II III IV V VI 
% Urban 
 
6.715*** 
[1.220] 
5.633*** 
[1.143] 
5.777*** 
[1.323] 
1.112*** 
[0.196] 
0.834*** 
[0.146] 
0.902*** 
[0.150] 
% Male 
 
-0.932* 
[0.495] 
-1.136* 
[0.573] 
-1.444* 
[0.756] 
0.206* 
[0.118] 
0.296*** 
[0.098] 
0.261** 
[0.106] 
Life Expectancy at 
Birth 
0.112*** 
[0.023] 
  0.009* 
[0.005] 
  
 
Life Expectancy at Age 
5 
 0.115** 
[0.045] 
  0.011*** 
[0.004] 
 
 
Life Expectancy at Age 
10 
  0.101** 
[0.044] 
  0.013*** 
[0.004] 
Parent’s Life 
expectancy 
0.023** 
[0.011] 
0.048*** 
[0.018] 
0.039** 
[0.018] 
0.003 
[0.003] 
0.007** 
[0.003] 
0.005* 
[0.003] 
Age 
 
   0.077*** 
[0.013] 
0.085*** 
[0.012] 
0.082*** 
[0.013] 
Age square 
 
   -0.10*** 
[0.000] 
-0.10*** 
[0.000] 
-0.10*** 
[0.000] 
% Married 
 
   0.471*** 
[0.153] 
0.298*** 
[0.103] 
0.369*** 
[0.110] 
Cohort Size 
 
   -8.577*** 
[1.534] 
-6.136*** 
[1.719] 
-6.368*** 
[1.916] 
Cohort Fixed Effect YES YES YES    
Survey Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant 
 
-1.198 
[1.736] 
-1.834 
[3.447] 
-0.091 
[3.117] 
4.206*** 
[0.671] 
3.856*** 
[0.610] 
3.814*** 
[0.650] 
N 3861 3341 3546 3861 3341 3546 
Adjusted R-square 0.987 0.984 0.984 0.998 0.999 0.999 
Note: Standard errors in brackets. Significance level can be read as * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.Although not 
reported here, life expectancy at age 15 results in similar estimate for both of schooling and earnings as those of life 
expectancy at age 5 or 10. 
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Table C5: Life Expectancy, Earnings and Education - Individual Level Data: Robustness Check 
with Life Expectancy at Higher Ages 
 Years in School Log of Earnings 
 I II III I II III 
Age    0.077*** 
[0.004] 
0.079*** 
[0.006] 
0.081*** 
[0.006] 
Age Square    -0.001*** 
[0.000] 
-0.001*** 
[0.000] 
-0.001*** 
[0.000] 
% Urban -1.621*** 
[0.087] 
-1.612*** 
[0.209] 
-1.625*** 
[0.202] 
-0.366*** 
[0.010] 
-0.361*** 
[0.022] 
-0.365*** 
[0.022] 
% Male 0.247*** 
[0.032] 
0.329*** 
[0.069] 
0.296*** 
[0.068] 
-0.424*** 
[0.017] 
-0.387*** 
[0.037] 
-0.402*** 
[0.036] 
Life Expectancy at Birth 0.113*** 
[0.008] 
 0.013*** 
[0.001] 
 
Life Expectancy at Age 5  0.126*** 
[0.025] 
  0.015*** 
[0.003] 
 
Life Expectancy at Age 10  0.129*** 
[0.026] 
 0.021*** 
[0.003] 
Parent’s Life expectancy 0.020*** 
[0.007] 
0.048*** 
[0.010] 
0.041*** 
[0.010] 
0.005*** 
[0.001] 
0.008*** 
[0.002] 
0.007*** 
[0.001] 
Marital Status    -0.107*** 
[0.008] 
-0.118*** 
[0.018] 
-0.115*** 
[0.018] 
Cohort Size    -2.483*** 
[0.286] 
-1.729*** 
[0.388] 
-1.770*** 
[0.379] 
Cohort Fixed Effect YES YES YES    
Survey Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant 3.718*** 
[0.635] 
1.221 
[1.775] 
1.810 
[1.765] 
4.925*** 
[0.217] 
4.564*** 
[0.286] 
4.259*** 
[0.279] 
N 2726329 2345389 2478221 2543741 2222008 2333455 
Adjusted  R-Square 0.444 0.418 0.427 0.898 0.903 0.901 
 101.021 25.791 35.514 1371.380 312.059 355.925 
Note: Standard errors in brackets. Significance level can be read as * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.Although not 
reported here, life expectancy at age 15 results in similar estimate for both of schooling and earnings as those of life 
expectancy at age 5 or 10. 
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CHAPTER 5. LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH AND LIFETIME HUMAN 
CAPITAL INVESTMENT 
 
1. Introduction 
The maximum life expectancy at birth has increased worldwide from 57 years for the 1922 birth 
cohort to 77 for the 1987 birth cohort.  As shown in Figure 1, this growth in life expectancy 
would raise expected discounted lifetime earnings by about 27%.  Lifetime earnings can increase 
because individuals work more years over their lifetime, because the improved health increases 
the hours they can work per day or per year, or because they invest more in human capital which 
raises their productivity per hour of work. This study examines the last link, using data on life 
expectancy at birth and lifetime years of schooling for birth cohorts from 1905 to 1988. The data 
spans 147 countries and 919 surveys. Results are presented separately for men and women, and 
for urban and rural residents. The results show overwhelming support for a consistent and stable 
positive relationship between years of schooling and life expectancy at birth.   
Despite a long-held theoretical presumption that increased life-expectancy will increase 
lifetime human capital investment (Ben Porath 1967; Becker1993;  Heckman 1976), recent 
studies examining the link between life expectancy and years of schooling has found mixed 
evidence. In a cross-country long panel, Acemoglu and Johnson (2006, 2007) failed to observe 
any significant association between life expectancy, schooling, and per capita income that 
heightened the debate on the impact of life expectancy gain on human capital investment. Later, 
Lorentzen, McMillan and Wacziarg (2008) and Hazan (2006, 2009) drew similar conclusion. 
The empirical findings from all these four studies that gains in life expectancy at birth were not 
translated into longer time spent in school actually cast doubt on the Ben Porath mechanism. In 
contrast to the macro studies, the findings from micro studies more consistently support that 
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improvement in health has a positive impact on human capital investment, except few of the 
recent studies (Bleakley 2010; Cutler 2010). Note that the micro studies link health status at 
different stages of lifecycle (e.g. in-utero health, early childhood health) instead of life 
expectancy at birth with individual school-enrollment information. The mixed evidences from 
recent empirical research motivate us to explore the issue rigorously in a broader setting.  
The theoretical motivation comes from Bleakley (2007; 2010b) that incorporates health 
related productivity components to explain human capital investment in different economic 
setting. The empirical framework is built on the hypothesis that individuals take expected length 
of life at the time of birth as a measure of future health to plan out human capital investment 
path. Our empirical design follows a macro pattern of cross-country analysis but links micro 
level schooling information with cohorts’ life expectancy at birth.  
This paper contributes in establishing the causal link from life expectancy at birth to 
human capital investment. The study covers a large number of developing countries from sub-
Saharan Africa and South Asia, and adopts a birth-cohort framework to exploit within country, 
across birth-cohort variation in life expectancy at birth and years of schooling. In contrast to 
other studies (Acemoglu and Johnson 2006;  Hazan 2012; Hansen 2013; Cohen and Leker 2014), 
the measure of schooling, completed years of schooling, is extracted from household-surveys 
rather than noisier school-enrollment data based on population census. The matching of birth-
year specific completed years of schooling with life expectancy at birth avoids the noisy 
aggregation of health and schooling decisions made by different birth cohorts. This is the first 
study in incorporating parents’ life expectancy while controlling for the intergenerational link. 
The extension with individual level schooling data is innovative in examining the robustness of 
causal link. Finally, the regional and survey-by-survey analysis will be unique in facilitating a 
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comparison of the effect of life-expectancy at birth on schooling across income regions and 
countries.  
The next two sections review the recent studies on life expectancy at birth and schooling 
to adapt a theoretical framework that will guide our empirical framework.  Section four reviews 
the data and variable construction. Section five and six reports the findings from empirical 
exercises and some extensions. The final section compares the result with other studies and draw 
the implications for policy. 
2. Relevant Literature 
We briefly discuss some of the recent studies that found contrary evidence to this prediction 
from the Ben Porath (1967) model. While examining the consequence of diseases for economic 
development based on the prediction from neoclassical growth models, Acemoglu and Johnson 
(2006, 2007) exploited cross-country variation in mortality reduction from global 
epidemiological intervention in the 1940s, and reported that increased life expectancy did not 
affect average years of schooling.69 Bloom, Canning, and Fink (2014) suggested that controlling 
for initial health is critical since countries with poor initial health endowment experienced most 
improvement from mortality reduction but did not exhibit a similar increase in completed years 
of schooling. In another cross-country study, Lorentzen, McMillan and Wacziarg (2008) failed to 
observe any statistically significant impact of life expectancy at birth on secondary schooling.  
Both of these two studies examined the effect of life expectancy on the stock of schooling 
years in a country (Cohen and Leker 2014). Note that life expectancy at birth is a decisive factor 
                                                 
69 The explanation lies in the higher fertility in response to an improved health, at least in the initial stage of 
development. Unexpectedly large cohorts will face depressed earnings from a crowding of more individuals into the 
market, particularly if different birth cohorts are not perfect substitutes in production. To the extent that the potential 
for crowding in is expected, individuals in cohorts with rising life expectancy will moderate their human capital 
investment decisions to reflect anticipated depreciated earnings per unit of human capital. 
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for schooling decision of younger cohorts and not relevant for people who have already 
completed their schooling. In our birth-cohort framework, we avoid such aggregation by relating 
life expectancy at birth in period t with completed years of schooling of only cohort born in t.70  
In another influential study, Hazan (2009) included retirement into the Ben Porath model, 
and derived a necessary condition that increased life expectancy has to increase lifetime labor 
supply to raise lifetime earnings because increased schooling is not a rational decision otherwise. 
As a supporting evidence, he noted that American cohorts born between 1840 and 1970 did not 
exhibit an increase in labor supply, from which he concluded that increases in life expectancy do 
not cause a rise in human capital investment through schooling. Hazan (2012) reinforces this 
view by studying cross-country data for the later part of the twentieth century, in which he finds 
positive and significant association between life expectancy at birth and schooling while such 
correlation goes away once life expectancy at age 5 or 10 replace the life expectancy at birth. 
Note that although life expectancy at birth exhibits higher variation across countries due to high 
rate of child and infant mortality, life expectancies at higher ages are more likely to be 
endogenous since parents make investment into children health. If such investments are not 
controlled in an empirical analysis, the life expectancy effects on schooling will be biased. In this 
study, we address this issue by choosing observations at the birth cohort level.  
According to the Ben-Porath framework, the longer time spent in school in response to a 
higher life expectancy at birth can increase lifetime earnings because the individuals enter the 
labor market with an increased stock of human capital. The resulting gain in lifetime earnings 
from increased human capital stock can offset the reduced earnings from decreased labor supply, 
which suggests that increased labor supply does not need to be a necessary condition in Ben 
                                                 
70 In contrast to our birth-cohort strategy, Hansen (2013) adopted a school-cohort based strategy and their schooling 
measures are not constructed from completed years of schooling.  
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Porath model. Cervellati and Sunde (2013) revisited Hazan’s model and data. They argued that 
Hazan adopted a special case of Ben Porath model, and the fall in expected lifetime labor supply 
by successive cohorts of US men born between 1840 and 1930 was actually due to the fact that 
the cohorts spent more time in school and delayed entry into the labor market. The decreased 
lifetime labor supply indicates to the possibility of increased leisure as well. The increased 
lifetime earnings in response to a rise in life expectancy at birth implies that individuals in 
successive cohorts can afford more leisure. Heckman (1976) theoretically demonstrated that 
increased human capital investment, decreased labor supply, and higher consumption of leisure 
is consistent in an extension of Ben-Porath model with endogenous leisure.   
In a micro-empirical study, Bleakley (2010a) compared the cohort’s schooling across sites 
with different malarial intensity both before and after the malaria eradication campaign in several 
South American countries and Mexico. The impact on schooling is mixed, in fact, in one country 
he noted that cohorts born after the malaria eradication obtained less schooling. In another study, 
Cutler et al. (2010) reported that there was no statistically significant relationship between 
schooling and health improvement among post malaria eradication cohorts in India. Several 
arguments exist that would explain such an inconclusive findings on schooling (Costa 2014; 
Bleakley et al. 2014). Better nutrition increases the number of healthy workers who are more 
productive in unskilled works as well as better performers in school as they learn faster. Now, 
whether improved health would have a positive impact on education actually depends on 
whether the economy is brain or brawn based. In the later type, demand for physical labor is high 
which implies that marginal cost of time spent in school to be higher compared to a brain based 
economy. Consequently, improved health in such economy might not lead to higher average 
schooling in the population (Pitt et al. 2012). 
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There is a view that significant association between economic outcome and life 
expectancy at birth in cross-country regression based studies is merely a correlation rather than 
causal effect because of some omitted or unobserved decisive factors. Some studies have argued 
that better educated individuals with higher income would be more knowledgeable to spend 
more in preventive health care and medical expenditure and health thus might be associated with 
income and education in the other direction. However, studies could not reach a conclusion on 
this. For example, Clark and Royer (2013) did not find any positive impact of British education 
reform on health although it reported such changes increased wages and educational attainment. 
3. Theoretical Motivation and Empirical Framework 
We illustrate the various ways that an improvement in health at the time of birth can 
affect years of schooling following the framework advanced by Bleakley (2007, 2010b).  Let the 
expected health at the time of birth for individual i be summarized by life expectancy at birth 
(li0).  Improved health at the time of birth will alter the expected length of productive life which 
increases potential lifetime earnings.  If health and time in school (Sit) are complementary inputs 
in the production of health, improved health will also increase the human capital that can be 
produced per year of schooling.  The expected lifetime benefits from additional time in school at 
age t can be summarized by the marginal benefit equation 𝐵(𝑙𝑖0, 𝑆𝑖𝑡, 𝑃𝑖𝑡 , 𝑞, 𝜀𝑖𝑡) where Pit is a 
vector of parental inputs and q an index of school quality that are inputs into the human capital 
production process.  The unobserved term 𝜀𝑖𝑡 represents individual-specific productivity in 
producing human capital that are uncorrelated with health, parental or schooling inputs.  The 
function B  can be viewed as the impact of an additional year of schooling at time t  on lifetime 
earnings or utility.   
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It is optimal to continue investing time in school until B = C, the marginal cost of an 
additional year of schooling.  The cost of education depends on monetary costs of schooling (pit), 
and the opportunity cost of time spent in school equal to the wage the child could earn given past 
investments in human capital 𝑊(𝑙𝑖0, 𝑃𝑖_𝑡, 𝑆𝑖_𝑡, 𝑌𝑖𝑡) where the notation _t reflects parental and 
school time investments before age t. The index Yit reflects the state of the labor market for 
workers with skill that are close substitutes for i with larger values indicating stronger demand 
for similarly skilled workers.  The opportunity cost of schooling is rising in all past 
accumulations of human capital, and the marginal cost of schooling 𝐶(𝑝𝑖𝑡, 𝑊(𝑙𝑖0, 𝑃𝑖𝑡 , 𝑆𝑖𝑡 , 𝑌𝑖𝑡)) is 
rising in both direct and opportunity cost of schooling.  We further assume that the marginal 
benefit from schooling is subject to diminishing returns (
𝜕𝐵
𝜕𝑆𝑖𝑡
< 0).  Because the opportunity cost 
of schooling is rising in years of schooling, 
𝜕𝐶
𝜕𝑆𝑖_𝑡
> 0.   
We can illustrate how changes in expected health at the time of birth will alter expected 
time spent in formal schooling using Figure two.  Consider two health states, one with a good 
draw and the other with a bad draw on life expectancy at birth.  Note that at the time of birth, all 
planned parental inputs are conditioned on the parents’ endowment at the time of birth, Pi0 , and 
all subsequent parental inputs will be endogenous.  Similarly, all planned trajectories for the 
direct and opportunity costs of schooling will be based on information at the time of birth.  
Therefore, all other factors affecting the marginal benefit and marginal cost of schooling are the 
same across the two health states.  The parents will plan for the child to remain in school as long 
as the marginal benefit exceeds the cost.  The good health state raises the marginal benefit per 
year of schooling because of the complementarity between health and productivity in school, but 
also because the child will have a longer potential time to productively exploit human capital.  At 
the same time, the good health state has a higher opportunity cost of an additional year of 
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schooling because of the faster accumulation of human capital.  As illustrated, expected time in 
school increases because the increased marginal benefit rose more than the marginal cost.  But 
the opposite could have happened, in which case the child would spend less time in school in the 
good health state.   
In either case, the present value of lifetime earnings, given by the area under the marginal 
benefit curve, rises as a result of the increase in life expectancy at birth.  However, the greater 
share of the benefits from improved child health will come from greater efficiency in the 
production of human capital per year of schooling (illustrated by the change in the height of the 
marginal benefit curves shaded by diagonal lines), and only a modest share of the increased 
lifetime income will come from the induced increase in years of schooling (illustrated by the 
cross-hatched area between S* and S**.71  Consequently, any response of years of schooling to 
increased life expectancy at birth will understate the induced increase in human capital resulting 
from the improved health. 
This discussion suggests that life expectancy at birth could raise or lower years of 
schooling and that the effect of higher life expectancy at birth can be confounded with other 
factors as the cohort ages.  Equating marginal benefit and marginal cost of schooling yields the 
relationship 
𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑙𝑖0, 𝑞, 𝑃𝑖𝑡, 𝑝𝑖𝑡, 𝑃𝑖_𝑡 , 𝑆𝑖_𝑡, 𝑌𝑖𝑡, 𝜀𝑖𝑡) , 
but as suggested by our previous discussion, 𝑃𝑖𝑡, 𝑝𝑖𝑡, 𝑃𝑖𝑡 , 𝑆𝑖_𝑡 and 𝑌𝑖𝑡 will all be endogenously 
determined by information obtained as the child ages.  Some of the reduced form effect of life 
expectancy at birth will be found through these other factors whose values will depend in part on 
life expectancy at birth and in part on new information revealed over time.  To make this point 
                                                 
71 This point was made by Bleakley (2007, 2010b). 
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more precise, consider the projection of the cost of schooling at time t on information available 
at the time of birth.   
𝑝𝑡 = 𝐸(𝑝𝑡|Ω0) + 𝜉𝑡 
Innovations in the cost of schooling will be uncorrelated with information known at the time of 
birth.  This will be true for the other factors 𝑃𝑖𝑡 , 𝑃𝑖𝑡 , 𝑆𝑖_𝑡 and 𝑌𝑖𝑡 as well. For this reason, we 
propose to measure the effect of life expectancy on completed schooling using only information 
known at the time of birth.  Note that even later innovations in life expectancy can endogenously 
reflect investments by the parents and will generate biased inference regarding the effect of life 
expectancy on schooling.   
 Define the relevant sample as individuals of an age such that they have completed their 
schooling.  For individual i in cohort j and country c, consider the specification  
𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑐 = 𝛾1𝐿𝐸𝑗𝑐0 + 𝛾2𝐿𝐸𝑗𝑐𝑃 + 𝛾𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑐 + 𝛾𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑗𝑐 + 𝛼𝑐 + 𝑎𝑗 + 𝛼𝑌 + 𝛼𝑗𝑐 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑐.                   (1) 
The dependent variables in the above equation, 𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑐  is the completed years of schooling for 
individual i in birth cohort j and country c.  The key exogenous variable 𝐿𝐸𝑗𝑐0 is the average life 
expectancy at birth for individuals in cohort j and country c. The coefficient 𝛾1 will provide the 
change in completed years of schooling for every one year increase in life expectancy.  The other 
key independent variable is 𝐿𝐸𝑗𝑐𝑃, taken as the life expectancy at birth for the parents of 
individuals  in cohort j and country c.  We use the life expectancy for birth cohorts 25 years prior 
as the parents’ life expectancy at birth.72   We know that increases in the parents’ life expectancy 
at birth will increase their lifetime earnings, whether from more schooling, more human capital 
accumulated per year of schooling, or more years of productive work, and so we should find that 
                                                 
72 We also experimented with life expectancy at birth 20 and 30 years prior as our measure of the parents’ health 
endowment.  In practice, life expectancy at birth 20, 25, and 30 years prior were highly correlated.  
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some of that increased parental wealth is transferred to their children in the form of greater   
human capital investments (𝛾2 >0).
73  We also control for the fraction of the birth cohort that is 
male in the survey and the fraction that reside in urban areas.   
 The error terms include 𝛼𝑐, a country-specific fixed effect that holds constant the level of 
economic development and other political, social and economic attributes that are common 
across birth cohorts; 𝛼𝑌, a fixed effect for the year of the survey that controls for any economic, 
political or health shocks that are common across states; and 𝑎𝑗, a fixed effect for the year of 
birth that is controls for health innovations and pandemics as well as other factors that would 
affect a birth cohort   across countries.  The error term 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑐  represents the purely random factors 
that affect years of completed schooling.  
The remaining variation that we use to identify our life expectancy effects is due to 
variation across cohorts within a country.  The possible bias in our estimate is due to 𝛼𝑗𝑐, a shock 
to completed schooling that is specific to birth cohort j within the country.  Our estimate of 𝛾1 
will be biased if this shock is correlated with changes in life expectancy for the cohort, as might 
be the case if a country always introduces improvements in public health with improvements in 
school quality.   
 We apply this model to two units of observation.  Our most comprehensive data set 
aggregates completed schooling decisions to the birth cohort level within a country.  For a subset 
of these countries, we also have data on individual completed years of schooling.  The latter data 
set allows us additional controls for the possible bias related to the country-cohort specific fixed 
effect 𝛼𝑗𝑐 as we will discuss below. We cluster the standard error, 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑐,   at the survey level to 
correct for correlated errors across birth cohorts j within the country c. We weight the 
                                                 
73 See Becker and Tomes (1979, 1986). 
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observations to reflect the cell share of the total population in the country.  We further weighted 
the data by the square root of the cell-size to correct for differences in measurement error 
variance between thin and thick cell samples. 
4. Data 
This study uses the World Bank’s International Income Distribution Database (I2D2), a 
harmonized collection of 919 household surveys from 147 countries. A list of the countries and 
total number of surveys from each country is presented in table A1 in the appendix D. The 
surveys were conducted between 1960 and 2012 with 78% of the surveys collected on or after 
2000.  The database includes countries from all regions and income groups. Of the 147 countries, 
32 are from industrialized nations, 16 from Asia and the Pacific, 20 from Central Asia and 
Eastern Europe, 23 from Latin America, 10 from the Middle East and North Africa, 8 from 
South Asia, and 38 from Sub Saharan Africa. From each survey we keep observations that have 
completed information on years of schooling. We include individuals in the age range 25 to 60. 
We use the 25 year age cut-off because individuals are likely to have completed their schooling 
by that age. The upper bound of age 60 is chosen to avoid the selection issues related to 
mortality.   
Our observations are aggregated to birth-year cohorts from each survey in each country. 
This allowed us to access the full set of data, as many of the data sets are privileged and not open 
to use by non-Bank researchers. The 919 surveys totaling 44.6 million individuals in the age 
range 25-60 were placed in one of 3583 country survey-birth year cohorts.  There were up to 87 
birth-year groups per country with birth years ranging from 1901 to 1987.  We further 
subdivided our birth cohorts by urban versus rural residence and by gender.  Our analysis 
requires information on each birth-cohort’s average completed years of schooling, proportion 
191 
 
 
 
living in urban or rural residence, and gender. 74 All of these variables are harmonized and 
consistent across surveys. We also compiled information on the surveyed population versus the 
total population for each birth cohort in order to construct sample weights used in our regression 
analysis.  
Our key independent variable “Life Expectancy at Birth” is compiled from United Nation’s 
Population database and “Gap Minder”.75 “Gap Minder” constructs a measure of life expectancy 
at birth for almost 200 countries back from 1900 by compiling pre-1950 data on mortality rates 
from the Human Mortality Database and the United Nations Population Division’s World 
Population Prospects.76  We also utilize life expectancy at age 5 and 10.  Because life 
expectancy at older ages will reflect parental investments in their children’s health and human 
capital in response to updated information on the cohort’s health, these measures are inherently 
endogenous, but are used to compare our findings to previously published estimates.  Life 
expectancy at ages 5 and 10 is gathered from world population prospects (2012) published by the 
Population Division of the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs.77  The 
data are reported for 5-year birth cohorts rather than specific birth cohorts.  
Figure 3 illustrates how life expectancy evolves globally across cohorts in our sample. The 
regional scatterplot in Figure 4 indicates that all of regions have experienced similar rising trend 
of life expectancy at birth across cohorts. The difference across regions in life expectancy at birth 
has converged overtime except for Sub Saharan Africa. In Latin America and the Caribbean, life 
                                                 
74 We will not know where an individual was at the time of birth and so we will have some mismatch between urban 
and rural residence during the survey versus birth-place.   
75 The UN maintains a rich database on various socio-economic indicators http://data.un.org/Default.aspx. 
76 In the case where no estimates are available, they rely on simple model of interpolation and extrapolation to reach 
an approximate measure. Although “Gap Minder” admits that quality of life expectancy at birth data would vary 
across countries for the period before 1950, our extensive search suggests that this is the best available information 
covering such a wide set of countries for a long period before 1950.   
77 Various region, gender and age specific life expectancy data is available at http://esa.un.org/wpp/Excel-
Data/mortality.htm  
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expectancy at birth was only 68.6% of that in the rich and developed countries, and the ratio has 
reached to 90.5% by early nineties. In the similar period, Sub Saharan Africa could narrow the 
gap in life expectancy at birth with the rich countries only by 24%.78 Besides the evolution of life 
expectancy at birth, figure 2 and 3 also show how global and regional mean years of schooling 
evolve across birth cohorts.  Average years of schooling across all birth cohorts follow similar 
pattern as life expectancy at birth does. The regional scatterplot indicates that all regions have 
experienced a rising trend of schooling across cohorts.   
In the survey specific analysis, we utilize all 919 surveys.  That means that the same cohort 
may show up multiple times across surveys.  Since cohort-specific schooling does not change 
within a country, the repeated cohort observations are redundant and would overweight repeated 
cohorts.  To correct this, we only include one observation for each country-birth cohort in our 
cross-country analysis. We used information from the oldest survey from each country.  If 
multiple surveys are available in a country, we used the most recent survey to add in the birth 
cohorts that did not appear in the first survey.79  
5. Results 
 In this section, first we report the survey specific estimates. In a following subsection we 
analyze the results obtained from pooling the surveys in a cross-country analysis.  
5.1 Survey by survey estimates 
We have estimated the life expectancy effects on completed school years in each of the 
919 surveys. A notable proportion of these surveys cover developing countries, approximately 
                                                 
78 Due to AIDS epidemic, the convergence for Sub Saharan Africa has been disrupted.  
79 For example, Germany has two surveys in our survey-pool, one in 2005 and the other in 2012.  The youngest 
cohort in the former survey was born in 1980 while in the later survey the youngest was born in 1987. Since the 
cohorts who were born between 1980 and 1987 were under 25 during the survey of 2005, we only include these new 
cohorts from the second survey for Germany in our sample.  
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twenty percent of the total surveys originated from South Asia and Sub Saharan Africa. Table 1 
reports the number of surveys we have utilized from each region, and a descriptive statistics on 
the estimates obtained from the survey specific exercises. We estimate specification (1) for each 
of these surveys-The identification comes from within survey, across cohort variation in life 
expectancy at birth. Note that in few of the surveys we had to exclude the control on urban-rural 
location because either the information is missing or because only the urban population was 
surveyed.  
The impact of life expectancy at birth on completed years in school is quite consistent 
across surveys and regions. The survey specific estimates from 95% of the surveys reveal that 
life expectancy at birth has a positive and statistically significant impact on years of schooling. 
Only in 2.2% of the surveys, life expectancy coefficients turn out to be negative. A simple 
average of life expectancy coefficients across these surveys shows that for each additional year 
of gain in life expectancy at birth, individuals spent approximate 0.155 years in school.  Figure 5 
presents region specific kernel distributions of the coefficients of life expectancy at birth 
obtained from survey-specific regressions. The region specific median value of the coefficient, as 
indicated in the graph, reveals that highest median life expectancy effect is observed in Latin 
America, while the lowest in Central Asia and Europe.80 The life expectancy estimates exhibit 
wide variation across surveys in Africa, East Asia and Pacific, and Industrialized countries. 
5.2 Estimates from the regression on pooled surveys 
As reported in table 2, life expectancy at birth is found to be positively associated with 
schooling. The coefficients of life expectancy at birth, 𝛾1, imply that a one year increase in life 
expectancy at birth  increases years in school in the range of 0.13 to 0.15 years.  
                                                 
80 For comparison, the distribution of all survey-specific estimates shows a median life expectancy effect of 0.148. 
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From our discussion in section 3 we realize that there might exist cohort-specific fixed 
factors that influence cohort’s schooling investment decision. For example, cohorts born during 
1930-1934 or before who reach school-going age during World War II might experience 
different environment than those who were born after that war.81 Considering this, we control for 
such cohort specific fixed effects in two different ways. In specification IV, the cohort dummies 
is incorporated by defining cohorts in five years birth range while in specification V cohort is 
defined by birth year. 82 The inclusion of cohort specific fixed effects in specification IV and V 
does not change the coefficient of life expectancy at birth. If one lives 7.5 years longer, s/he 
would spend an additional year in school. Only in the specification with birth-year fixed effect, 
parent’s life expectancy exhibits a positive, but small effect which is marginally significant.  
5.3 Heterogeneity across groups 
The effect of gain in life expectancy at birth might differ across groups. We investigate 
this by male, female, urban and rural groups separately. Table 3 presents the group-specific 
results. The estimates, in general, reveal similar pattern as those observed in the pooled sample. 
Increases in life expectancy at birth increase schooling more for rural than urban birth cohorts. 
Increased life expectancy increases years of schooling more for female than male birth cohorts.  
Another year of life expectancy at birth adds 0.15 years of schooling for women and 0.11 years 
of schooling for men. In specification V, where we control for birth-year fixed effect, a gain of 
10 years in life expectancy at birth will lead a female cohort to take 0.43 years of more schooling 
                                                 
81 Again, there were several United Nations programs and activities to improve health and education across the 
developing countries. So, cohorts born after 1960s in those countries might have enjoyed favorable environment for 
schooling. 
82 While constructing the five-year birth cohorts, we collapse all individuals aged 25-60 into different five year birth 
cohorts except the first and the last. In total, we have defined 13 cohorts based on 5-year birth groups. Since the 
number of observations before 1930 is too thin, we group them into one cohort. Similarly all individuals, who were 
born during 1985-87, were collapsed to form the last cohort.  
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compared to the male cohort. In specifications with birth-cohort fixed effects, parents’ life 
expectancy turn out to be positive and statistically significant for the rural and female group.  
Life expectancy at birth might affect the schooling decision of birth-cohorts differently 
across regions. Therefore, we extend the empirical exercise by seven regions based on the World 
Bank classification of countries based on income and region.83 The results reported in table 4 
reveal that although life expectancy effects are consistently positive and statistically significant, 
they vary in magnitude across regions. The coefficient of life expectancy at birth shrinks for all 
regions once we control for birth-cohort specific fixed effects. The estimates suggest that 
compared to other regions cohorts in the Middle East and North Africa spent longer time in 
school in response to a rise in life expectancy at birth. Consistent with what we observe in survey 
specific estimates, life expectancy effect is smaller in East Europe and Central Asia. However, 
the life expectancy effect in South Asia is not significant after including birth-year specific fixed 
effect. Parents’ life expectancy does not exhibit consistency across specifications and regions. 
5.4 Life expectancy at higher ages 
There exist concerns related to appropriateness of using life expectancy at birth in explaining 
human capital investment decision.  Hazan (2012) argued that life expectancy at birth exhibits 
more variation across countries and cohorts due to high infant and child mortality, based on that 
he suggests that life expectancy at age five will be more appropriate to capture its true effect on 
human capital investment decision. However, we must recognize that in consistent with the 
predictions of the model laid out in section two and three, life expectancy at age 5 or 10 is 
                                                 
83 World Bank classifies the developing economies into six regions: “East Asia and Pacific”, Europe and Central 
Asia”, “Latin America and Caribbean”, “Middle East and  North Africa”, “South Asia” and “Sub-Saharan Africa”. 
We added to this the pool of industrialized countries into “High Income Countries”. For World Bank classification 
please see http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-and-lending-groups 
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endogenous because by the time one reaches age five or ten, parents have made substantive 
investment into his/her health. To check the robustness of our findings to life expectancy at 
higher ages, we incorporate life expectancy at age five, ten, and fifteen in our empirical analysis. 
Since life expectancy at exact ages is not available before 1950 for many countries, we use a 
truncated sample.  In addition, since the data is available at 5-year range, life expectancy 
measures at higher ages vary by five-year birth cohorts within a country.84  
Table 5 reports that the effect of life expectancy at higher ages on time spent in school is 
consistently positive and statistically significant that contrasts Hazan’s (2012) findings. A one 
year of gain in life expectancy at age five, ten, and fifteen increases time in school by 0.185 year, 
0.17 year, and 0.129 year respectively. Parents’ life expectancy turns out to be positive and 
statistically significant in specifications with life expectancy at birth, but not consistently at 
higher ages. Note that the value of parental life expectancy falls, at least in precision, as we 
measure life expectancy at higher ages, which probably indicate that parents’ endowment is not 
as crucial as they are in early childhood.  
5.5 Robustness checks 
This section incorporates several country-cohort specific measures to check robustness of 
the effects of life expectancy at birth on completed years of schooling. We extend the paper by 
incorporating cohort-country specific weather and polity variables. To investigate the quality of 
institutions and political regimes at the time of one’s birth, we utilize polity measure that ranks 
countries by their strength of democratic institutions. We use Polity IV data, which assigns a 
                                                 
84 Moreover, since we are using birth-year cohort specific data and life expectancy at five and ten are available by 
five-year range, for a birth-year cohort in a country we assign a five year forwarded value of life expectancy at five, 
and ten year forwarded value of life expectancy at ten. 
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polity score to 167 countries which as of 2013 has a population of more than 500,000.85 
Although the data goes back to 1800 for some countries, for many countries the polity constructs 
start after their independence. For a few countries we impute the missing polity information by 
the polity score of their origin country prior to the split, for example, all of the Post-Soviet states 
and states formed after the dissolution of former Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia.86 We also 
exploit information from Nunn and Puga (2014) on whether a cohort in a country was born under 
colonial regime, and if yes, their colonial origin. The time series data on country averages on 
yearly temperature and precipitation is obtained from CRY-CY dataset, produced and maintained 
by Climate Research Unit at University of East Anglia, UK.87 Table 6 reports the results from 
robustness checks. In specification I, we incorporate two weather measures while in specification 
II and III we include a quality of governance measure, polity score that cohorts experienced at 
the time of birth in a country. Since the polity variable is missing for many birth cohorts, we start 
the estimation with a sample consisting observations on polity score. In specification III, we 
divide the sample into two groups on the basis of having polity data to check if missing polity 
sample exhibit a differentiated effect of life expectancy at birth on schooling across groups.88 We 
                                                 
85 The data and documentation is available at http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html (accessed on October 
8th, 2014). The polity scale varies from “strongly autocratic” coded as -10 to “strongly democratic” coded as 10. 
86 Belize, though included in our sample does not have any polity data. In some cases, we could not use the available 
polity data since two countries have been consolidated into one, and the surveys do not identify respondents by the 
origin.  For example, in surveys from Germany, we could not utilize cohorts born after 1945 since the surveys do not 
identify individuals born between 1946 and 1987 by place of birth, i.e., whether one was born in West or the Eastern 
part. We exclude cohorts born before 1976 in Vietnam, and all cohorts born in Yemen for similar reason.   
87 The CRU-CY dataset is constructed from the CRU TS dataset. The original data (CRU TS 3.21) took the form of a 
value for each month and each box on a 0.5 degree latitude/longitude grid. CRU assigned each box to a single country. 
For each country CRU calculated the weighted mean of the values from its constituent grid boxes for each month in 
turn. Each grid box was weighted by surface area, using the cosine of the latitude. The seasonal and annual values are 
the means of their constituent months. The CRU TS dataset prioritizes completeness, and has no missing data over 
land. Where observations are unavailable, the 1961-90 monthly climatic mean is used as a substitute. In data sparse 
regions of the world, this can lead to repeated values, and this can show up in derived products such as CRU CY.” 
88 As most of the developing countries were European colonies in early twentieth century and polity data is missing 
for cohorts born during the colonial regime in those countries, we divide the sample into four groups based on non-
missing polity data and colonial exposure of countries: (i) cohorts from countries that were never colonies but lack 
polity data at the time of birth (ii) cohorts from countries that were colonies and lack polity data at the time of 
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investigate in speciation IV if colonial exposure affects life expectancy effects on schooling in 
systematic way on the basis of polity data availability. 
In table 6, under specification (I) and (II), we observe that inclusion of weather or polity 
measures does not alter the impact of life expectancy at birth on completed years of schooling. 
Average yearly precipitation at the time of birth has no effect on schooling while average 
temperature at the time of birth is positively associated with years in school. However, the 
estimates on polity variable itself and its interaction with life expectancy reveal that quality of 
government at the time of birth does not matter for schooling in our sample. However, are the 
cohorts with polity data different from that without polity data? In specification III, the dummy 
for having polity data turns out to be positive and statistically significant, which implies that 
average schooling is higher for the group having polity data. But the life expectancy at birth 
effect on years in school does not differ between the two groups in a notable manner.89  
Next, specification IV, where we incorporate the colonial exposure of a country, reveals that 
effect of gain in life expectancy at birth does not vary in a statistically significant manner across 
the four groups formed on the basis of availability of polity data and colonial exposure. The 
historic colonial origin and exposure does not matter for life expectancy effect on cohort’s 
decision on time spent in school. The interaction of polity with life expectancy at birth do not 
vary on the basis of colonial exposure - higher polity score does not cause higher life expectancy 
effect on schooling in countries with colonial exposure compared to those who were never 
colonies.  In all three specifications with information included on quality of governance, the 
                                                 
birth(iii) cohorts from countries that were never colonies and have polity data at the time of birth(iv)cohorts from 
countries that were never colonies and have polity data at the time of birth. 
89 Although we do not report in table 6, estimates from a simple modification of specification I with a colony 
dummy and interaction of colony with life expectancy at birth reveal that life expectancy effect on years in school is 
positive and statistically significant but does not exhibit any statistically significant difference at 10 percent level 
across groups of countries who were never colonies and who had colonial exposure.  
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finding of positive and statistically significant coefficient on parents’ life expectancy suggests 
the possibility of transmission of intergenerational health.  
5.6 Extension 
We extend the analysis utilizing individual level observations instead of cohort level means 
from 66% (173) of the original surveys used for cross-country analysis. Note that the theoretical 
model suggests that life expectancy at birth is exogenous in determining human capital 
investment, an individual level analysis will confirm if country-cohort specific unobservable is 
contaminating the cohort-mean based empirical results. We estimate the equivalent 
specifications of equation 1 using individual level data.   
In our setting, we cannot observe individual life expectancy at birth; however, cohort life 
expectancy at birth, an average measure of individual life expectancies at birth across individuals 
within a cohort ( 𝐿𝐸𝑗𝑐 =
∑ 𝐿𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑐
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑁
 ), is exogenous to an individual’s completed years of schooling 
or lifetime earnings. Group mean is often used as an instrument to resolve endogeneity issue in 
individual level empirical analysis90. In the above specifications, 𝐿𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑐 = 𝐿𝐸𝑗𝑐 + 𝜇𝑖𝑗, which 
states that individual i’s life expectancy at birth in the country c deviates from cohort j’s mean 
life expectancy by 𝜇𝑖𝑗, which is by construction orthogonal to mean. Since 𝜇𝑖𝑗 will be contained 
in the error term, the condition, 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜀𝑖𝑐𝑡, 𝐿𝐸𝑗𝑐) = 0, must hold. In contrast to cohort mean level 
analysis, to save time and space, here, we estimate one specification for each of the pooled, male, 
female, rural, and urban subsamples.91 As table 7 reveals, the estimates conform to those 
obtained from the cohort-mean level analysis, life expectancy at birth exhibits a positive and 
                                                 
90 Royalty (2000) has used state tax rate as an instrument for marginal tax rate in explaining employees’ health 
insurance eligibility. Similarly, a series of studies following Ruhm (2000) exploited variation in state or county level 
unemployment rate while explaining individual health behavior during a recession. 
91 We choose specification V from table 2, and specification III & VI from table 3. 
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statistically significant association with completed years of schooling. The pattern is similar to 
those obtained from cohort-mean level analysis reported in table 1 and 2. In the pooled sample, 
one year gain in life expectancy at birth leads one to complete 0.11 years more completed years 
of schooling. In general, the life expectancy coefficients are smaller compared to the cohort-
mean level analysis.  
In contrast to the cohort-mean level analysis, the findings from individual empirical analysis 
consistently suggest that parent’s life expectancy exhibit a statistically significant positive 
influence both on human capital investment in the pooled sample as well as across male, female, 
urban and rural groups. Parents’ life expectancy effects on years in school are 20-34% of an 
individuals’ own life expectancy effect. This evidence implies the possibility of intergenerational 
transfer.  
6. Discussion & Conclusion 
This study covers a wide group of countries, extensive time range, and exploits the across-
cohort variation within a country to identify the impact of life expectancy at birth on human 
capital accumulation. We find that gain in life expectancy at birth increases investment in human 
capital. An individual spent 11% to 15% time in school out of every one additional year of gain 
in life expectancy at birth.  One out of every 6.5 to 9 years of additional life years is translated 
into time spent in school. This is comparable to the estimates of 0.11 years in Sri Lanka 
(Jayachandran and Lleras-Muney 2009), and 0.17 years in a cross-section of countries (Hansen, 
2013).  
In our sample, life expectancy at birth and completed years of schooling increase by 31 years 
and 5 years respectively for the younger cohort compared to the older birth cohort. Our estimates 
imply that gain in life expectancy at birth explains at least 70% of this rise in schooling years. To 
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put this in the U.S. perspective, life expectancy at birth in the U.S. rose by 28 years from 1880 to 
1980 birth cohorts and years of schooling rose by about 6.5 years. Our estimates suggest that 
rising life expectancy at birth in the U.S. explains 4 out of the 6.5 years of increased schooling. 
We complement our main findings by several robustness checks. To address concern with the 
appropriateness of using life expectancy at birth in explaining human capital investment, we took 
attempt to estimate life expectancy effects at higher ages. Although our estimates exhibit 
robustness against life expectancy at age five or ten, we claim that life expectancy at age five or 
ten are endogenous, and the interpretation of coefficients of life expectancy at higher ages 
instead of that at birth is difficult.  There is evidence that parents make compensatory and 
complementary investment in children to offset early life health shock. For example, in Austria, 
Halla and Zweimuller (2013) find that parents of children exposed to Chernobyl Accident made 
compensatory investment through choosing smaller family size and decreasing participation in 
the labor force. Further, within a birth-cohort, if only the kids with better health survive beyond 
infancy, the issue with mortality selection arises. Since life expectancy at higher ages are 
correlated with one’s probability of being alive at higher ages, and this probability is correlated 
with ones’ performance in school but part of unobservable, the coefficient of life expectancy at 
higher ages would be contaminated due to mortality selection bias.  
The robustness of life expectancy at birth effects to the inclusion of birth-cohort and country 
specific weather and quality of governance information, gives us confidence in the impact of life 
expectancy at birth on completed years of schooling. The consistent estimates on the effects of 
life expectancy at birth on schooling reinforce the importance of investment in infant and child 
health for long run human development. The finding suggests that health could be an important 
avenue for developing countries to catch up the developed nation. 
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Source: Chapter 3, Figure Four. 
Note:  We assume 1922 as the base year. We plot the implied present value of lifetime earnings. The lifetime 
earnings estimates are assumed for male residing in urban areas. The life expectancy at birth numbers are the 
maximum life expectancy enjoyed by a cohort across the countries, which is to capture what an average person 
would expect to enjoy staying on the frontier of health technology at the time of birth. While calculating the net 
present value of log of lifetime earnings, we try two different discount rates 2% and 5%.  The period in the figure 
ranges from 1922 to 1987 as prior to 1922, the information on urban/rural residence is missing. 
 
Figure 1: World Average Life Expectancy at Birth and Implied Lifetime Earnings Index 
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Figure 2: Benefits and Costs of Schooling in the Presence of Health Improvement 
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Figure 3: How Life Expectancy at Birth and Average Years in School Evolves Overtime 
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Figure 4: Life Expectancy at Birth and Average Years in School across Region and Time 
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Note: Median effect is indicated by the vertical line. 
Figure 5:  Kernel Density of Life Expectancy Effects on Years in School across Regions
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Table 1: Survey Specific Estimates of Life Expectancy at Birth Effect on Schooling 
 
Region Number 
of 
Surveys 
Positive Negative Life expectancy Effects on 
Schooling 
significan
t 
insignifican
t 
significan
t 
insignifican
t 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
High Income 
Countries 
239 226 8 0 5 0.154 0.092 -0.017 
 
0.420 
 
Asia & 
Pacific 
78 71 3 1 3 0.132 0.076 -0.022 0.413 
East Asia & 
Central 
Europe 
93 82 6 0 5 0.076 0.054 -0.041 
 
0.218 
Latin 
America 
292 290 2 0 0 0.187 0.074 0.010 0.777 
Middle East 
and North 
Africa 
33 33 0 0 0 0.172 0.055 0.077 0.348 
South Asia 49 49 0 0 0 0.128 0.062 0.034 0.27 
 
Africa 135 123 5 2 5 0.16 0.093 -0.14 0.36 
          
Total 919 874 24 3 18  
%  95.1% 2.6% 0.3% 2.0%  
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Table 2: Life Expectancy at Birth and Education 
 I II III IV V 
% Urban  5.671*** 
[1.965] 
5.655*** 
[1.727] 
5.668*** 
[1.066] 
5.671*** 
[1.021] 
% Male  1.671* 
[0.919] 
1.575** 
[0.755] 
1.269 
[0.839] 
1.323* 
[0.785] 
Life Expectancy at 
Birth 
0.153*** 
[0.008] 
0.140*** 
[0.007] 
0.138*** 
[0.010] 
0.133*** 
[0.025] 
0.134*** 
[0.026] 
Parents Life 
Expectancy  
  0.003 
[0.025] 
0.028 
[0.017] 
0.030* 
[0.018] 
Cohort FE    YES  
Birth-Year FE     YES 
Survey FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant 0.237 
[0.436] 
-3.211** 
[1.573] 
-3.162* 
[1.672] 
-3.635** 
[1.445] 
-3.821** 
[1.643] 
N 6959 6143 5688 5688 5688 
adj. R-square 0.985 0.984 0.984 0.985 0.985 
Note: Significance level can be read as * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table 3: Life Expectancy and Schooling across Male, Female, Urban, and Rural Group 
 I II III IV V VI 
 URBAN RURAL URBAN  RURAL URBAN RURAL MALE FEMALE MALE FEMAL
E 
MALE FEMAL
E 
Life 
Expectancy 
at Birth 
 
0.149*** 
[0.010] 
 
0.142*** 
[0.009] 
 
0.119*** 
[0.023] 
 
0.127*** 
[0.026] 
 
0.118*** 
[0.024] 
 
0.128*** 
[0.028] 
 
0.119*** 
[0.009] 
 
0.159*** 
[0.011] 
 
0.11*** 
[0.024] 
 
0.154*** 
[0.026] 
 
0.11*** 
[0.026] 
 
0.154*** 
[0.028] 
% Urban  
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
5.771*** 
[1.643] 
4.308*** 
[1.155] 
5.61*** 
[1.137] 
4.197*** 
[0.735] 
5.59*** 
[1.022] 
4.187*** 
[0.739] 
% Male 2.730*** 
[0.639] 
1.831** 
[0.705] 
2.325*** 
[0.566] 
1.683** 
[0.731] 
2.331*** 
[0.532] 
1.690** 
[0.704] 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
Parent's 
Life 
Expectancy 
-0.002 
[0.022] 
0.027 
[0.023] 
0.023 
[0.018] 
0.034* 
[0.021] 
0.024 
[0.019] 
0.036* 
[0.021] 
-0.013 
[0.026] 
0.022 
[0.024] 
0.018 
[0.016] 
0.037* 
[0.019] 
0.021 
[0.017] 
0.039* 
[0.020] 
Cohort FE     YES YES                                     YES YES                                 
Birth-Year 
FE 
      YES YES       YES YES 
N 5687 5462 5687 5462 5687 5462 5681 5685 5681 5685 5681 5685 
 
Note: Significance level can be read as * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. We estimate each specification for each group separately. An estimation on the appended 
male and female sample with an interaction of male-female indicator and life expectancy at birth shows that life expectancy coefficient statistically differs across 
male and female group.  No such difference is found for the urban-rural sample.
2
1
2
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Table 4: Region Specific Life Expectancy Effects on Schooling 
 I II 
 High 
Income 
Group 
Asia & 
Pacific 
East 
Asia & 
Central 
Europe 
Latin 
America 
Middle 
East 
and 
North 
Africa 
South 
Asia 
Sub-
Saharan 
Africa 
High 
Income 
Group 
Asia & 
Pacific 
East 
Asia & 
Central 
Europe 
Latin 
Americ
a 
Middle 
East 
and 
North 
Africa 
South 
Asia 
Sub-
Saharan 
Africa 
% Urban -2.97 
[1.872] 
12.4*** 
[2.266] 
7.5*** 
[1.846] 
4.88*** 
[1.101] 
11.7** 
[4.547] 
19.0*** 
[2.99] 
6.57*** 
[1.021] 
-6.2*** 
[2.242] 
10.5*** 
[1.509] 
6.73*** 
[1.680] 
4.71*** 
[1.102] 
9.97*** 
[3.655] 
17.14**
* 
[3.392] 
5.76*** 
[1.018] 
% Male -2.2*** 
[0.751] 
3.63*** 
[1.268] 
1.108 
[0.919] 
0.22 
[0.611] 
3.59** 
[1.778] 
0.029 
[0.626] 
3.1*** 
[0.575] 
-3.2*** 
[0.973] 
3.05*** 
[0.769] 
0.477 
[1.152] 
0.456 
[0.545] 
4.6*** 
[1.633] 
-0.07 
[1.008] 
3.6*** 
[0.597] 
Life 
Expectancy 
at Birth 
 
0.10**
* 
[0.029] 
 
0.11*** 
[0.010] 
 
0.08**
* 
[0.024] 
 
0.13*** 
[0.009] 
 
0.20*** 
[0.022] 
 
0.08*** 
[0.025] 
 
0.14*** 
[0.013] 
 
0.07*** 
[0.024] 
 
0.07*** 
[0.013] 
 
0.04** 
[0.023] 
 
0.08*** 
[0.018] 
 
0.15*** 
[0.023] 
 
0.028 
[0.035] 
 
0.07*** 
[0.024] 
Parent's Life 
Expectancy 
 
-0.002 
[0.009] 
 
0.021 
[0.024] 
 
0.03**
* 
[0.012] 
 
0.04*** 
[0.013] 
 
0.041** 
[0.018] 
 
0.07*** 
[0.023] 
 
0.034** 
[0.016] 
 
-0.06** 
[0.024] 
 
0.012 
[0.023] 
 
0.012 
[0.014] 
 
0.027 
[0.019] 
 
0.028 
[0.021] 
 
0.039 
[0.027] 
 
0.018 
[0.020] 
Birth-Year 
FE 
       YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Survey FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 5688 5688 5688 5688 5688 5688 5688 5688 5688 5688 5688 5688 5688 5688 
Note: Significance level can be read as * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.The region specific analysis adopted the World Bank classification based on income and 
region. We estimate each specification with an interaction of each of the control with region dummies to extract region specific estimates of life expectancy at 
birth. In specification II we control for birth-year specific fixed effect to control for differences in environment across birth cohorts. 
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Table 5: Life Expectancy at Higher Ages 
 I II III IV V VI 
 LE at Birth LE at 5 LE at Birth LE at 10 LE at Birth LE at 15 
% Urban 5.865*** 
[1.214] 
4.613*** 
[1.536] 
5.875*** 
[1.131] 
4.452*** 
[1.494] 
5.805*** 
[1.095] 
4.550*** 
[1.495] 
% Male 1.38 
[1.015] 
0.723 
[1.122] 
1.33 
[0.954] 
0.347 
[1.280] 
1.349 
[0.885] 
0.082 
[1.383] 
Life Expectancy at 
Birth 
0.160*** 
[0.026] 
 0.146*** 
[0.026] 
 0.138*** 
[0.026] 
 
Life Expectancy at 5  0.185** 
[0.075] 
    
Life Expectancy at10    0.170*** 
[0.062] 
  
Life Expectancy at 15  0.129** 
[0.052] 
Parents life Expectancy 
(25 years lag of Life 
Expectancy at Birth) 
0.040*** 
[0.015] 
0.052* 
[0.029] 
0.035** 
[0.015] 
0.044 
[0.029] 
0.029* 
[0.017] 
0.037 
[0.031] 
Constant -5.67*** 
[1.662] 
-7.50 
[4.799] 
-4.714*** 
[1.600] 
-5.56 
[3.457] 
-4.05** 
[1.575] 
-2.48 
[2.645] 
Cohort FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Survey FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 4453 4453 4982 4982 5302 5302 
adj. R-square 0.987 0.981 0.985 0.979 0.985 0.978 
Note: To facilitate comparison, we estimate life expectancy at birth effect in the sample for which data  
on life expectancy at higher ages are available. Standard errors are in brackets. Significance level can be read as * 
p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table 6: Effect of Life Expectancy at Birth in the Presence of Weather and Polity Scores 
 
 (I) 
Weather 
(II) 
Polity Data 
(III) 
Incorporating 
Sample without 
Polity Data 
(IV) 
Colonial 
Exposure 
& Polity 
% Urban 5.679*** 
[1.058] 
4.941*** 
[1.257] 
5.496*** 
[1.096] 
5.457*** 
[1.080] 
% Male 1.237 
[0.831] 
0.363 
[0.870] 
1.537** 
[0.759] 
1.608** 
[0.757] 
Life Expectancy at Birth 0.132*** 
[0.024] 
0.150*** 
[0.021] 
  
Have Polity Data   0.882** 
[0.410] 
0.756* 
[0.411] 
(Do not have polity Data)* Life 
Expectancy at Birth 
  0.145*** 
[0.026] 
 
(Have polity Data)* 
Life Expectancy at Birth 
  -0.013 
[0.008] 
 
 
(Colony)*(Have  Polity Data)* Life 
Expectancy at Birth 
   0.135*** 
[0.022] 
(Never Colony)*(Do not have Polity 
Data)* Life Expectancy at Birth 
   -0.011 
[0.020] 
(Colony)*(Do not have Polity Data)* 
Life Expectancy at Birth 
   0.011 
[0.008] 
(Never Colony)*(Have  Polity Data)* 
Life Expectancy at Birth 
   -0.022 
[0.017] 
(Have polity Data)*Polity Score  -0.029 
[0.036] 
-0.019 
[0.031] 
0.008 
[0.030] 
(Have polity Data)* Life Expectancy at 
Birth*Polity Score 
 0.001 
[0.001] 
0.000 
[0.001] 
 
 
(Colony)*(Have Polity Data)* Life 
Expectancy at Birth*Polity Score 
   0.001 
[0.001] 
(Never Colony) *(Have Polity Data) 
*Life Expectancy at Birth*Polity Score 
   0.001 
[0.001] 
Parents Life Expectancy 0.028 
[0.017] 
0.036* 
[0.020] 
0.033** 
[0.016] 
0.034** 
[0.015] 
Average Precipitation -0.08 
[0.052] 
 
-0.076 
[0.047] 
 
-0.076 
[0.050] 
-0.079 
[0.049] 
Average Temperature 0.049*** 
[0.019] 
 
0.021 
[0.021] 
 
0.041** 
[0.018] 
0.044** 
[0.018] 
Average Temperature*Average 
Precipitation 
0.001 
[0.001] 
 
0.001 
[0.001] 
 
0.001 
[0.001] 
0.001 
[0.001] 
Constant -2.930* 
[1.648] 
-3.294* 
[1.810] 
-4.085** 
[1.680] 
-3.942** 
[1.659] 
N 5602 3960 5602 5602 
Adjusted  R Square 0.985 0.987 0.985 0.986 
Note: All specifications incorporate cohort and survey fixed effects. Standard errors are in brackets. Significance 
level can be read as * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Excluding weather variables and utilizing only polity score 
increase our sample size by around 700 observations, however, this does not change the estimates that we observe in 
specification II. 
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Table 7: Life Expectancy at Birth Effects on Schooling, Individual Level analysis 
 
 POOL FEMALE MALE RURAL URBAN 
Urban -2.141*** -2.247*** -2.007***   
 [0.099] [0.098] [0.100]   
Gender 0.486***   0.715*** 0.337*** 
 [0.054]   [0.060] [0.048] 
Life Expectancy at Birth 0.114*** 0.090*** 0.138*** 0.117*** 0.097*** 
 [0.009] [0.009] [0.010] [0.009] [0.009] 
Parents Life Expectancy 0.029*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.026*** 0.033*** 
 [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] 
Constant 2.259*** 4.290*** 0.698 -0.463 3.346*** 
 [0.606] [0.598] [0.663] [0.568] [0.640] 
Birth Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES 
Survey Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES 
N 3953161 1901176 2051985 1512968 2440193 
adjusted R-square 0.54 0.482 0.604 0.623 0.406 
F 55.882 42.613 64.098 50.979 41.7 
Note: Standard errors are in brackets. Significance level can be read as * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.     
Standard errors are clustered at the survey-cohort (survey specific birth-year) level. 
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APPENDIX D. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 5 
 
Table A1: List of Countries and Number of Surveys from Each Country 
Country Number of 
Surveys 
Percent Country Number of 
Surveys 
Percent 
Afghanistan 2 0.22 Lebanon 2 0.22 
Angola 2 0.22 Liberia 1 0.11 
Albania 4 0.44 Sri Lanka 16 1.74 
Argentina 20 2.18 Lesotho 1 0.11 
Armenia 1 0.11 Lithuania 8 0.87 
Australia 10 1.09 Luxembourg 9 0.98 
Austria 9 0.98 Latvia 9 0.98 
Azerbaijan 1 0.11 Morocco 2 0.22 
Burundi 1 0.11 Moldavia 2 0.22 
Belgium 8 0.87 Madagascar 5 0.54 
Benin 1 0.11 Maldives 2 0.22 
Burkina Faso 5 0.54 Mexico 13 1.41 
Bangladesh 3 0.33 Macedonia 3 0.33 
Bulgaria 9 0.98 Mali 2 0.22 
The Bahamas 1 0.11 Malta 4 0.44 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 2 0.22 Myanmar 2 0.22 
Belarus 1 0.11 Mongolia 7 0.76 
Belize 6 0.65 Mozambique 2 0.22 
Bolivia 14 1.52 Mauritania 3 0.33 
Brazil 28 3.05 Mauritius 12 1.31 
Bhutan 2 0.22 Malawi 2 0.22 
Botswana 1 0.11 Namibia 1 0.11 
Canada 3 0.33 Niger 4 0.44 
Switzerland 2 0.22 Nigeria 4 0.44 
Chile 11 1.2 Nicaragua 5 0.54 
China 1 0.11 Holland 8 0.87 
Cote d'Ivoire 2 0.22 Norway 9 0.98 
Cameroon 2 0.22 Nepal 5 0.54 
Colombia 12 1.31 Pakistan 11 1.2 
Comoros 1 0.11 Panama 19 2.07 
Cape Verde 2 0.22 Peru 16 1.74 
Costa Rica 21 2.29 Philippines 10 1.09 
Cyprus 7 0.76 Papua New 
Guinea 
3 0.33 
Czech Republic 8 0.87 Poland 8 0.87 
Germany 8 0.87 Puerto Rica 5 0.54 
Djibouti 1 0.11 Portugal 9 0.98 
Denmark 9 0.98 Paraguay 15 1.63 
Dominican Republic 14 1.52 Romania 7 0.76 
Ecuador 18 1.96 Russia 14 1.52 
Spain 9 0.98 Rwanda 4 0.44 
Estonia 9 0.98 Senegal 4 0.44 
Ethiopia 9 0.98 Solomon Islands 2 0.22 
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Table A1 Continued 
 
Country Number Of 
Surveys 
Percent Country Number Of 
Surveys 
Percent 
Finland 9 0.98 Sierra Leone 2 0.22 
Fiji 1 0.11 El Salvador 15 1.63 
France 9 0.98 Serbia 2 0.22 
Micronesia, Fed. Sts. 1 0.11 Sao Tome and 
Principe 
2 0.22 
Gabon 1 0.11 Surinam 1 0.11 
United Kingdom 8 0.87 Slovakia 9 0.98 
Georgia 1 0.11 Slovenia 8 0.87 
Ghana 4 0.44 Sweden 9 0.98 
Guinea 2 0.22 Swaziland 2 0.22 
Gambia, The 1 0.11 Syria 2 0.22 
Greece 9 0.98 Chad 1 0.11 
Guatemala 6 0.65 Togo 2 0.22 
Guyana 1 0.11 Thailand 19 2.07 
Honduras 20 2.18 Tajikistan 1 0.11 
Croatia 3 0.33 Turkmenistan 1 0.11 
Haiti 1 0.11 East Timor 2 0.22 
Hungary 9 0.98 Tonga 1 0.11 
Indonesia 13 1.41 Tunisia 3 0.33 
India 8 0.87 Turkey 20 2.18 
Ireland 6 0.65 Tanzania 10 1.09 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 1 0.11 Uganda 4 0.44 
Iraq 1 0.11 Ukraine 5 0.54 
Iceland 9 0.98 Uruguay 19 2.07 
Italy 9 0.98 USA 7 0.76 
Jamaica 5 0.54 Venezuela 12 1.31 
Jordan 8 0.87 Vietnam 7 0.76 
Kazakhstan 1 0.11 West Bank and 
Gaza 
12 1.31 
Kenya 2 0.22 Yemen, Rep. 1 0.11 
Kyrgyzstan 1 0.11 South Africa 26 2.83 
Cambodia 5 0.54 Zaire 1 0.11 
Kiribati 1 0.11 Zambia 4 0.44 
Lao PDR 3 0.33    
Total Number of Countries 147;     Total Number of Surveys   919 
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CHAPTER 6. ECONOMIC VALUATION OF ECOSYSTEM BENEFITS 
FROM CONSERVATION PRACTICES TARGETED IN IOWA NUTRIENT 
REDUCTION STRATEGY 2013: A NON MARKET VALUATION 
APPROACH 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Following the Environmental Protection Agency’s recommendation, Iowa is the first state in the 
nation to develop a strategy paper to reduce nutrient loads through waterways to the Gulf of 
Mexico. The Iowa Nutrient Reduction Strategy 2013 sets a goal of reducing agricultural 
nonpoint source generated nitrogen (N) load by 41 percent and phosphorus (P) load by 29 
percent in the waterways across 21 million acres of cropland in Iowa. The strategy paper 
evaluates the cost and performance of various agricultural conservation practices with different 
nitrate N and P load reductions. It develops several example cost scenarios incorporating various 
combinations of nutrient reduction practices, such as widespread adoption of conservation 
practices by farmers (reduced fertilizer application rate, adoption of cover crops, reduced tillage, 
and buffers etc.), land retirement, and wetland construction that can meet the specified target 
reduction. Out of these, three scenarios are predicted to achieve the targeted reduction of 41% N 
and 29% P. Table 1 presents these example scenarios, the agricultural conservation practices 
included under each scenario, and the estimated yearly implementation costs.  
In addition to water quality improvement in Iowa and downstream waterbodies, the nutrient 
reduction practices will also offer a number of co-benefits through additional ecosystem services 
such as soil health improvement, greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduction benefits, and 
wildlife habitat. However, the Nutrient Reduction Strategy (NRS) paper does not estimate the 
benefits and co-benefits to be derived with water quality improvement through implementation 
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of the NRS. The valuation of these benefits and ecosystem services associated with proposed 
practices is the primary objective of this study. 
A science-based systems approach to address the nutrient over-enrichment in waterways 
requires an understanding of both the costs and benefits of nutrient reduction technologies and 
implementation strategies. The estimation of the benefits and ecosystem services from the 
nutrient reduction practices is challenging since most, for example, soil health and water quality,  
are not routinely bought and sold.. This study uses economic tools of nonmarket valuation to 
estimate the benefits of water quality improvement that would result from the various nutrient 
reduction strategies. The co-benefits through additional ecosystem services are also included to 
the extent possible. We use primary data sets collected specifically for lake valuation purposes 
by Iowa State University, as well as by using benefit transfer methods, to assess these benefits. 
2. Ecosystem Services from Nutrient Reduction Strategy 
The benefits of reducing nutrient loads in Iowa’s surface water include: improved water 
clarity, growth control of algae that negatively affect water-based recreation, minimization of 
dissolved oxygen that is problematic to aquatic biological diversity, and minimization of 
contamination occurrences in drinking water supplies. In addition to these water quality benefits, 
the nutrient reduction practices may offer a number of ecosystem services including increased 
opportunities for water-based outdoor recreation, aesthetic value, drinking water provision, 
wildlife recreation, improved soil quality, flood control, reduced global warming, biodiversity 
and endangered species protection, and pollination services.  
We first evaluate the nutrient reduction practices to establish a link among agricultural 
conservation practices, changes in ecosystems, and resulting ecosystem services. We include six 
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nutrient reduction practices in the evaluation because the example scenarios in the NRS 
particularly focus on these practices: maximum return to nitrogen rate (MRTN), wetland 
construction, cover crops, reduced tillage, buffers, and land retirement. A lit review on the 
agronomic and environmental effects of each practice is conducted. Other practices that are very 
effective in reducing nutrient transport to waterways (such as bioreactors, controlled drainage, 
application of nitrification inhibitor, and sidedressing) are not included in the review since their 
effects on the ecosystem, other than through improved water quality, is limited. An appendix 
with the review is available from the author upon request. The literature review suggests that 
each of the conservation practices results in multiple ecosystem services, mainly through reduced 
nutrients and reduced sediment transport into the lakes, streams, and rivers, reduced soil erosion, 
and sequestration of carbon from the atmosphere. We identify several final ecosystem services 
including water quality improvement, enhanced soil fertility, carbon sequestration and reduced 
greenhouse gas emission, pollination habitat, biodiversity, and enhanced wildlife habitat that 
would result from implementation of the suggested conservation practices.  
Following Keeler and Polasky (2012), figure 1 presents a schematic depiction of how the 
ecosystem components respond to the agricultural conservation practices. Note that the link and 
pathways are established based on the literature review mentioned above. The relationship is 
complex. Some practices affect the ecosystem both through direct and indirect channels. For 
example, conservation tillage retains more crop residue which helps reduce soil erosion and 
improves soil quality by retaining topsoil. Reduced tillage further increases soil organic matter 
and reduces compaction which improves soil health. Similarly, wetlands contribute to 
biodiversity and endangered species protection by creating both wildlife habitat and pollinators’ 
habitat. The last two columns in figure 1 (titled “ecosystem services” and “economic valuation”) 
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indicate the link between the ecosystem services and human welfare, and show how the effects 
of the ecosystems on human welfare can be measured.  
3. Methodology for this Study 
The direct local benefit of reduced N and P load under Iowa NRS is improved water quality 
in Iowa waterbodies, which will offer a number of ecosystem services. To derive the monetary 
value of benefits from water quality improvements, we will consider three use values- recreation 
opportunities, residential housing near the lakes, and drinking water purification cost. 
Additionally, we evaluate three co-benefits generated from nutrient reduction strategies: (a) 
offsite benefits from reduced soil erosion, (b) enhanced wildlife habitat, and (c) greenhouse gas 
emission reductions.  
There are a number of additional ecosystem services that we are unable to quantify and 
monetize. For example, land retirement and wetland construction will have a positive impact on 
biodiversity and pollination but the magnitude of these effects is not known. Other examples of 
such excluded benefits are flood control, groundwater recharges, and non-use values of various 
ecosystem improvements. Finally, we do not attempt to quantify or monetize the on-farm 
benefits of conservation practices. For example, the agricultural conservation practices may 
affect soil productivity and result in higher crop yield. We exclude those benefits from this 
valuation exercise since those are private benefits, and the focus of this study is exclusively on 
external benefits.  
3.1 Quantification of benefits from improved water quality  
In the first step, we estimate the change in environmental effect, such as improved water 
quality, that is attributable to the adoption of new conservation practices. Next, we value these 
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changes using nonmarket valuation methods. These valuations have been done using information 
from primary data sets collected specifically for valuation purposes (Iowa Lake Valuation 
Project, Iowa State University) as well as by using benefit transfer methods. 
The Iowa Lakes Valuation Project is a large, multiyear project which collects a rich set of 
information on Iowans’ lake visitation patterns and preferences, as well as demographics.92 The 
survey has been administered five times in total, once in each of the four consecutive years 2002-
2005, and again in 2009.93 The second data set covers the usage and value of water quality 
improvements in Iowa’s rivers and streams. Both of these data sets provide significant cross-
sectional coverage of usage patterns. The values from these two data sets have been linked to 
estimates of water quality changes from a third dataset collected by the Limnology Lab at Iowa 
State University.94 The surveys were designed to complement a lake database that includes water 
chemistry, biological analysis, and watershed geographic information systems data for 131 
principal recreation lakes in Iowa. This combined effort resulted in detailed information on both 
the biological condition of Iowa lakes and the value and use of water quality improvements at 
those lakes. This data has been used to fit revealed preference models to estimate the benefits of 
reduced nutrients in this lake system.  
A third source of information used to monetize the environmental benefits associated with 
water quality improvements is a meta-analysis on the value of clean water (Je, Kling, and 
Herriges, 2013). The value function from this study is utilized with the data set on biological 
conditions of Iowa lakes to assess the lake-specific hedonic value of water quality improvements 
                                                 
92 Please see http://www.card.iastate.edu/lakes/ ( last accessed on June 20th, 2015) 
93 The sixth round of the survey is conducted in 2014, and the data is currently under processing and review. We 
could not use those for the analysis in this report. 
94 Please see http://limnoweb.eeob.iastate.edu/minireport/.   Last accessed on June 20th, 2015. 
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assuming water quality is a housing amenity. Finally, this willingness to pay measure for water 
quality improvements is combined with housing counts across all of Iowa’s lakes to estimate the 
benefits of reduced nutrients translated into lake-adjacent housing prices. 
Another welfare change from water quality improvement will come through reduced 
drinking water purification cost. To understand the implied benefits of nutrient reduction on 
municipal drinking water treatment cost, we exploit production and cost information from the 
state’s largest water treatment facility, Des Moines Waterworks (DMWW), as a case study. We 
relate DMWW’s source water quality with production cost data to calculate the potential savings 
from the reduced nutrient abatement requirement for the safe drinking water supply. 
3.2 Quantification of benefits from reduced soil erosion 
Many of the conservation practices will reduce soil erosion. We estimate the benefits 
from reduced soil erosion following a benefits transfer exercise. In most of the cases, the transfer 
of benefits is drawn from studies conducted in Iowa. However, in a few cases, we had to rely on 
studies in similar sites, e.g., Corn Belt or Midwestern states. First, we estimate how many acres 
of land will be treated by a specific conservation practice under each scenario. Next, based on the 
agronomic and environmental literature review, we draw a relevant low and high number on 
yearly soil erosion reduction rates from per acre adoption of that conservation practice. The 
formula to derive yearly total reduced soil erosion from a specific practice j is the following: 
Reduced Soil Erosionj = Treated Acresj ∗ Rate of Soil Retentionj,        (1) 
where rate of soil retention is measured as tons per acre per year. The lower bound on soil 
retention rate for each of the agricultural conservation practices- the fall in soil erosion due to 
adoption of an acre of cover crops, reduced tillage, land retirement, and buffers- are adopted 
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from RUSLE estimates based on Iowa.95 The data is of high quality since it (i) uses actual land 
use data from 2006-2010 across all of the major land resource areas (MLRA) in Iowa, (ii) 
considers distance of cropland from waterbodies to adjust for the sediment delivery ratio. The 
data on soil erosion is on the low side since the model estimates soil erosion for the most 
conservative practice scenario compared to the baseline. 
To assign a monetary value we adopt Hansen and Ribaudo’s (2008) benefits measures of 
dollar-per ton soil for the Corn Belt region. The authors split the measure across 14 specific 
categories that benefit from reduction in soil erosion. Their dollar-per ton soil value considers 
welfare improvements due to (a) reservoir services(less sediment in reservoirs), (b) Navigation 
(shipping industry avoidance of damages from groundings), (c) water-based recreation (cleaner 
fresh water for recreation), (d) irrigation ditches (reduced cost of removing sediment and  aquatic 
plants from irrigation channels), (e) road drainage( ditches less damage to and flooding of roads), 
(f) municipal water(lower sediment removal costs for water-treatment plants), (g) flood 
damages(reduced flooding and damage from flooding), (h) marine fisheries(improved catch rates 
for marine commercial fisheries), (i) freshwater fisheries (improved catch rates for freshwater 
commercial fisheries), (j)marine recreational(increased catch rates for marine recreational 
fishing), (k)municipal & industrial water use (reduced damages from salts and minerals 
dissolved from sediment), (l) steam power plants (reduced plant growth on heat exchangers), (m) 
soil productivity(reduced losses in soil productivity), and (n) dust cleaning (decrease in cleaning 
due to reduced wind-borne particulates). 
The per ton soil erosion reduction was valued at $2.77 (in 2000 $) for the Corn Belt 
region. We adjust this value by excluding $1.01 due to soil productivity, $ 0.01 due to freshwater 
                                                 
95 We thank Calvin Wolter for providing us with this data. 
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fisheries, $0.18 due to municipal water treatment. The soil productivity is pure private benefit, 
while the last two categories will be partially captured while valuing the water quality 
improvement by their use value. This will save us from double counting problem in the valuation 
of ecosystem services (Keeler and Polasky, 2012). The adjusted per ton soil value will give us 
offsite benefits from erosion reduction. The per ton soil value is multiplied with the measure on 
total reduced soil erosion obtained in equation (1) to obtain the total value of offsite soil benefits. 
It can be expressed as  
Value of Reduced Soil Erosionj = Reduced  Soil Erosion in tonsj ∗ $/ton.        (2) 
3.3 Quantification of benefits from wildlife and carbon sequestration  
Wildlife related benefits will mainly be derived from two practices, wetland creation and 
land retirement. We monetize the benefits by multiplying the treated by a measure of per-acre, or 
per household wildlife benefits obtained from a suitable study.   
Our monetization of carbon benefits from nutrient reduction practices exploit the Social 
Cost of Carbon (SCC) from EPA (2013)96. SCC is a $/ton measure that combines various 
damages including net agricultural productivity, human health, and property from a small 
increase in carbon dioxide.  Note that we choose the SCC estimated at 3% discount rate.97 We 
assume a homogenous rate of carbon sequestration across periods. To be consistent, when 
drawing the carbon sequestration rate by a practice from other studies, we focus on long term 
studies. To estimate the total carbon benefit from a practice j, we apply the following steps. 
Step 1: Estimate how many acres will be treated under practice j. 
Step 2: Use a low and high estimate on carbon sequestered per acre from suitable studies  
                                                 
96 SCC estimates are available at http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/EPAactivities/economics/scc.html (last 
accessed on May 20th, 2015). 
97 The SCC estimates are provided up to 2050, based on this we extrapolate SCC values up to 2063 to match with 
our project life. Note that the cost estimates in NRS are obtained assuming a 50 year project life. 
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Step 3: Compute yearly total carbon sequestered (CS) by practice j as 
𝐶𝑆𝑗 = 𝐶𝑆 per unit of land under practice 𝑗 ∗  Total Land Areas Under Practice 𝑗. 
Step 4: Construct the total monetary benefits (CB) from carbon sequestered by practice j  
            𝐶𝐵𝑗 = ∑ 𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝑆𝑗𝑡
2063
𝑡=2015 . 
Since social damage functions are of convex shape, SCC are increasing overtime. 
Step 5: Derive Equivalent Annual Carbon Benefits from Practice j assuming a 50-year project 
life.98 
Note that reduction of carbon and other GHG emission from the atmosphere incorporates 
global spatial benefits-the reduced damages from global warming will improve welfare 
worldwide.  To facilitate comparison and further analysis, we adjust the global monetized 
benefits from GHG reduction from each of the nutrient reduction practices in Iowa by Iowa’s 
share of the global population (3 million/7 billion).  
4. Benefits from Agricultural Conservation Practices 
We estimate the reduced amount of erosion and sequestered carbon due to the adoption of a 
practice. Next, we assign monetary values to those following the method laid out in section three.  
4.1 Benefits from construction of wetland  
According to NRS, each 1000 acres of land will be treated with a wetland comprising 10 
acres of pond and 35 acres of buffer surrounding the pond.  As Table 2 shows, based on 
scenarios, this will treat 14%-61% crop acres out of the total 28.4 million cropland acres and, 
0.17-0.4 million acres of cropland will go out of production. Note that eroded soils from all 
                                                 
98 We assume a 4% discount rate while spreading the total carbon benefit across 50 years. NRS assumes a 4% 
discount rate while estimating EAC. 
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treated acres that previously ended up in the lakes, streams, and rives are now trapped by the 
wetland. We consider the baseline soil erosion rate in all these treated acres to calculate the 
potential reduction. This implies that soil erosion will decrease by up to 40 million tons per year. 
The low and high values assume two different soil erosion rates, one from RUSLE 
estimates across all MLRAs in Iowa, which is 2.49 tons/acre, and another from Gleason et al. 
(2008), which is 4.45 tons/acre. For carbon sequestration, we choose the lower bound from the 
Gleason et al. (2008), which is 0.66 tons/acre/year and the upper bound of 0.95 tons/acre/year 
from Hansen et al. (2015). Yearly total carbon sequestered by the land converted into wetland 
lies in the range of 0.12-0.38 million tons. 
Table 3 presents the monetary value of the benefits from the constructed wetland acres. 
The value of the offsite benefits of reduced soil erosion ranges from $20 million to $84 million 
per year based on the scenarios considered. In contrast to the soil erosion benefits, the recreation, 
aesthetic, and wildlife viewing benefits are based on value estimates obtained from Azevedo, 
Herriges, and Kling (2000).99 They estimate the median Iowan household’s yearly WTP to be 
$2.76-$6.76(in 2013 USD) for the wetland services. We adjust this value for land size, 
normalizing with respect to the wetland acres under NCS8 that converts the maximum acres into 
wetland. Total benefits from recreation, aesthetic, and wildlife view can reach up to $8.36 
million under scenario NCS8. Finally, the GHG benefits from wetlands, considering only 
Iowans’ share, is small. However, the GHG benefits can increase by $27 million if we consider 
worldwide damages from sequestered carbon, and reduction in other GHG gases from the 
constructed wetlands in Iowa. Total benefits lie in the range of $22-$120 million, and the largest 
benefits are generated under scenario NCS3 when global GHG benefits are included. 
                                                 
99The recreation, aesthetic, and wildlife viewing benefits are calculated based on constructed wetland acres rather 
than the treated acres. 
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4.2 Benefits from cover crops 
Under two scenarios, NCS1 and NCS3, the strategy paper suggests that a total of 17-27 
million acres of land will be treated by cover crops during the fallow period. For the reduced soil 
erosion rate, the lower bound is based on RUSLE estimates based on Iowa, which is extremely 
conservative since the model only considers treating Corn-Soybean (CS) acres under no-tillage 
with cover crops. The rate will be much higher if conventional tillage and Corn-Corn (CC) acres 
are treated with cover crops. Although Kasper et al. (2001) reports from a study in central Iowa 
that in CC acres, cover crops can reduce the erosion by 2.9 tons/acre, we choose the more 
conservative upper bound of 0.89 tons/acre from Schipanski et al. (2014). The low and high 
bounds of yearly carbon sequestration rates from cover crops, 0.99 tons/acre and 1.24 tons/acre, 
are chosen from Gonzalez-Ramirez et al. (2014) and Schipanski et al. (2014).  
Table 4 reveals that cover crops can reduce soil erosion by up to 24 million tons per year 
and sequester carbon by up to 33 million tons per year under scenario NCS3. Table 5 presents 
the monetized value of reduced soil erosion and sequestered carbon. The annual offsite benefits 
from sequestered carbon and reduced erosion lie in the range of $23-$2440 million. If the lower 
bound on total benefits is considered, the majority of the benefit is coming through offsite 
benefits from reduced soil erosion. In contrast, 98% of the upper bound total benefit is derived 
from global GHG damage reduction. 
4.3 Benefits from land retirement 
The NRS considers land retirement under scenario NCS3. The plan is to retire 5% of the 
land currently under crop production, 1.14 million acres. The reduced soil erosion will come 
through two paths: (i) reduced erosion from the retired land, and (ii) soil trapped by this retired 
land from the surrounding land. We exclude the second path since we do not know the locations 
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of the retired acres as well as size of surrounding crop acres they will treat.  The RUSLE 
estimate, based on all MLRAs in Iowa, suggests an erosion reduction of 3 tons/acre assuming 
that lands under extended rotation will be converted into energy grasses (Miscanthus or 
Switchgrass). Note that this is conservative because the erosion rate in the row crop acres 
without extended rotation can be much higher, and we exclude sediment trapped from 
surrounding acres. The upper bound estimate is 4.45 tons/acre, drawn from Gleason et al. (2008). 
The carbon sequestration rates of 0.58tons/acre and 0.66 tons/acre are chosen from Gonzalez-
Ramirez et al. (2014) and Gleason et al. (2008) respectively. Note that the upper bound we 
choose at 0.66 tons/acre is actually the lower bound reported in Gleason et al. (2008) for PPR 
region. As Table 6 shows, land retirement can reduce soil erosion by 3-5 million tons per year. 
The retired land sequesters carbon in the range of 0.66-0.75 million tons in every year. 
Table 7 reports the monetized benefits from land retirement. The offsite benefit from 
reduced soil erosion amounts to $7-$11 million. The per acre recreation value of $72.71, chosen 
from Hansen et al. (2007), suggests that 1.14 million acres of retired land will offer a recreation 
and hunting benefit of $83 million. This estimate from Hansen et al. (2007) is conservative since 
it considers a limited set of recreation and hunting options in the CRP land. Finally, total local 
carbon benefits is 0.02 million, but the global benefits can be as high as $54 million. The total 
benefit is in the range of $90-$147 million.   
4.4 Benefits from buffers 
In one scenario, NCS8, the NRS includes a practice that 70% of all agricultural streams 
will have a vegetative buffer on each side of the streams that are not currently buffered. The 
buffers will be 35 feet wide and will cover 44,768 miles of agricultural streams (Table 14, NRS). 
Similar to land retirement, we only consider soil erosion prevented from the 0.4 million acres 
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converted into buffers, and not the amount of soil erosion trapped from other acres. The rates on 
soil erosion and sequestered carbon are chosen from the same sources as we followed for the 
land retirement acres except the upper bound on carbon sequestration rate, which is chosen from 
the upper bound for wetland acres. Note that the buffers adjacent to the streams might sequester 
carbon at the same rate as the wetlands.  
Table 8 shows that this practice will convert 380,000 acres of cropland into buffers. The 
soil erosion will be reduced by up to 1.7 million tons per year. The yearly sequestered carbon 
will range from 0.22 to 0.36 million tons. The monetized offsite benefits from reduced soil 
erosion, as reported in Table 9, will lie in the range of $2.26-$3.6 million. The local carbon 
benefit is marginal but the global benefit can increase up to $26 million. The total benefits lie in 
the range from $2.27-$29 million. 
4.5 Benefits from reduced tillage 
Conservation tillage is a widely adopted practice as it is very effective in reducing sediment 
transported phosphorus loss from the field. In example scenario NCS8, the NRS includes 
reduced tillage practice as follows: 
(i) Convert 90% of Conventional Tillage CC and CS Acres into Conservation tillage: 
This will convert 7.66 million CC and CS acres of land (out of 8.5 million acres) 
currently under conventional tillage into conservation tillage. 
(ii) Convert 10% of Non-no-till CC and CS Acres into No-till: Out of the total 16.2 
million crop acres, which are currently under conventional or conservation tillage 
practice, 1.62 million acres will switch into no-till practice.  
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The RUSLE estimates, based on all MLRAs in Iowa, provide potential reduction in soil 
erosion for each type of change in tillage practice. Switching from conventional to no-till will 
reduce erosion by 2.48 tons from each treatment acre, while the erosion rate will fall by 1.45 tons 
per acre for switching from conventional to conservation tillage. The upper bound estimate is 
chosen from Zhaou, Al Kaisi, and Helmers (2009): for switching from conventional to 
conservation tillage (no-tillage), 2.7 tons/acre/year (3.05tons/acre/year) less soil will be eroded.  
For carbon sequestration we choose the estimates from USDA (2010) and Gonzalez-Ramirez 
(2014). The former reports a rate of 0.33 tons/acre/year for switching from conventional to 
conservation tillage and 0.64tons/acre/year for switching to no-till, while the latter reports an 
estimate for Iowa. The carbon is sequestered at the rate of 0.81 tons/acre for switching from 
baseline scenario to no-tillage system. 
Table 10 shows the effects from reduced tillage practice. This can reduce soil erosion by 
15-26 million tons in each year. Approximately 3.5-3.9 million tons of carbon will be 
sequestered in every year. Table 11 shows the total monetary benefit from reduced tillage lies in 
the range of $32.11-$329 million. The carbon benefit is relatively large because a large number 
of crop acres will be treated with either conservation tillage or no-till practices.   
4.6 Benefits from nutrient application at MRTN rate 
The NRS has considered several nutrient management options to ensure more efficient 
use of nitrogen and reduce nitrate loss through leaching and runoff. The practices are (a) to limit 
application of fertilizers to the Maximum Return to Nitrogen Rate (MRTN) - the rate of nitrogen 
application that maximizes the profit from crop production, (b) nitrification inhibitor that slows 
down the release of nitrogen in the field, and (c) sidedress-changes the timing of fertilizer 
application by application of Nitrogen N to the plant at the time when needed most. The MRTN 
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has the potential to reduce nitrous oxide emission. In the following section, we will quantify the 
benefits from MRTN. 
The strategy paper reports that the estimated average nitrogen application (commercial 
fertilizer and manure) to corn in a corn-soybean rotation is 151 lb/acre while the application rate 
is 201 lb/acre to corn in continuous corn in Iowa. Assuming a corn price of $5/bushel and a 
nitrogen price of $0.5/bushel, the MRTN for corn following soybean is 133 lb-N/acre and 190 
lb/acre for corn following corn. The implication is that all MLRAs where the current rate is 
higher than this will have to adjust N application to follow MRTN. Application of the MRTN 
rate to all continuous corn and corn-soybean acres in Iowa would reduce nitrate-N loading by 
28,000 tons/year, all of which can be attributed to reduced N fertilizer application. Adopting the 
biophysical relationship between nitrogen application and nitrous oxide emission from IPCC 
(2010) and Millar (2006) as the low and high bound, we calculate that MRTN adoption will 
reduce GHG emission by 1.14-5 ml Mt per year. As Table 12 reports, the implied benefit for 
Iowa from such a reduction in GHG emission can reach up to $0.15 million per year. However, 
the global GHG benefits can be as high as $353 million per year. Note that since a fixed MRTN 
rate is assumed, the benefits amounts do not vary across the scenarios. 
4.7 Ecosystem services not quantified 
The nutrient reduction practices included in the NRS will offer several other ecosystem 
services that we are not able to quantify due to lack of required information. Ecosystem services 
that are expected to stem from agricultural conservation practices but are missing in our analysis 
includes: pollination services, pest control, endangered species protection, wildlife habitat, and 
flood control among others.   
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Natural pollinators are critical to agriculture. Natural pollinators, such as insects and 
birds, add a value of US$ 190bl/year to agriculture and almost 15-30% of the average US diet 
depends on pollination services. The value of pollination services from honeybees is estimated in 
the range of $8-$16.4 billion while that from native bees is around $3.1 billion (Losey and 
Vaughan 2006).  Availability of wild pollinators are in sharp decline and managed honeybees are 
exhibiting a high death rate since 2007. Pollinator habitat and health is jeopardized due to factors 
including monoculture cropping practices, natural pollinator habitat decline and fragmentation, 
pesticide and herbicide use, pests and migratory beekeeping practices (Ehmke et al. 2015).  The 
conservation practices under Iowa NRS will improve the pollinators’ habitat. In-field practices 
such as reduced tillage and cover crops will provide more floral resources, buffers and wetlands 
provided they include flowering strips, and retiring land from crop to CRP acres will improve 
habitat for pollinator services. 
Valuation of pollinators’ services is difficult to quantify due to three key missing links (i) 
the production function between pollinators and agricultural yield, (ii) evaluation of agricultural 
practices on pollinators’ health, and (iii) societal values (people value pollinators for non-market 
reasons such as existence, floral and arboreal services, and biodiversity). 
Following the same reasons, it is difficult to assign a monetary value to endangered 
species protection benefits. Based on literature search, Hansen et al. (2015) report that there are 
76 wetland related endangered vertebrate species, but note the lack of a biophysical model to 
assess the value of imperiled species protection from wetland. Land retirement provides habitat 
for many threatened and endangered species which are difficult to quantify due to inadequate 
data (Sullivan 2004). Wildlife habitat and flood control are two additional services whose 
benefits are difficult to quantify, and those are left to future studies. 
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5. Water Quality Benefits 
We consider three direct use values of improved water quality in this section. For the 
valuation purpose, we consider 131 major lakes in Iowa. Figure 2 shows the exact locations of 
these lakes in a map. When water quality improves due to the nutrient reduction strategy, 
recreationists from all over the state and residents living close to those lakes are expected to 
benefit directly. Similarly safe drinking water supply will be less costly due to reduced nutrients 
and sediments in the raw water. The three benefits we consider here were not included in the 
calculation of offsite benefits from per ton soil erosion reduction.100 
5.1 Water quality benefits to local homeowners 
We estimate the aesthetic value of water quality improvement to residents near major 
lakes in Iowa.  To do so, we link the Iowa water quality database (Limnology Lab at Iowa State 
University)101 with a meta-analysis (Ge, Kling, and Herriges 2013) on lake-adjacent households’ 
willingness to pay for improved water quality, and adjacent property counts across the major 
lakes.  
Step 1: Convert the raw water quality measurements of turbidity, dissolved oxygen, PH value, 
total nitrate and total phosphorus into quantile values (q) for all major lakes in Iowa.  
Step 2: Calculate a water quality index from q values obtained from various water quality 
attributes using the National Sanitation Foundation water quality index formula, as follows: 
𝑊𝑄𝐼 = ∏ 𝑞𝑖
𝑤𝑖5
𝑖=1 , where 𝑤𝑖 is the weight. The adjusted weight assumed in the above formula is 
reported in Table 13. 
                                                 
100 Note that in the previous section, while quantifying the offsite benefits from soil erosion reduction, the per-ton-
soil benefits incorporate several benefits from water quality improvement, such as reduced dredging, reservoir 
services, and industrial waste treatment. 
101 Retrieved at http://limnology.eeob.iastate.edu/lakereport/default.aspx 
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Step 3: Using the above formula, derive two water quality indices for pre-NRS and post-NRS 
water quality attributes. We utilized 2004 water quality attributes to derive pre-NRS water 
quality index. Following targets set in the NRS, we assume there will be a uniform 40% 
reduction in nitrogen and 30% reduction in total phosphorus in all lakes in Iowa.  We assume 
that other water quality attributes included in the formula (dissolved oxygen, pH value, and 
turbidity) will remain unchanged to obtain a lower bound estimate of the water quality index 
based on the NRS. Due to this nutrient reduction plan, the average water quality index in 131 
lakes in Iowa will improve from 72.07 to 73.74. In short, average water quality index will at least 
increase by 1.68 once the nutrient reduction plan is adopted. Table 15 incorporates summary 
statistics on water quality changes due to NRS. 
Step 4: Based on initial and improved water quality indices, we calculate the annual WTP per 
household per year for the proposed water quality improvement using the value function 
estimated for hedonic studies in the meta-analysis by Ge, Kling, and Herriges (2013). Only 
hedonic studies are included because we are considering that only households owning homes and 
living near the lakes will benefit from the locally improved water quality.  
WTP = −2.67 ∗ Initial Water Quality + 4.48 ∗ ∆WaterQuality + 27.94 ∗ NortheastDummy
+ 287.23 ∗ (Lake Dummy) + 4.69 ∗ (Publicationdate) + 284
∗ (InPersonDummy) − 0.01 ∗ (Income) + 78.96 ∗ (TotalValueDummy)
+ 212.50 ∗ Improvement Dummy − 208.04 ∗ ladderDummy +  277.26
∗ CVDummy +  217.88 ∗ HedonicDummy + 0.06 ∗ SiteSize –  0.004
∗ RegionSize 
In the above equation, while deriving the hedonic values we assume  NortheastDummy = 1, 
Lake Dummy = 1,  Publication Date = 40(year 2010), InPerson Dummy =
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0, TotalValue Dummy = 0,  Income = 50,000, Improvement Dummy = 1, Region Size =
100 Square Miles, Ladder Dummy = 0, Site Size = 10 Square Miles, CV Dummy = 0,  
Hedonic Dummy = 1, RegionSize = 100 square miles around the lake. 
Estimates from the above equation will translate the water quality changes into monetary 
values. The equation above implies that for a 1.67 point improvement in water quality, the 
average WTP per lakefront property per year is $655.27. Table 14 adds implied WTP for the 
improved water quality.  
Step Five: We know the point location of each of the lake in Iowa. Extracting information from 
different sources that combine GIS and population censuses, we count the total number of 
housing units within half mile and one mile radius of each lake. Table 15 provides a breakdown 
of housing units by sources.  
Step Six: We consider two radius distances, half mile and one mile, to obtain a lower bound and 
upper bound in count of housing units.  Note that these counts are conservative since we are 
considering only residences near 131 lakes for which we have data from the Iowa Lakes Project, 
and we exclude a large number of housing units located near other lakes, and all rivers including 
the two major rivers, Mississippi and Missouri river. In our sample, 35 % of the lakes do not 
have any housing units within a half mile while 24% do not have any housing within a one mile 
radius from the lake. The value of the improved water quality for each lake is derived by 
multiplying the total number of housing units by mean willingness to pay obtained for that lake, 
as described in step five. The value of water quality improvement to local residents from the 
Iowa NRS is at least in the range of $14.6-$35.4 million in 2013 USD. The six most benefitted 
lakes from appreciation in aesthetic value are West Okoboji Lake, Saylorville Lake, Coralville 
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Lake, Storm Lake, Easter Lake and Clear Lake. The total aesthetic benefits accrued by residents 
surrounding these lakes are at least $1 million.  
5.2 Recreation benefits 
The cleaner water resulting from NRS will benefit outdoor recreationists who use the 131 
lakes included in Iowa Lakes Project. To estimate the size of this benefit, we perform welfare 
analysis adopting the reveled preference method and utilizing the detail demographic and lake 
usage data from random household surveys conducted under the Iowa Lakes Project.102 
Step One: We first convert the nitrate and phosphorus reduction from Iowa nutrient reduction 
strategy into a representative water quality measure. Following Egan et al. (2009), we consider 
secchi depth as a key measure of water quality. We utilize the baseline data from 130 lakes in 
Iowa to estimate the relationship among secchi depth, total nitrate, and total phosphorus with the 
following regression specification 
𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑖 = 1.69 + 0.0166 ∗ 𝑇𝑁 − 0.004 ∗ 𝑇𝑃. 
This translates the reduction of 42% nitrate and 30% phosphorus into corresponding change in 
secchi depth.  
Step Two:  Based on the baseline and predicted change in secchi depth, we employ a Random 
Utility Model to calculate the compensating variation under both linear and log specifications. 
The welfare estimates, as reported in Table 16, suggest that water quality improvement would 
generate recreation benefits in the range of $5-$22 million dollars. 
                                                 
102 The modelling part for this section is done by Yongjie Ji, Postdoc Research Associate at CARD 
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5.3 Water quality and drinking water treatment costs 
Drinking water in Iowa is obtained mainly from three sources: (i) groundwater from deep 
shallow wells, (ii) surface water from rivers, lakes, and reservoirs, and (iii) shallow groundwater 
that are under direct influence of surface water. In Iowa, approximately 90.3% of the total 3.05 
million Iowans are served by public water supplies while the remaining 9.7% are served by 
private water systems. Although 92% of Iowa’s water supply system uses groundwater as the 
primary source, approximately 45% Iowans are served by public water systems which collect 
source water from (ii) and (iii). Agricultural runoff carrying pollutants, such as nitrogen and 
phosphorus, often end up in lakes, streams, and rivers and contaminate the surface water. In 
addition, since nitrogen is highly mobile and soluble, it leaches easily through soil structure to 
reach drainage water systems, groundwater, and aquifers. The extent to which agricultural 
nitrogen contaminates groundwater depends on soil structure, surface and bedrock geology, 
especially soil crust and permeability.    
5.3.1 Implication of nutrient reduction strategy for safe drinking water in Iowa 
One direct benefit of improved water quality from Iowa Nutrient Reduction Strategy will 
be passed through to the drinking water treatment plants. Reduced nitrogen and phosphorus 
levels in the streams and rivers will reduce nitrate removal cost for the treatment plants drawing 
source water from streams, lakes and rivers.  
Excessive nitrogen in water can cause blue baby syndrome. EPA regulates the maximum 
level of allowable nitrogen in drinking water, which is 10 milligrams per liter (mg/L). Even a 
nitrogen level of 2.5 mg/L in drinking water, much lower than the EPA recommended level, is 
associated with high risk of thyroid cancer (Ward et al. 2010). Phosphorus is responsible for 
algal blooms that make water smell bad and have dire consequences for aquatic life, human and 
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animal health. Cyanobacteria, blue green algae, produces cyanotoxins which have negative 
health consequences. Further, while treating water for algae with chemical disinfectants various 
disinfectants byproducts are generated that may cause cancer, birth defects, and damage the 
DNA (Naidenko, Craig, and Nils 2012; Villanueva et al. 2007).  
An EPA assessment showed that between 1998-2005, 17% of Iowans were served with 
drinking water with nitrate levels above the recommended level. Total 250 public water supplies 
(PWS) were at risk of high nitrate contamination (Naidenko, Craig, and Nils 2012). In 2013, 125 
PWS failed to comply with at least one health-based standard, affecting 10% of Iowans (Iowa 
DNR 2014). Most of these violations are related to coliform bacteria, and nitrate level. EWG’s 
National Drinking Water Database based on 2004-2008 data showed that 50 water supply 
utilities in Iowa were violating the trihalomethanes or haloacetic acid standard, exposing around 
62000 people (Naidenko, Craig, and Nils 2012). Examining 32 lakes in Iowa that were then used 
as source water by water treatment utilities, EWG found that 94% of the samples were detected 
with cyanobacteria at levels much higher than the recommended level by World Health 
Organization (WHO).  
Drinking water utilities face significant cost from treating pollutants including nitrate and 
phosphorus that are directly caused by agricultural practices.  Ribaudo et al. (2011) estimated the 
annual nitrate removal cost from drinking water sources across the US to be $4.8 billion, out of 
which agricultures’ contribution is 1.7 billion dollar. The study implies that a 1% reduction of 
nitrate concentration in the source water would save $175 million per year. Naidenko, Craig, and 
Nils (2012) compile information on nitrate treatment and management costs. The water facilities 
cope with high nitrate levels in source water in several ways: by blending high nitrate wells with 
low nitrate wells , or shutting down wells if nitrate levels are high, building a nitrate removal 
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facility, construction of holding ponds that will remove nitrates in natural way, and reverse 
osmosis of ground water. The reported per household construction cost of ion exchange and 
reverse osmosis systems for treating nitrate in drinking water can vary between $400-$1000 
while the cost for drilling a new well can vary between $300-$400. The process of treating water 
for cyanotoxins is complex and highly expensive; the installation cost of a treatment facility to 
serve 100,000 people can vary from $4.4million to $56.6 million and annual operating costs can 
range from $0.5-$5.6 million (Naidenko, Craig, and Nils 2012).103  
Private water wells are not subject to EPA regulatory limit. GEOSAM database records 
that there are currently 40,325 private water wells in Iowa.104 Approximately 12% of Iowa’s 
private water wells were detected with nitrate level above 10mg/L (University of Iowa Center for 
Health Effects of Environmental Contamination 2009). Keeler and Polasky (2014) provides an 
estimate of nitrate removal costs from private wells. Assuming that the least cost method of 
reverse osmosis will be adopted for nitrate treatment in drinking water, the cost to bring nitrates 
at least to the EPA level is $1790-$6160 per well, which is equivalent to $120-$414 per year.105. 
The cost of avoidance behavior, captured by purchase of bottled water for consumption, ranges 
in $241-$723 per individual per year.  
 The studies discussed above shed some light on the external cost of agriculture on 
drinking water treatment costs. If 17% of Iowans served by PWS are still experiencing high 
nitrate levels in their drinking water, the Naidenko, Craig, and Nils (2012) estimates on reverse 
osmosis systems for nitrate removal suggest an avoidance cost estimate of $84-$210 ml.  If 12% 
                                                 
103 In a high agricultural county, Fairmont, Minnesota, where 95% of land are under row crops, the cost for 
establishing a 5.4 million gallon per day treatment facility that will serve around 100000 people and treat source 
water for algal blooms, disinfection byproducts, and bad taste is $31.8 million.  
104 GEOSAM, Iowa Geological Survey. Available at http://geosam.iihr.uiowa.edu/search 
105 They assume a 20-year project life and 3% discount rate 
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of Iowa’s 40,325 private wells still exhibit nitrate levels above 10mg/L, the Keeler and Polasky 
(2014) setting suggests that the total cost for Iowa will be $8.7-$30 ml.  
5.3.2 Case Study on Des Moines Water Works  
Des Moines Water Works is the largest municipal water treatment plant in Iowa, and 
provides water supply to 0.5 million Central Iowans. Its three treatment plants are Fleur Drive 
Treatment Plant with a capacity of 100 million gallons per day (MGD), L.D. McMullen 
Treatment Plant at Maffitt Reservoir with a capacity of 25 MGD, and Saylorville Water 
Treatment Plant with a capacity of 10 MGD. The raw water at the Fleur Drive Plant comes from 
the Des Moines River, Raccoon River, and a Shallow Gallery system(a series of underground 
pipes located throughout Water Works Park next to the Raccoon River), where water must be 
pre-treated to remove sediment, organic matter and nitrate level.  High nitrogen problem is 
common in all three sources at Fleur Drive Plant. Recently they have encountered similar nitrate 
problems in wells at McMullen plant. Based on the nitrate level on the source water, the system 
responds by switching from one river to the other, by maximizing use of the infiltration gallery 
system, using water stored in reservoirs, or adjusting production at the L. D. McMullen and 
Saylorville Water Treatment Plants. However, these ground water sources are reserved for high 
demand times and emergency conditions.  
When the nitrate level is high, and the demand cannot be met by switching across plants 
and reservoirs, the facilities have to run their nitrate removal system. It has 8 vessels that are 
used to remove nitrate from source water, to bring it down to the EPA recommended level of 
10mg/L. The treatment facilities did not have to run these vessels at all during the 2011-2012 
time period. With the rise in nitrate level, in 2013 these vessels were operated for 74 days, 28 
days in 2014, and all 26 days till January till 26th in 2015. The average cost per day for running 
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this nitrate removal system is $7000. Facing a consistently high level of nitrate in Des Moines 
and Raccoon River and the resulting high treatment cost, DMWW has blamed agricultural 
discharge from the upstream. The debate on the impact of agriculture on water quality has been 
ignited once DMWW sued three counties for transporting N fertilizer into the river through tile 
drainage. An extract from DMWW website- “A major conduit of nitrate pollution in the 
Raccoon River watershed is the artificial subsurface drainage system infrastructure, such as 
those created and managed by drainage districts. Des Moines Water Works recently filed a 
federal complaint against the Boards of Supervisors of Sac County, Buena Vista County, and 
Calhoun County, in their capacities as trustees of 10 drainage districts, for the discharge of 
nitrate pollutants into the Raccoon River”106.   
The DMWW, being the largest municipal water treatment facility, has experienced an 
increase in the cost of nitrate treatment due to upstream water pollution. This has implications for 
other similar or smaller water treatment plants. Note that based on an extensive empirical 
analysis, Ribaudo et al. (2011) suggests that there is economies of scale in nitrate abatement cost. 
To understand the implied benefit of 40% reduction of Nitrogen in Iowa’s waterways, we exploit 
information from Des Moines Waterworks (DMWW) to derive an estimate of abatement costs 
on treating drinking water for nitrate. The DMWW’s savings from nitrate abatement cost will 
provide a relevant benefit estimate for Iowa from NRS. Following is a description of how we 
accomplish this.107 
Step One: using daily data from January 1, 2012-January 26th, 2015 we predict the probability of 
treatment requirement based on the nitrate level in the Des Moines and Raccoon River, the total 
                                                 
106 Retrieved at http://www.dmww.com/about-us/announcements/clean-water-act-litigation-faq.aspx (last accessed 
on May 25th, 2015). 
107 We thank Michael J. McCurnin, P.E., Director of Water Production, Des Moines Water Works for sharing some 
of their production information.  
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water processed(demand and treated water), producer price index, if the other two treatment 
plants were operating, and  lag values of treatment. We estimate several specifications of the 
following binary model, and the results are reported in Table 17. 
Treatedd,m,t = Nitrogen Level in Des Moines Riverdmt +
                              Nitrogen Level in Raccoon Riverdmt +
                             Total Water Processedd,m,t +  Producer Price Indexmt +
                             Mcmullen Plantd,m,t + Saylorville Plantdmt + ∑ l. Treatedd,m,t
3
l=1 +
                             Unobserveddmt, 
where d, m, and t denote day, month, and year.  
Step Two: we consider specification IV as our preferred specification since it includes the 
dynamics and proceed based on the parameters obtained from this. The estimates suggest that the 
predicted probability of daily treatment is 14%. Based on the parameters obtained, we estimate 
the out of sample probability of treatment requirement if the mean nitrate level in the Des 
Moines River and Raccoon River falls by 40% due to the implementation of Iowa NRS. Panel 
(b) reports the results. This suggests that if the NRS is adopted, nitrate treatment requirement by 
DMWW will fall by 50%-100%. 
Step three: Based on actual total treatment days in 2013, 2014, and average of 2013-2015, and 
average nitrate treatment cost per day, we develop three baseline cost scenarios as reported in 
Table 18. The baseline cost of treatment ranges from $0.2-$0.5 million. The 50%-100% reduced 
abatement requirement for nitrate due to the adoption of NRS will be translated into a yearly cost 
savings of $0.1-$0.5 million. 
Step Four: The estimate above is obtained from the variable cost associated with operating the 
facility. The fixed cost of installing a nitrate treatment facility is $7-$183 million108. If we spread 
                                                 
108We gathered the replacement cost of nitrate removal facility from the following two sources.  
(i)http://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/money/agriculture/2015/05/14/water-works-nitrates-lawsuit/27331305/ 
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this over 50 years, with a discount factor of 4% the equivalent annual cost will be $0.14-$3.7 
million. Currently DMWW serves around 16% of the Iowa population. Assume that absent the 
NRS Iowa’s surface and groundwater will eventually need treatment. We simulate the implied 
cost savings when 50% of Iowans need to have their drinking water treated. The estimated 
benefits, as reported in Table 19, range from $0.24 to $13.1 million per year. 
The estimate derived from this case study is conservative since it considers only nitrate 
removal costs for one large municipality. Due to data limitations, we have not considered many 
other small treatment utilities which are experiencing similar problems, where the cost of 
abatement is much higher due to economies of scale. We do not include nitrate related health 
damages since nitrate levels below EPA recommended level still might have health implications. 
In addition, other nutrient removal costs, including that for cyanotoxins, chlorophylls, and bad 
smell, are not considered. Finally, the welfare cost of high nitrates in private wells are not 
included. 
6. Comparison across Conservation Practices in terms of Benefits 
Figures 3 to 5 shows the total benefits from reduced soil erosion, increased wildlife 
habitat, and carbon sequestration by conservation practices under each example scenario 
considered. Since SCC is calculated based on global damages, we translate the global carbon 
benefit into a local benefit by weighting the SCC by the share of 3 million Iowans’ in 7 billion 
                                                 
(ii) http://www.dmww.com/upl/documents/water-quality/lab-reports/fact-sheets/nitrate-removal-facility.pdf (last 
accessed on May 19th, 2015). 
 
 
The construction cost incurred by DMWW for the nitrate treatment facility in 1990-1991 was $4.1, which is $7 
million at 2013 US$ value.  
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global population. That means when we are considering Iowan’s share only, we are assigning a 
lower value to SCC.  Under scenario NCS1, almost 65-70% of the benefits derive from wetlands, 
and another 30-34% from cover crops when local carbon benefits are considered. In this case, the 
MRTN’s share is negligible. However, when we include the global carbon benefit and thus 
assign a higher value of carbon sequestration, cover crops’ contribution to the lower bound of 
total benefit rises to 95%. This is because of the large amount of carbon sequestered by 17 
million acres under cover crops in scenario NCS1. MRTN’s contribution in total benefit reaches 
5%. 
Under scenario NCS3, when local carbon damage is considered, 5% of the retired land 
contributes to 48-60% of the total benefit. Similar contributions from cover crop acres and 
converted wetland acres are respectively 19%-24% and 12%-15%. However, when global 
damage from carbon is considered, cover crops’ and MRTN’s share in total benefit shows a 
sharp rise. Under scenario NCS8 with local carbon benefit, a larger share in total benefits comes 
from wetlands and tillage practices. However, when the global carbon benefit is considered, the 
lion’s share of total benefit is taken up by reduced tillage practices, which is mainly because of a 
large coverage of acres under reduced tillage practice. 
Tables 20 and 21 report total benefits by ecosystem services under each of the scenarios 
including benefits from improved opportunities for water-based recreation, local lake-adjacent 
housing values, and drinking water purification. Note that these three ecosystem services do not 
vary across scenarios since they are derived for a uniform reduction of 40% N and 29% P that is 
achieved under one of these three scenarios. The monetary benefit figures in Table 21 are 4-19 
times larger compared to those in Table 20, which is mainly because of the higher carbon value 
assigned in the former case.  Assuming a local carbon damage, the largest monetary benefits are 
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derived from conservation practices included under NCS3 that lie in the range of $163-$246 
million. The combined benefits under NCS1 in low and high scenarios are approximately 50% 
and 26% lower compared to those under NCS3. Finally, the combined benefits from low 
scenario under NCS8 are 34% lower compared to similar benefits under NCS3.  
7. Conclusion 
This study evaluates the potential external benefits from a number of agricultural 
conservation practices included under the Iowa Nutrient reduction strategy 2013. The estimation 
method follows a benefits transfer approach and excludes private benefits from the analysis. 
Besides the direct benefit of reduced nutrients in Iowa’s waterbodies, these practices generate a 
large amount of benefits through other ecosystem services including reduced soil erosion, 
reduced carbon in the atmosphere, enhanced wildlife, and increased biodiversity. Iowans’ 
welfare will improve from these ecosystem improvements through increased opportunities for 
outdoor recreation, aesthetic values of improved water quality, better quality for drinking water, 
and reduced greenhouse gas emission, among others.  
The yearly aggregate monetary values for Iowans from these ecosystem services range from 
$88-$257 million. However, the benefit estimates are conservative for a number of reasons. First, 
we took a conservative approach when selecting values from the literature concerning rates of 
carbon sequestration, reduced soil erosion, and the monetization of ecosystem services using 
benefits transfer. Due to lack of supporting studies we could not include many benefits, such as 
pollinators, existence value associated with water quality and wildlife, biodiversity and 
endangered species protection etc. In addition, we focus exclusively on the benefits to be accrued 
to Iowans. We have not included the benefits to be accrued at the Gulf from improved aquatic 
life and reduction of the hypoxic zone. Inclusion of such benefits will make the actual benefit 
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estimates larger. To put it in context, out estimates reveal that including the global benefits from 
additional carbon sequestered in Iowa can make the total benefit estimates 4 to 19 times larger.  
The success of Iowa nutrient reduction strategy largely depends on farmers’ adoption of 
targeted management practices at the field level. Incentives and payment vehicles may be 
necessary to incentivize them to participate in the program. However, since the source of funds is 
most likely to be public, to ensure the optimum use of public tax money in incentivizing nutrient 
management practices requires attaining the highest benefit per unit of money spent. In this 
regard, a detailed in-depth analysis of benefits derived from this strategy is imperative. The 
findings from this research will inform policymakers and stakeholders across the state and help 
them better understand the tradeoffs involved in policies that encourage conservation. 
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Note:  A, B, and C stand for clarification of whether a valuation has been conducted here. A: Valuation at least partially undertaken here, B: 
Valuation is possible but not undertaken, C: Valuation is not undertaken due to lack of Data.  
Figure 1: Link between Conservation Practices, Ecosystem, and Ecosystem Services 
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Source: CARD, Iowa State University 
Figure 2: A Map with Major Lakes in Iowa
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Figure 3: Benefits from Soil Erosion Reduction, Wildlife, and Carbon Sequestration by 
conservation Practices under Scenario NCS1 
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Figure 4: Benefits from Soil Erosion Reduction, Wildlife, and Carbon Sequestration by 
Conservation Practices under Scenario NCS3 
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Figure 5: Benefits from Soil Erosion Reduction, Wildlife, and Carbon Sequestration by 
Conservation Practices under Scenario NCS8 
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Table 1: Three Scenarios Combining Practices to Achieve Nutrient Reduction Target 
 
 
S
c
e
n
a
ri
o
s   
Nitrate 
N 
 
Phosp
horus 
 
Initial 
Investment 
(million $) 
Total Equal 
Annualized 
Cost EAC 
(million 
$/year) 
Statewide 
Average 
EAC 
Costs 
($/acre) 
 
Practices Included 
%Reduction 
from baseline 
 
 
 
NCS1 
(i) MRTN Rate, 
(ii) 60% Acreage with Cover Crop 
(iii) 27% of ag land treated with   
wetland 
(iv) 60% of drained land has 
bioreactor 
 
 
 
42 
 
 
 
30 
 
 
 
3,218 
 
 
 
756 
 
 
 
36 
 
 
 
NCS3 
(i) MRTN Rate, 
(ii) 95% of acreage with Cover 
Crops 
(iii)34% of ag land in MLRA 103 
and 104 treated with wetland, 
(iv)5% land retirement in all 
MLRAs 
 
 
 
42 
 
 
 
50 
 
 
 
1,222 
 
 
 
1,214 
 
 
 
58 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NCS8 
(i) MRTN Rate, 
(ii) Inhibitor with all Fall 
Commercial N, 
(iii) Sidedress All Spring N, 
(iv)70% of all tile drained acres 
treated with bioreactor, 
(v)70% of all applicable land has 
controlled  drainage, 
(vi) 31.5% of ag land treated with a 
wetland, 
(vii) 70% of all agricultural streams 
have a buffer 
Phosphorus  reduction practices: 
( i)convert 90% of Conventional 
Tillage CS & CC acres to 
Conservation Till and 
(ii)Convert 10% of Non--No‐till CS 
& CC ground to No-‐Till 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
42 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
29 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4,041 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
77 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
Source: Table 5 in Iowa NRS. *EAC stands for Equal Annualized Cost (50 year life and 4% discount rate) and 
factors in the cost of any corn yield impact as well as the cost of physically implementing the practice. 
Average cost based on 21.009 million acres, of Corn-Corn and Corn‐Soybean Rotation. 
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Table 2: Soil Erosion Reduction and Sequestered Carbon by Wetland Acres 
 
Scenarios Treated Acres of Land by wetland 
 
Total 
converted 
wetland acres 
 (ml acres) 
Reduced Soil 
Erosion 
(ml tons/year) 
Total sequestered 
carbon  
(ml tons/year) 
  Million 
acres 
 Low High Low High 
NCS1 27% of all Agricultural 
Land in all MLRAs 
 
17 
 
0.34 
 
19.09 
 
 
34.10 
 
 
0.23 
 
0.33 
NCS3 34% of Agricultural 
Land in all MLRA 103 
and 104 
 
4 
 
0.17 
 
9.69 
 
 
17.30 
 
 
0.12 
 
0.17 
NCS8 31.5% of all 
Agricultural Land in 
all MLRAs 
 
9 
 
0.40 
 
22.27 
 
 
39.78 
 
 
0.27 
 
0.38 
Note: Carbon Sequestration is calculated following the similar manner as that for soil erosion. Similarly, 
total carbon sequestration= Total treated acres*Per Acre carbon Sequestration. 
 
 
Table 3: Monetary Value of Benefits from the Wetland Acres 
 
  Offsite 
Benefits from 
Reduced Soil 
Erosion 
($ ml/year) 
Recreation, 
Wildlife View, 
Aesthetic 
($ ml/year) 
Value of Sequestered Carbon or 
Reduced GHG Emissions 
 
Total Benefits 
($ ml/year) Iowans’ share 
($ ml/year) 
Global Benefits 
($ ml/year) 
  Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High 
NCS1 40.46 72.29 2.87 7.16 0.01 0.01 23.23 23.41 43.35 102.86 
NCS3 20.53 36.68 1.46 3.63 0.01 0.01 27.10 27.31 22.00 67.63 
NCS8 47.21 84.34 3.35 8.36 0.01 0.01 27.10 27.31 50.57 120.00 
Note: The lower and upper bound of the total benefits is calculated respectively including lower bound on 
Iowan’s share in GHG benefits and upper bound on global GHG benefits. 
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Table 4: Soil Erosion Reduction and Sequestered Carbon by Cover crop Acres 
 
Scenarios Treated Acres of Land by 
Cover Crops  
( million acres) 
Reduced Soil Erosion 
(million tons/year) 
Sequestered Carbon 
(million tons/year) 
      Low High Low High 
NCS1 60% of all 
Agricultural Land 
17.03 10.35 15.15 16.86 21.11 
NCS3 95% of all 
Agricultural Land 
26.96 16.39 23.99 26.69 33.43 
NCS8 N.A. - - - - - 
 
 
Table 5: Monetary Value of Benefits from the Cover Crop Acres 
 
  Offsite Benefits 
from Reduced 
Soil Erosion 
($ ml/year) 
Value of Sequestered Carbon or 
Reduced GHG Emissions 
 
Total Benefits 
($ ml/year) Iowans’ share 
($ ml/year) 
Global Benefits 
($ ml/year) 
  Low High Low High Low High Low High 
NCS1 21.95 32.13 0.64 0.65 1501.28 1508.85 22.59 1540.98 
NCS3 34.75 50.87 1.02 1.02 2377.03 2389.01 35.77 2439.88 
NCS8 - - - - - - - - 
Note: The lower and upper bound of the total benefits is calculated respectively including lower bound on 
Iowan’s share in GHG benefits and including upper bound on global GHG benefits. 
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Table 6: Soil Erosion Reduction and Sequestered Carbon from Acres under Land Retirement 
 
Scenarios Acres of Land to be Retired 
( million acres) 
Reduced Soil Erosion 
(million tons/year) 
Sequestered Carbon (million 
tons/year) 
   Low High Low High 
NCS1 N.A. - - - - - 
NCS3 5% of Agricultural 
Land 
 
1.14 
 
3.20 
 
5.07 
 
0.66 
 
0.75 
NCS8 N.A. - - - - - 
 
 
Table 7: Monetary Value of Benefits from the Retired Acres 
 Offsite Benefits 
from Reduced 
Soil Erosion 
($ ml/year) 
Recreation, 
Wildlife View, 
Aesthetic 
($ ml/year) 
Value of Sequestered Carbon or 
Reduced GHG Emissions 
 
Total Benefits 
($ ml/year) 
Iowans’ share 
($ ml/year) 
Global Benefits 
($ ml/year) 
 Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High 
NCS1 - - - - - - - - - - 
NCS3 6.79 10.76 82.89 82.89 0.02 0.02 53.61 53.77 89.71 147.42 
NCS8 - - - - - - - - - - 
Note: The lower and upper bound of the total benefits is calculated respectively including lower bound on Iowan’s 
share in GHG benefits and upper bound on global GHG benefits. 
 
 
 
 
Table 8: Soil Erosion Reduction and Sequestered Carbon from Acres under Buffers 
 
Scenarios Acres of Land to be 
Converted 
( million acres) 
Reduced Soil Erosion 
(million tons/year) 
Sequestered Carbon (million 
tons/year) 
     Low High Low High 
NCS1 N.A.  - - - - 
NCS3 N.A.  - - - - 
NCS8 70% of ag streams 
that are not 
currently buffered  
 
0.38 
 
1.07 
 
1.69 
 
0.22 
 
0.36 
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Table 9: Soil Erosion Reduction and Sequestered Carbon from Acres under Buffers 
 
  Offsite 
Benefits from 
Reduced Soil 
Erosion 
($ ml/year) 
Value of Sequestered Carbon or 
Reduced GHG Emissions 
 
Total Benefits 
($ ml/year) Iowans’ share 
($ ml/year) 
Global Benefits 
($ ml/year) 
  Low High Low High Low High Low High 
NCS1 - - - - - - - - 
NCS3 - - - - - - - - 
NCS8 2.26 3.58 0.01 0.01 25.55 25.80 2.27 29.38 
Note: The lower and upper bound of the total benefits is calculated respectively including lower 
bound on Iowan’s share in GHG benefits and including upper bound on global GHG benefits. 
 
 
 
 
Table 10: Soil Erosion Reduction and Sequestered Carbon from Conservation Tillage 
 
Scenarios Acres of Land to be 
Treated 
( million acres) 
Reduced Soil Erosion 
(million tons/year) 
Sequestered Carbon 
(million tons/year) 
     Low High Low High 
NCS1 N.A.  - - - - 
NCS3 N.A.  - - - - 
 
 
 
 
NCS8 
Convert 90% of 
Conventional 
Tillage CC and 
CS Acres to 
Conservation 
tillage 
 
7.66 
 
11.08 
 
20.83 
 
2.53 
 
2.53 
Convert 10% of 
Conventional 
Non-no-till CC 
and CS Acres to 
no-till 
 
1.62 
 
4.01 
 
4.93 
 
1.03 
 
1.31 
 Total 9.28 15.09 25.75 3.56 3.84 
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Table 11: Monetary Value of Benefits from the Conservation tillage 
 
  Offsite Benefits 
from Reduced Soil 
Erosion 
($ ml/year) 
Value of Sequestered Carbon or Reduced 
GHG Emissions 
 
Total Benefits 
($ ml/year) 
Iowans’ share 
($ ml/year) 
Global Benefits 
($ ml/year) 
  Low High Low High Low High Low High 
NCS1 - - - - - - - - 
NCS3 - - - - - - - - 
NCS8 31.99 54.60 0.12 0.12 273.86 274.35 32.11 328.94 
Note: The lower and upper bound of the total benefits is calculated respectively including lower bound on 
Iowan’s share in GHG benefits and including upper bound on global GHG benefits. 
 
 
 
Table 12: Reduced GHG Emission from MRTN, and Implied Benefits in $ 
Average Nitrogen application Reduced GHG emission by 
shifting to MRTN rate 
Value of Sequestered Carbon or 
Reduced GHG Emissions 
 Low: 
Applying 
IPCC(2006) 
Formula 
High: Applying 
Millar(2010) 
Formula 
Iowa’s Share 
($ ml/year) 
Global GHG 
Benefits 
($ ml/year) 
 Current  
Rate 
(lb/acre) 
Proposed 
MRTN 
(lb/acre) 
 
Mt-CO2 e/year 
 
Low High Low High 
CC 201 190 
 
262184 
 
1678299 
 
    
CS 151 133 1167170 4942465     
Total   1.17 ml 4.94 ml 0.04 0.15 83.41 353.19 
Method of Calculation 
We show the calculation of GHG benefits for switching to MRTN rate for CC adopting the numbers from 
Millar (2010). 
 
Carbon Emission under baseline: [(225.08*0.012*exp(0.00475*225.08))+1.47]*298*44/28= 4372.61 Kg 
CO2 e/ha/year 
Carbon Emission under MRTN: [(190*0.012*exp(0.00475*190))+1.47]*298*44/28= 3321.05 Kg CO2 
e/ha/year 
The GHG emission is reduced by (4372.61-3321.05 ) = 1051.56 Kg CO2 e/ha/year 
Total Corn-Corn Land in Iowa= 1596013 hector 
Total GHG emission reduction=(1596013*1051.56)/1000= 1678296.85 metric tons. 
IPCC’s linear formula is 1.47+(0.01*Fertilizer rate)*298*44/28.  
Note that Both linear and non-linear formula assumed 1.47 kgCO2 e/ha/year will be emitted under no 
nitrogen scenario. 
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Table 13: Weight assigned in construction of Water Quality Index 
Parameter Weight (adjusted) 
Dissolved Oxygen 0.3 
pH 0.2 
Total Phosphorus 0.18 
Total Nitrate 0.18 
Turbidity 0.14 
 
 
Table 14: Change in Water Quality and Iowan’s Willingness to Pay 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Water Quality Index Before the 
Plan 
130 72.07 12.85 34.21 90.21 
Water Quality Index After the Plan 130 73.74 12.13 35.04 90.31 
Change in Water Quality 130 1.68 1.53 0.07 6.08 
WTP(Hedonic) 130 655.27 38.27 599.81 752.46 
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Table 15: Information Sources Used to Extract Count of Total Housing Units near Lakes 
 
 Sources Total Number 
of Lakes 
Housing Units within 
Half mile 1 Mile 
a Parcel Data without property type information 3 2717 4936 
County Address Maps 68 16678 24644 
Parcel Data with property type info (Residential) 5 3516 8617 
Zillow and Google Maps 55 594 12396 
 Total 131 23505 50593 
b Missouri Census Data Center109 131 23462 49938 
 
 
 
Table 16: Compensating Variation in Iowa from Water Quality Improvement (in million $) 
Specification In million $ per year 
 NCS1 (42% less Nitrate 
and 30% less Phosphorus) 
NCS3 (42% less Nitrate 
and 50% less Phosphorus) 
NCS8 (42% less 
Nitrate and 29% 
less Phosphorus) 
Linear form 5.34 9.62 5.34 
Log form 13.89 22.44 12.7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
109 Source is Missouri Census Data Center, http://mcdc.missouri.edu/websas/caps10c.html (last accessed on July 
17th, 2015). We know the latitude and longitude of each lake. Providing this input on Missouri Census Data Center 
extracts information from the census on total counts of housing units within half mile and 1 mile radius from the 
lake border. 
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Table 17: Nitrate Level in Source Water and Probability of Treatment 
 I II III IV 
 Both River One River Both River One River Both River One River Both River One River 
Nitrate Level in DSM 
River 
0.684*** 0.591*** 0.268 0.165 0.352* 0.287 0.489** 0.500** 
(0.07) (0.06) (0.16) (0.16) (0.17) (0.16) [0.18] [0.17] 
Nitrate Level in Raccoon 
River 
-0.086*  -0.083  -0.089  0.007  
[-0.038]  [-0.078]  [-0.088]  [0.034]  
Lag of Nitrate Level in 
DSM River 
  0.418** 0.456** 0.484** 0.515**   
  [0.146] [0.151] [0.159] [0.158]   
Lag of Nitrate Level in 
Raccoon River 
  0.017  0.062    
  [0.077]  [0.091]    
Treated Water (DD + 
Reserve adjustment) 
0.045*** 0.045*** 0.044*** 0.044*** 0.092*** 0.093*** 0.037* 0.037* 
[0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.015] [0.015] [0.018] [0.018] 
Producer Price Index 0.127*** 0.119*** 0.128*** 0.123*** 0.169*** 0.166*** 0.153 0.154 
[0.022] [0.024] [0.025] [0.028] [0.035] [0.036] [0.085] [0.084] 
McMullen Plant     -0.092* -0.092* -0.042 -0.042 
    [-0.036] [-0.036] [-0.066] [-0.065] 
Saylorville Plant     -0.249* -0.253* -0.366* -0.367* 
    [-0.126] [-0.123] [-0.156] [-0.156] 
1st Lag of Treatment 
Indicator (Yt-2) 
      8.236*** 8.284*** 
      [-1.063] [-1.067] 
2nd Lag of Treatment 
Indicator (Yt-2) 
      -5.724*** -5.777*** 
      [-1.098] [-1.096] 
3nd Lag of Treatment 
Indicator (Yt-3) 
      1.685** 1.687** 
      [-0.554] [-0.557] 
Constant term -26.95*** -25.84*** -27.25*** -26.57*** -35.34*** -34.93*** -29.42* -29.58* 
[-3.569] [-3.814] [-4.115] [-4.419] [-5.787] [-5.943] [-13.41] [-13.283] 
N 879 897 763 788 763 788 878 896 
Model Statistics 
pseudo R-square 0.70 0.70 0.69 0.69 0.72 0.73 0.95 0.95 
AIC 225.44 227.84 220.65 219.13 202.80 199.82 53.18 51.18 
Panel b: what will be the probability of treatment requirement in a certain day? 
 
Predicted Probability 
( In Sample) 
0.14 0.14 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.14 
Out Of Sample 
Prediction 
(40% Nitrate Reduction) 
0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.001 0.001 0.070 0.068 
% Change -96.60 -96.74 -96.89 -96.99 -99.44 -99.46 -50.41 -50.90 
 
Updating Lag with initial Value at 0      0.000 0.000 
% Change       -99.99 -99.99 
 
Updating Lag with initial Value at mean=0.14     0.003 0.000 
% Change       -97.98 -99.98 
Note: Standard errors in brackets. Significance level can be read as * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
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Table 18: Estimated Cost Savings from Reduced Abatement Requirement of Nitrate 
 
 
Baseline Cost Scenarios 
Saving  In treatment Costs 
2013 
(73 Days) 
2014 
( 28 days) 
Average 
2012-2015 
(26 Days) 
$518000 $196000 $240722 
 
How the lag values were assessed 
while deriving change in probability 
of treatment requirement for nitrate 
% Change in Nitrate 
Treatment Requirement  
Saving  In treatment Cost compared to Baseline 
2013 2014 Average  of 
2013-2015 
Dynamic Model: Both River 
Realized value of lag -50.41 $257,573.36 $98,795.26 $91,738.46 
Update the lag initial value  at 0 -99.99 $510,932.07 $195,973.95 $181,975.81 
Update the lag initial value at (Mean 
=0.14) 
-97.98 $500,657.93 $192,033.18 $178,316.52 
Dynamic Model : Des Moines River Only 
Realized Value of Lag -50.90 $260,073.64 $99,754.27 $92,628.97 
Update the lag Initial value  at 0 -99.99 $510,928.84 $195,972.71 $181,974.66 
Update the lag initial value 
(Mean=0.14) 
-99.98 $510,921.47 $195,969.88 $181,972.03 
 
 
 
Table 19: Drinking Water Treatment Benefits from Nutrient Reduction 
 If Customers of DMWW 
(16% Iowans) are 
affected 
 
If 50% of Iowans are 
affected 
 
 Min Max Min Max 
Operational Cost 0.09 ml 0.51 ml 0.29 ml 1.6 ml 
Fixed Cost in $ 
(Equalized annual cost) 
0.14 ml 3.7 ml 0.44 ml 11.5 ml 
Annual Benefit in 2013 $ 0.24 ml 4.2 ml 0.73 ml 13.1 ml 
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Table 20: Breakdown of Total Benefits by Conservation Practices and Ecosystem Services 
(Carbon Benefits are Local) 
Categories NCS1 NCS3 NCS8 
  Low High Low High Low High 
Wetland 40.46 72.29 20.53 36.68 47.21 84.34 
Cover Crops 21.95 32.13 34.75 50.87   
Buffers     2.26 3.58 
Tillage     31.99 54.60 
Land Retirement        
MRTN 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Reduced Soil Erosion 62.41 104.42 55.29 87.55 81.46 142.52 
Wetland 2.87 7.16 1.46 3.63 3.35 8.36 
Cover Crops 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00   
Buffers       
Tillage       
Land Retirement   82.89 82.89   
MRTN 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Recreation and Wildlife 2.87 7.16 84.35 86.53 3.35 8.36 
Wetland 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Cover Crops 0.64 0.65 1.02 1.02   
Buffers     0.01 0.01 
Tillage     0.12 0.12 
CRP   0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 
MRTN 0.04 0.15 0.04 0.15 0.04 0.15 
Total Carbon Benefit 0.69 0.81 1.09 1.21 0.18 0.29 
Benefits from 40% reduction in Nitrate N and Phosphorus in Iowa’s Waterbodies 
Water Based Recreation  5.34 22.45 5.34 22.45 5.34 22.45 
Residential Amenity 16.50 35.40 16.50 35.40 16.50 35.40 
Drinking water Purification 0.24 13.10 0.24 13.10 0.24 13.10 
Total 88.06 183.34 162.81 246.24 107.08 222.12 
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Table 21: Breakdown of Total Benefits by Conservation Practices and Ecosystem Services 
(Carbon Benefits are Global) 
 
Categories NCS1 NCS3 NCS8 
  Low High Low High Low High 
Wetland 40.46 72.29 20.53 36.68 47.21 84.34 
Cover Crops 21.95 32.13 34.75 50.87   
Buffers     2.26 3.58 
Tillage     31.99 54.60 
Land Retirement       
MRTN 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Reduced Soil Erosion 62.41 104.42 55.29 87.55 81.46 142.52 
Wetland 2.87 7.16 1.46 3.63 3.35 8.36 
Cover Crops 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00   
Buffers     0.00 0.00 
Tillage     0.00 0.00 
Land Retirement   82.89 82.89   
MRTN 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Recreation and Wildlife 2.87 7.16 84.35 86.53 3.35 8.36 
Wetland 23.23 23.41 27.10 27.31 27.10 27.31 
Cover Crops 1,501.28 1,508.85 2,377.03 2,389.01   
Buffers     25.55 25.80 
Tillage     273.86 274.35 
Land Retirement   53.61 53.77 0.00 0.00 
MRTN 83.41 353.19 83.41 353.19 83.41 353.19 
Total Carbon Benefit 1,607.92 1,885.45 2,541.15 2,823.28 409.92 680.65 
Benefits from 40% reduction in Nitrate N and Phosphorus in Iowa’s Waterbodies 
Water Based Recreation  5.34 22.45 5.34 22.45 5.34 22.45 
Residential Amenity 16.50 35.40 16.50 35.40 16.50 35.40 
Drinking water Purification 0.24 13.10 0.24 13.10 0.24 13.10 
Total 1,695.28 2,067.98 2,702.86 3,068.32 516.81 902.47 
 
 
 
 
 
